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In 2011, Korea ratified the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS-FTA). This treaty remains 
controversial in Korean society, particularly because many Koreans claim that the indirect 
expropriation doctrine under investor-state arbitration in the investment chapter will allow global 
investors to challenge governmental regulation justified by the Korean constitution. Despite such 
criticism, the KORUS-FTA indirect expropriation doctrine and the Korean constitutional property 
doctrine share more than might be expected in practice. However, this substantive doctrinal 
convergence between national and global legal systems does not eliminate all risks of conflict 
between the nation-state and global investors; conflicts can occur whenever two actors interpret the 
same text differently. Once an investment dispute happens, independent investor-state arbitration 
reviews governmental action according to independent interpretative rules.  
 
Systems theory suggests that nation-states can turn such global challenges into opportunities by taking 
contextual control over global investment in relying on the global investment legal system of the 
global investment regime. The nation-state can convince global investors that the nation-state respects 
transnational investment mechanisms, whilst indirectly imbuing norm-making with minimum 
national interest without incurring serious damage to its reputation. To be specific, the nation-state can 
attract more foreign investors by accepting the indirect expropriation doctrine and the investor-state 
arbitration respected by global investors. Simultaneously, the nation-state can secure minimum 
control over global investment under legitimate regulatory power reflected in the same indirect 
expropriation clause. In addition, the nation-state can guide the investment tribunal to secure a balance 
between investment protection and the regulatory power of the host state by prescribing the 
proportionality principle. Contextual control can be a sub-optimal choice for the nation-state in the 
sense that it avoids a worst-case scenario by securing proportionality and predictability.  
 
In order to make this measure more effective, the current global investment legal system needs to 
secure more commensurate autonomy or autopoiesis by furthering simultaneous and balanced 
structural coupling with a greater variety of social powers. In this context, global constitutionalism 
provides national constitutional tools for the nation-state; specifically, democratic participation in 
national treaty-making procedures and autopoietic structuralisation of the investment arbitration 
mechanism can make the substantive contents and application of global investment law fairer and 
more acceptable, not only to global investors and strong states, but also to social movements and 
smaller countries. In the context of the KORUS-FTA, the Korean government needs to make the 
treaty terms of indirect expropriation clearer through democratic participation. At the same time, the 
Korea should pay attention to making arbitration process reflexive to more various social interests, 
whilst protecting its operation from inappropriate influences. Such measures can prevent KORUS-
FTA tribunals from making extremely unacceptable decisions to actors of the global investment 
regime, including the Korean government, although they could not guarantee ideal decisions that 
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE KORUS-FTA  
This thesis examines how the nation-state can utilise a national and global constitutional 
mechanism to manage the challenges of the global investment field and to expand the relevant 
opportunities. In particular, the thesis proposes some Korean alternatives for dealing with indirect 
expropriation concerns under the investor-state arbitration mechanism of the Free Trade Agreement 
between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America (hereafter ‘KORUS-FTA’). 
Although the Korean government has established a strategic policy to conclude many free 
trade agreements (hereafter ‘FTA’s) and bilateral investment treaties (hereafter ‘BIT’s), the Korean 
people have not paid enough attention to FTA-related issues.1 Korean trade policy makers have 
pursued many of these FTAs in a bid to increase Korean investor access to foreign markets and 
attract foreign investment into Korea.2 Since 2003, Korea has had an FTA policy road map; while 
participating in the WTO regime, Korea signed a series of ‘exploratory’ FTAs with Chile and 
Singapore which were not expected to have serious negative impacts on Korea’s main industries or 
legal system.3 Those FTAs did not  receive much public  attention at  the time due to the fact  that  
trade with those countries did not represent a significant portion of Korea’s overall foreign trade. 
                                               
1 While a BIT is a treaty that deals with investment issues, such as investment protection or dispute settlement, 
an FTA covers overall trade policies, such as customs or market openness. In practice, FTAs are prescribed in 
many different ways; many recent FTAs include a traditional BIT, but others do not. In this thesis, an FTA is 
an international agreement that includes an investment treaty, unless otherwise defined.  
2 The Korean government has concluded 8 FTAs since signing the first FTA with Chile in 2003. So far, the 
Korean government is in negotiation with over 50 countries to secure further FTAs. See Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade Republic of Korea, ‘FTA Status of Korea’ 
<http://www.mofat.go.kr/ENG/policy/fta/status/overview/index.jsp?menu=m_20_80_10> accessed 15 April 
2012 (explaining the FTA status of Korea). 
3 See generally Wonhyuk Lim, ‘KORUS FTA: A Mysterious Beginning and an Uncertain Future’ (2006) 
30(4) Asian Perspective pp.175-77; Nakryoon Choi and Hongshik Lee, A Sectorial Assessment of a Korea-US 
FTA and Policy Implications for the Korean Economy (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 




Despite some negative impacts on agriculture, there was no significant discussion about FTA 
concerns because the Korean economic structure was already dominated by the manufacturing and 
service sectors. Moreover, the Korean people expected losses in the agricultural industry to be 
balanced out by gains in the manufacturing industry. In addition, neither the Korean government 
nor Korean investors have ever been involved in investment arbitration under the FTAs or BITs.4  
Korean policy makers viewed these exploratory FTAs as having been mutually beneficial.5 
As a result, the Korean government has sought FTAs with major countries like Japan and the 
United States to promote economic prosperity and stabilise national security.6 Based on the 
experience of Korea’s exploratory FTAs, the government announced the launch of the KORUS-
FTA negotiations. Notably, KORUS-FTA proponents estimated that the positive impact of the 
KORUS-FTA would be incomparable to that of previous FTAs, since trade between Korea and the 
U.S. makes up a significant proportion of Korea’s total foreign trade. The Korean and U.S. 
governments finally concluded the KORUS-FTA in 2007 after around 14 months of negotiations. 
After nearly four years of legislative discussion, the U.S. Congress gave its final consent to the 
treaty in October 2011; the Korean National Assembly followed suit in November 2011.7 The 
KORUS-FTA has been officially in effect since 15 March 2012. 
II. GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO THE KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM  
The Korean governing party railroaded the KORUS-FTA’s approval through the National 
Assembly8 despite some Koreans’ warning that it would restrict regulatory powers exercised in the 
                                               
4 In 1984, Colt Industries Operating Corporation submitted a legal claim to the ICSID arbitration panel against 
the Korean government. However, this claim was based not on a BIT or an FTA but on a dispute over 
technical and licensing agreements for the production of weapons. The parties agreed to settle and to 
discontinue the proceedings. See Colt Industries Operating Corporation v. Republic of Korea, ICSID No. 
ARB/84/2. 
5 In the case of the Korea-Chile FTA, KOTRA (Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency) analyzed that 
the bilateral trade volume was increased by 454% (from $1.6 billion to $7.2 billion) within five years of the 
conclusion of the FTA. See KOTRA, Achievement and Issues of Korea-Chile FTA (KOTRA, 2009). 
6 Lim (n 3) pp.178-79.  
7 Article 24.5.1 of the KORUS-FTA requires the signatory states to complete the relevant legal requirements 
and procedures, such as legislative approval and establishment of implementation laws, in order to bring the 
treaty into force.  
8 Representative Sundong Kim of the Democratic Labour Party sprayed tear-gas in the chamber in order to 
stop the surprise vote of the KORUS-FTA. See Myo-ja Ser, ‘KORUS FTA Ratified in Surprise Vote’ Korea 
Joongang Daily (23 November 2011) 
<http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2944540&cloc=rss|news|joongangdai




public interest and guaranteed under Korean constitutional law.9 A Korean progressive left-wing 
party and various critical activist groups are consequently insisting on the renegotiation and 
termination of the KORUS-FTA. These opponents to the KORUS-FTA have accentuated the 
potential harm of many so-called ‘poisonous clauses’ which could force the Korean government to 
give in to American social and economic interests under the pretext of maintaining a stable Korea-
US relationship. In relation to these ‘poisonous clauses’, this thesis focuses on the indirect 
expropriation clause as one of the contentious legal aspects of the KORUS-FTA. Although many 
Korean critical scholars and civic groups have taken up slightly different positions as to what these 
‘poisonous clauses’ are, most of them seem to agree that the indirect expropriation doctrine presents 
the greatest potential threat to future Korean public policy planning in many areas.10  
As Chapters II and III of this thesis explain, indirect expropriation under the KORUS-FTA 
entails an action or series of actions by the host state11 that have ‘an effect equivalent to direct 
expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure’.12 Here, international investment 
lawyers have experienced many doctrinal difficulties in clearly discerning between mere restriction 
and restriction that causes ‘an effect equivalent to direct expropriation’.13 This doctrinal ambiguity 
has led the opponents of the KORUS-FTA to point out that this substantive norm could emerge as 
one of the most serious threats to the Korean public authorities in the treaty.14  
These indirect expropriation concerns cannot be fully understood without analysing a 
unique procedural aspect of the KORUS-FTA: the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism. 
This thesis therefore discusses issues of investor-state dispute settlement in relation to indirect 
expropriation concerns. Since the 1960s, the international investment field has developed an 
unconventional type of dispute settlement, known as investor-state arbitration. Traditionally, there 
                                               
9 See generally Gi-Bin Hong, Invest-State Claim (Nogsaekpyeongnonsa, 2006) (regarding the critical points 
of view on the KORUS-FTA). 
10 ibid pp.63-86; Hae-Young Lee, ‘Carefully Selected 11 Poisonous Clauses of the KORUS-FTA’ (2011) 
<http://h21.hani.co.kr/arti/economy/economy_general/30589.html> accessed 15 April 2012. In fact this clause 
was one of the most controversial issues in the negotiation of the KORUS-FTA. See Choi and Lee (n 3) p.216. 
11 This means the state where the foreign investment is made under the investment treaty. 
12 Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America (KORUS-FTA) 
Annex 11-B.3. See also Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in 
International Law’ (1982) 176 Recueil des Cours pp.322-54; Rudolf Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriation of Alien 
Property’ (1986) 1(1) ICSID Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal (regarding a classical understanding of 
indirect expropriation). 
13 OECD, ‘“Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law (Working 
Papers on International Investment No. 2004/4)’ (2004) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf> 
accessed 15 April 2012. 
14 Sang Hie Han, ‘Constitutional Analysis on the Expropriation Clause of the KORUS FTA’ (2007) 9 Sugang 




have been two main ways for foreign investors to ask for compensation for damages caused by the 
host state on the basis of an investment treaty. Firstly, a foreign investor could submit a legal claim 
to a public court of the host state; alternatively, the home state15 could bring a claim on behalf of its 
investors to state-to-state arbitration. By contrast, the contracting parties to the treaty consent to 
delegate the power of conflict resolution to an independent tribunal, through which an individual 
investor can raise a direct claim against the host state. This system is different from national conflict 
resolution in the sense that the independent tribunal reviews the case without any legal or political 
bias in favour of the host state. Additionally, a peculiar feature of this form of dispute settlement is 
that an individual is entitled to submit a claim without consultation with the home state. If the host 
state fails in establishing a successful defence against the investor before the tribunal, it assumes 
liability for the payment of damages.16 
Under the KORUS-FTA mechanism, the indirect expropriation doctrine, combined with the 
investor-state dispute settlement mechanism, carries the risk of discouraging constitutionally 
justifiable regulation by the Korean government.17 Indeed, almost all government regulation of 
investment carries the possibility of negative effects on property. In such cases, the Korean 
Constitutional Court consistently recognises the social obligation of the investor to tolerate such 
negative effects as long as they are proportional to the public interest pursued.18 On the other hand, 
international investment law has been blamed for the chaotic development of indirect expropriation 
jurisprudence over the last two decades.19 In particular, some tribunals under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (hereafter ‘NAFTA’) have not paid due attention to legitimate regulatory 
power in expanding the concept of indirect expropriation. Consequently, foreign investors have 
abused this rule to freeze many constitutionally justifiable government actions, like environmental 
protection, by arguing that those regulations would have adverse effects regardless of the intentions 
of the host states.20  
                                               
15 This refers to the state from which the investor originated under the investment treaty. 
16 See generally Zachary Douglas, ‘The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2004) 74(1) 
British Yearbook of International Law. 
17 Han (n 14) pp.60-93. 
18 10-2 KCCR 927, 89Hun-Ma214, 90Hun-Ba16, 97Hun-Ba78, December 24, 1998. 
19 See generally Anne K. Hoffmann, ‘Indirect Expropriation’ in August Reinisch (ed) Standards of Investment 
Protection (Oxford University Press, 2008) pp.151-55 (describing the current state of the indirect 
expropriation discussion). 
20  e.g. Public Citizen, ‘NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Cases: Bankrupting Democracy’ (2001) 





Many Korean critical commentators anticipate that the notorious experiences of the 
NAFTA  will  repeat  themselves  in  the  KORUS-FTA. 21  In this context, the stable future 
implementation of the KORUS-FTA depends on how accurately the challenges presented by the 
KORUS-FTA are analysed, and how those obstacles would be managed.  
III. UNPRODUCTIVITY OF CURRENT DISCUSSIONS ON THE KORUS-FTA  
Although many people are engaged in nationwide debate over the KORUS-FTA, the pros 
and cons of this treaty appear to be ideologically distorted in Korea. In fact, many negative Korean 
views about the KORUS-FTA seem to be associated with uncertain fears which derive from anti-
American or anti-capitalist sentiments. In this sense, the experiences of the Free Trade Agreement 
between the Republic of Korea, of the One Part, and the European Union and Its Member States, of 
the Other Part (hereafter ‘Korea-EU FTA’), and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
Agreement (hereafter ‘Korea-India CEPA’), provide meaningful references in assessing the 
unproductive state of the current KORUS-FTA discussion.  
The negotiation and conclusion of the Korea-EU FTA and the Korea-India CEPA began 
later than those of the KORUS-FTA. However, neither the Korea-EU FTA nor the Korea-India 
CEPA have faced any significant criticism, and both were approved by the legislature without any 
particular difficulty. Moreover, some Koreans consider the Korea-EU FTA to be a ‘less poisonous’ 
or even a ‘good’ FTA because it contains no indirect expropriation or investor dispute settlement 
clauses.22 However, the future of the Korea-EU relationship is expected to show a different picture 
as the pre-Lisbon Treaty framework in place at the time of the Korea-EU FTA negotiations did not 
then allow the EU authorities to deal with investment issues in FTA negotiation. However, the 
Treaty of Lisbon has now conferred competence on the EU authorities to deal with these 
investment issues and Korea and the EU can now therefore negotiate the establishment of a new 
BIT or add an investment chapter to the Korea-EU FTA in the future.23 Against this backdrop, 
                                               
21 e.g. Hong (n 9); Gi-Ho Song, Handbook of the KORUS-FTA: A Commentary of the KORUS-FTA for 
Government Officials (Noksaengpyeongnonsa, 2007). 
22  Hae-Yoeng Lee, ‘Why Are People Silent to KOREA-EU FTA?’ Midiaus (29 April 2009) 
<http://www.mediaus.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=6468> accessed 15 April 2012 (regarding a critical 
comment on this public attitude). 
23 Steffen Hindelang and Niklas Maydell, ‘The EU’s Common Investment Policy – Connecting the Dots’ in 
Marc Bungenberg, Joern Griebel and Steffen Hindelang (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic 
Law (Special Issue: International Investment Law and EU Law) (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011) 




indirect expropriation, combined with investor-state dispute settlement, will emerge as a 
controversial issue in the future discussion of the economic relationship between Korea and the EU. 
More interestingly, Koreans have not expressed strong opposition to the Korea-India CEPA, even 
though it does include clauses on indirect expropriation24 and investor-state dispute settlement.25  
Given these facts, it is difficult to find a persuasive reason why Korean activists now 
denounce the FTA with the United States after their long silence over other so-far concluded 
treaties.26 In this context, it might look circumstantially convincing to claim that vague fear, rooted 
in anti-American sentiment, has indeed produced negative opinions regarding the KORUS-FTA. 
This fear comes from Korea’s conventionally ambivalent attitude toward the U.S. Indeed, Korean 
people have expected various benefits from the Korean-US relationship, and have, at the same time, 
suffered a feeling of being victimized by the U.S. because Korea has experienced the unilateralism 
of the U.S. as a superpower. Additionally, fear and antipathy towards the expansive powers of 
global capitalism after the 2008 global economic crisis might have fuelled this negative attitude 
toward the KORUS-FTA.  
Taking advantage of these vague public concerns, some critical activists seem to exaggerate 
the potential harms of the investor-state arbitration mechanism. First of all, foreign investors tend to 
employ investor-state arbitration less often than KORUS-FTA opponents think. Although the 
investor-state arbitration framework was established in the 1960s, it was not until nearly two 
decades later that the first treaty-based claim was brought before an ICSID arbitration panel in 
1987.27 Since then, innumerable transactions and contracts have been made within the framework 
of over 2,600 BITs and FTAs around the world,28 whilst only around 390 cases have gone through 
the investment arbitration system by the end of 2010.29 In many of these cases, host states have 
been involved in disputes due to apparently malicious measures which are blamed on their 
relatively undeveloped legal systems. Given the state of Korean legal development, that many 
                                               
24 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (Korea-India CEPA) Article 10.12.1. 
25 ibid Article 10.21.  
26 The Korean government has established many BITs since the 1960s. 80 of all the effective 85 Korean BITs 
with other countries have provisions for investor-state dispute settlement. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade Republic of Korea, ‘Counterarguments against So-called “KORUS-FTA Poisonous Clauses”’ (2011) 
p.13 <http://www.fta.go.kr/new/ftakorea/korea_psd2_read.asp> accessed 15 April 2012. 
27 Asian Agricultural Products Limited v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 27 June 1990, Award 
and Dissenting Opinion, ICSID No. ARB/87/3. See also Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Law and Practice 
of International Commercial Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) pp.565.  
28  UNCTAD, ‘Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements’ (2009) p.2 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf> accessed 15 April 2012. 
29 UNCTAD, ‘UNCTAD IIL Issues Note: Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ (March 




claims would be raised under the KORUS-FTA, looks questionable. Additionally, a quantitative 
analysis  of  the  decade’s  experiences  of  the  NAFTA,  which  many  critics  consider  to  be  
characterised by damaging applications of ‘poisonous clauses’, shows that host states lose 
arbitrations relatively rarely. According to Jeong’s analysis, foreign investors won in only 6 of the 
18 cases decided under NAFTA arbitration between 1994 and 2008 – when the KORUS-FTA was 
heavily discussed in Korea.30 At minimum, it is an exaggeration to claim that investor-state 
arbitration necessarily works in favour of U.S. investors and U.S. interests. In reality, American 
investors have submitted 27 claims against the Canadian government and 18 against the Mexican 
government to NAFTA arbitration between 1994 and 2010. However, American investors have 
been successful in only 2 of 12 decided cases against Mexico and 3 of 10 decided cases against 
Canada.31  
As will be seen in Chapter III, many of the rules of the notorious NAFTA cases, which 
some critical commentators have heavily cited, have been challenged in the development of 
international investment law over the last decade.32 NAFTA jurisprudence presents only a part of 
international investment law, even if the doctrinal significance of the NAFTA cases cannot be 
completely ignored.33 Therefore, KORUS-FTA negotiators like other nation-states have attempted 
to follow the new trends in international investment law concerning indirect expropriation, rather 
than NAFTA jurisprudence.34 In addition, the wording of the KORUS-FTA incorporates more 
national legal doctrines than the other U.S. FTAs concluded before the 2004 U.S. Model BIT. As a 
result, the KORUS-FTA’s wording strives to induce the KORUS-FTA tribunal to take an approach 
similar to the Korean Constitutional Court, which respects the regulatory power of the host state as 
long as it is proportional to the public purpose of the relevant regulation. This is outlined further in 
Chapter II. Indeed, this proportionality approach concurs with the general direction of other recent 
investment arbitration practices.35 Although, as some Korean constitutional lawyers have noted, 
there are some doctrinal differences between Korean law and the jurisprudence of international 
                                               
30 Soo-Bong Jeong, Analysis on KORUS-FTA Investment Chapter (Ministry of Justice in Republic of Korea, 
2008) p.13. 
31 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Republic of Korea (n 26) p.15. 
32 UNCTAD, Expropriation, UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II (United 
Nations, 2011) pp.80-142 <http://archive.unctad.org/en/docs/unctaddiaeia2011d7_en.pdf> accessed 15 April 
2012 (mapping out the overview of indirect expropriation doctrine in the recent international investment law). 
33 UNCTAD, ‘Investor-state Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking’ (2007) pp.56-60 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20073_en.pdf> accessed 15 April 2012.  
34 ibid pp.75-76 (explaining the general trend of other states in drafting the expropriation clauses). 




investment law,36 there are more commonalities than differences in the sense that both systems 
share the same legal principles: balancing the protection of an individual’s property with the 
regulatory powers of a democratic government. At the very least, it is hard to say that the doctrinal 
differences between Korean national law and international investment law are so severe that all 
government actions are totally prevented.  
Nevertheless, KORUS-FTA proponents seem to overlook the fact that risk is a matter of 
probability. Despite the low probability of a risk, no one can guarantee that the risk will not occur, 
as long as there remains a structure through which it can do so. Indeed, nobody can be certain that 
the Korean government will not become embroiled in investment disputes under the KORUS-FTA. 
More significantly, the unforeseen occurrence of real problems can occur, whilst not in the 99% of 
usual circumstances, in 1% of unusual ones.  
In such unusual circumstances, the textual similarities between the Korean Constitution and 
the KORUS-FTA do not formally prevent foreign investors from challenging constitutionally 
justifiable government regulations – even if they could reduce the probability of disputes in practice. 
Although Korean government officials would take measures on the basis of their own interpretation 
of the KORUS-FTA, U.S. investors could submit a claim to KORUS-FTA arbitration based on a 
different interpretation of the same clause. Here, the problem is not only attributable to substantive 
discrepancy but also to the procedural aspects of investor-state dispute settlement. In any case, the 
nation-state under the KORUS-FTA cannot control the occurrence of disputes between the investor 
and the host state directly.  
Although only a small number of disputes have so far been resolved through the investor-
state dispute settlement process, international investment law is evolving quickly. The number of 
cases has increased significantly since the late 1990s with an eye-catching proliferation of BITs and 
FTAs.37 Even if the current jurisprudence of international investment law is deemed to be 
somewhat in accordance with Korean law, the interpretative gap between the Korean courts and 
investment arbitration could be broadened in the future. If so, nation-states cannot expect to control 
the global development of jurisprudence because it is constantly changing through a closed network 
of cross-references between investment arbitration decisions. 
                                               
36 e.g. Ha-Myoung Jeong, ‘The Meaning of “Expropriation and Compensation” at Proposed Korea-U.S FTA 
Text and the Government’s Police Power’ (2007) 8(3) Public Law Studies p.59. See also Seung Pil Choi, 
‘Several Matters on Public Law of U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement’ (2008) 36(3) Public Law pp.520-24 
(mapping out various opinion concerning the doctrinal affinity between the Korean constitutional property 
clauses and indirect expropriation provisions of the KORUS-FTA).  




More significantly, even just one lost case carries a risk of inflicting considerable harm 
because foreign investments usually involve hugely expensive long-term public projects. Of course, 
almost all awards produced by investment arbitrations are involved in pecuniary obligations in 
order to avoid any direct restrictions on the sovereign power of the nation-state. From a legal 
perspective, a responding state could continue a disputed policy as long as it could pay 
compensation to the claimant, because the illegality in international law does not necessarily affect 
legality under domestic law. However, de facto influences are often strong and enforceable enough 
to influence host states to follow the global investment rule rather than their own domestic 
constitutional doctrine. Host states usually attempt to reach a compromise or conciliation before or 
during proceedings of investment arbitration in order to avoid either the payment of massive 
compensation or damage to their investment reputation. In the course of such a compromise, the 
nation-state could promise the withdrawal of a certain government measures or regulations on the 
condition of a reduction in compensation due or the withdrawal of an investor’s submission to the 
arbitration institution. In Ethyl vs. Canada, the Canadian government gave up its ban on importing 
a gasoline additive into Canada, when the U.S. investor, Ethyl Corporation, indicated it would raise 
a claim for damages of $251 million on the grounds of the indirect expropriation clause. Eventually, 
the Canadian government promised to pay $13 million for legal fees and damages, and to issue and 
advertise a statement which declared that the methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl 
(MMT) had not been proven to be hazardous, so that the government could settle with Ethyl.38  
As a result, a host state can be compelled to follow international investment law in order to 
avoid the risk of investment claims. The attitudes of the nation-state, under the KORUS-FTA, could 
be explained by the so-called ‘regulatory chilling’ or ‘chilling effect’.39 Here,  whether  it  won or  
lost, a government’s involvement in arbitration would hinder its desire and ability to advance future 
proposals of social policy because of the uncertain risk of future claims. This effect might be more 
apparent in investment-importing countries like Korea; Korea is very sensitive to its bad reputation 
among investors which entails the risk of decreasing future foreign direct investment. Thus, under 
the KORUS-FTA, when the state attempts to establish regulations for public purposes, it might 
consider not only the domestic constitution but also the rules of international investment. 
                                               
38 Public Citizen (n 20) pp.8-10.  
39 Vicki Been and Joel C. Beauvais, ‘The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and 
the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine’ (2003) 78(1) New York University 
Law Review pp.132-35; Gonzalo Guzman-Carrasco, ‘Indirect Expropriation in U.S. Free Trade Agreements: 
From the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 and Beyond’ (2004) 4 Revista International Law pp.287-89; Jack J. Coe Jr 
and Noah Rubins, ‘Regulartory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case: Context and Contributions’ in Todd 
Weiler (ed) International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral 




Furthermore, if it looks questionable to the government whether the policies involved constitute 
expropriation, then the government would be more likely to abandon the relevant policies or take a 
less active position in order to circumvent claims for indirect expropriation.40 
IV. CONTRIBUTIONS AND QUESTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
This study aims to contribute to a productive discussion of the KORUS-FTA. Of course, the 
future of this agreement depends fundamentally on the Korean people’s political will. Nevertheless, 
it is questionable whether the risks and opportunities are being explained fully enough for the 
people to make a prudent decision over the KORUS-FTA. The global investment legal system, 
introduced by the KORUS-FTA, seems to provide appropriate challenges and opportunities for 
Korea as a nation-state. Nevertheless, its opponents and proponents seem either to overstate or to 
downplay the risks and opportunities of indirect expropriation and investor-state arbitration, 
according to their own political positions. It is undeniable that the treaty’s potential for harm could 
inflict enormous damage on Korean society. Nonetheless, it is too easy to claim that Korean policy 
makers  have  simply  been  captured  by  American  imperialism,  because  the  government  of  the  
United States is equally exposed to the risk of investment claims by Korean investors.  
Another important point is that a fair assessment of the risks and opportunities entailed 
cannot be completed without proposing convincing alternatives for dealing with the risks and 
                                               
40 Recently, the Korean government has withdrawn a pre-announcement of its intention to revise the 
Enforcement Rules of the Postal Savings and Insurance Act. The Korean press revealed that the government, 
in the process of collecting the opinions, received a letter of complaint from the American Chamber of 
Commerce in Korea (hereafter, AMCHAM Korea). The AMCHAM Korea argued that the new policy would 
shrink the private insurance industry and that the revision process has a risk of violation of the transparency 
clauses of the KORUS-FTA Article 13.11.9 and the relevant Confirmation Letter (Cross-Border Financial 
Services) because of the very short notice of the amendment (8 days). The Korean government stated that 
Korean insurance companies also had complained heavily about the amendment and the government plans to 
reintroduce a new proposal after allowing enough time to review it. Nevertheless, some people point out that 
the Korean government was implicitly influenced by the AMCHAM Korea piggybacking on the KORUS-
FTA. Although this is not directly related to the investment issues under the Chapter 11 arbitration, it implies 
that the investment protection under the KORUS-FTA could in the future impose an unseen burden so as to 
shrink the government actions in various areas. See Eun-Joo Jung, ‘AMCHAM Interferes in Domestic 
Policies through FTA’ The Hankyoreh (7 January 2012) 
<http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_business/513802.html> accessed 15 April 2012; Yonhap 
News Agency, ‘National and International Companies Challenging the Increase in Value Limitation on Sale 
of an Insurance Product by Korea Post’ Yonhap News (5 January 2012) 
<http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2012/01/05/0200000000AKR20120105064900017.HTML> 





opportunities. In other words, how can the Korean government attract foreign investment without 
any promise of adopting the global legal mechanism for investment protection? Conversely, despite 
the acceptance of the global investment legal system, is it possible for the nation-state to control 
foreign investors in accordance with national constitutional goals?  
The current situation of the KORUS-FTA discussion, combined with an ideologically 
distorted assessment of its risks and opportunities, seems to hinder any productive discussion of the 
KORUS-FTA. In this context, the most urgent task of this thesis is to analyse how the challenges 
and opportunities occasioned by the treaty will happen; specifically, whether the discrepancy 
between indirect expropriation under the KORUS-FTA and Korean constitutional property law is 
so unbearable as to thwart the major constitutional tasks of the Korean government. Next, why does 
the nation-state wish to accept indirect expropriation and investor-state dispute settlement despite 
the risk of disruption for the government’s policies? Lastly, if Korea were to accept the KORUS-
FTA, is there any national or global constitutional mechanism that would allow the Korean 
government to utilise the opportunities on the one hand and reduce – even if not eliminate – the 
possible risks on the other?  
V. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
In this context, Chapter II explains the structure of Korean constitutional property rights 
before Chapter III compares the concept of indirect expropriation under the KORUS-FTA with 
Korean property law at the level of substantive doctrines. Through this doctrinal comparison, 
Chapter III establishes that there are more commonalities than differences between the two legal 
precepts. At the same time, that chapter points out that an insuperable gap remains as a potential 
source of anxiety for the Korean government because of the peculiar nature of investor-state dispute 
settlement. Chapter III therefore implies that the substantive problems of indirect expropriation 
concerns cannot be successfully solved without some theoretical consideration of the procedural 
aspects of the KORUS-FTA. Chapter IV goes on to apply the framework of the global law of 
systems theory to the global investment field, so as to demonstrate the evolution of global 
investment law. This theoretical framework may help Chapter V to explicate the risks and benefits 
of encouraging the global investment law. Moreover, Chapter V assumes that today’s nation-states 
are caught in a global dilemma, where both direct intervention and non-intervention within the 
global investment field cause unexpected backlashes. Against this background, that chapter uses 




the global legal system creatively. Contextual control could allow the nation-state to attract foreign 
investment, on the one hand, and maintain a minimum scope of normative predictability over 
global investment within a controllable level, on the other. Chapter V therefore suggests several 
alternatives that the Korean government can consider from the perspective of national and global 
constitutionalism in order to reduce the risks of global investment law and extend its benefits. 
Chapter V will conclude that current global investment law has some flaws that preclude effective 
contextual control due to its lack of autonomy. Therefore, the global investment regime needs a set 
of institutional facilities that can protect its legal autonomy from unjustifiable economic or political 
impacts. This thesis will ultimately propose the global application of the traditional heritage of 
national constitutionalism, which attempts to protect legal autonomy from the inappropriate 











PROTECTION AND RESTRICTION OF PROPERTY IN THE KOREAN 
CONSTITUTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will contribute to Chapter III’s discussion of the similarities and differences in 
property protection and restriction between the KORUS-FTA and the Korean Constitution. As 
outlined in the introductory chapter, the indirect expropriation provision in the KORUS-FTA 
allows a foreign investor to raise a claim before investor-state arbitration where the investor alleges 
that the host state’s public policy causes an expropriation-like effect without full market value 
compensation in practice. Some Korean constitutional lawyers have argued that the Korean 
Constitution does not prescribe any concept similar to indirect expropriation.1 However, this does 
not mean that the two doctrines are based on very different legal contexts as regards property 
protection and restriction. Here, a comparative study between the two legal systems cannot be 
instructive as long as it focuses only on whether one concept, found in one legal system, also exists 
in the other system. Rather, this thesis proposes a practical approach towards examining how 
differently or similarly the two legal systems solve the same problem. In other words, can Korean 
property owners sue the government in a situation of indirect expropriation where a regulation for 
the public interest causes an expropriation-like effect? In such a case, would a Korean court review 
the case in a totally different way from a KORUS-FTA tribunal? 
In this regard, this chapter, as a preliminary discussion leading to Chapter III’s comparative 
analysis, aims to gain an overview of property protection and restriction in the Korean Constitution, 
based mainly on current court cases. Therefore, Part II provides a brief sketch of the social and 
legal backgrounds associated with Korean property rights. Then, Part III examines the 
                                               
1 e.g. Sang Hie Han, ‘Constitutional Analysis on the Expropriation Clause of the KORUS FTA’ (2007) 9 
Sugang Legal Studypp.60-93. 
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constitutional foundations of the property rights enshrined in the Korean Constitution. From Part IV, 
the chapter looks at the structural elements of Korean property clauses one by one. Part IV begins 
by examining the content-and-limits clauses associated with the social-obligation-based restriction 
of Article 23(1)’s second sentence and (2). Part V goes on to articulate the meaning of public 
interference under Article 23(3) of the Korean Constitution. Lastly, Part VI examines one of the 
most controversial issues in Korean property rights; namely, a structural relation between the 
social-obligation-based restriction of Article 23(1) and (2) and the public restriction of Article 23(3). 
This discussion plays a crucial role in guiding the Korean Constitutional Court to review the 
constitutionality of non-compensated regulations that restrict property in the public interest.  
II. SOCIAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUNDS IN RELATION TO KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
A.Tradition of strong state power 
Like other countries, Korea has a very complicated system of property rights that is 
influenced by its deep-rooted historical and social context.2 Initially, Korean constitutional settings 
were founded on a compromise between socialism and liberalism. After liberation from Japanese 
rule, nation-building discourse suffered from an extreme conflict between the political right and 
left.3 Against this backdrop, the constitution’s framers tried to find a middle way: ‘somewhere in 
between liberal free marketism and state socialism’.4  
Nevertheless, Korean constitutional practice had shown a tendency to support strong 
governmental regulatory power in restricting property rights. The wartime government of the 1950 
Korean War, and the authoritarian governments established by military coups of the 1960s and 
1980s, had exercised strong state-driven regulatory power. These regimes, which had come to 
power illegitimately, tried to gain public support by promoting rapid economic growth whilst 
                                               
2 A. J. Van der Walt, Constitutional Property Clauses: A Comparative Analysis (Juta, 1999) (explaining the 
complicated historical and doctrinal contexts of property law in other countries). 
3 See generally Young-Soo Chang, ‘Historical Implications of 1948 Enactment of Constitution’ (2008) 51 
Korea University Law Review; Yong-Ok Shin, ‘Korean Constitution Founders’ Drafts and Their Political 
Directions’ (2008) 51 Korea University Law Review. 
4 Byeong Cheon Lee, ‘Political Economy of Korean Development after Liberation: A Critical Reflection’ 




turning a blind eye to civil rights abuses and bureaucratic corruption. 5  Ironically, the 
accomplishments of illegitimate authoritarian rule gave birth to a legitimate democratic government. 
Economic improvement contributes to political liberty because the people, educated and 
awakened by economic prosperity, tend to become more interested in political issues such as 
distributive justice and human rights. The 1987 Democratisation Movement was fuelled by the 
1980 Gwang-Joo Massacre (where the military government killed and injured more than 5,000 
citizens) and the 1987 Great General Strike.6 Korea was eventually able to achieve both 
economic and political development by amending its constitution. 
Nevertheless, the judiciary has upheld broad governmental discretion over the restriction of 
property rights in the interests of social welfare. The 1987 Constitutional Amendment animated 
numerous constitutional rights which had previously been prescribed but never enforced. Despite 
the incorporation of a detailed bill of social rights into Korea’s previous constitutions, the 
commitment of the authoritarian military government to these rights extended no further than 
empty phrases for a long time. Indeed, this list of constitutional rights was seen as little more than a 
symbolic text allowing the government to defend itself against international pressure regarding 
human rights abuses. However, the newly-amended constitutional setting helped the Korean public 
to focus more on redistribution issues, which are related to the social rights enshrined in the Korean 
Constitution. Consequently, the people wanted the government retain the power to carry out its 
constitutional tasks, namely, in promoting distributive justice. The Supreme Court of Korea 
(hereafter ‘the Korean Supreme Court’) has upheld the constitutionality of many regulations 
restricting property rights without careful consideration of the issues. As will be discussed below, 
the Supreme Court with only cursory arguments found that non-compensated property restrictions 
imposed by government policy maintained constitutional proportionality between the constitutional 
requirement to fulfil social obligations and the suffering of property owners.7 
                                               
5 Sang Bum Han, ‘The Fundamental Human Rights and Korean Constitutional Government in 50 Years’ 
(1998) 5 Asia-Pacific Public Law Review pp.10-22. See also Moon-Hyeon Kim, Social- and Economic Order 
and Property (Beobwonsa 2001) pp.359-64; Byeong Cheon Yi (ed), Development Dictatorship and Park 
Chung Hee Era (Changbi, 2003); Dong-Myeon Shin, Social and Economic Policies in Korea: Ideas, 
Networks and Linkages (Routledge, 2003) pp.77-82 . 
6 Shin (n 5) pp.107-110; Sunhyuk Kim, ‘State and Civil Society in South Korea’s Democratic Consolidation: 
Is the Battle Really Over?’ (1997) 37(12) Asian Survey; Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics of Democratization in 
Korea: The Role of Civil Society (University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Samuel S. Kim, Korea’s 
Democratization (Cambridge University Press, 2003) (explaining the history of the Korean dictatorship and 
democratisation). 
7 e.g. Supreme Court of Korea Decision 89Bu2 Declared May 8, 1990; Supreme Court of Korea Decision 
94Da54511 Declared December 24, 1996.  
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B. Rethinking property protection in light of court structure and legal culture 
Recent changes in the socio-economic environment and the constitutional framework have 
challenged the aforementioned long tradition in relation to property right practices. The 1997 East-
Asian Financial Crisis (hereafter ‘the IMF Crisis’) forced the Korean government to accept a series 
of International Monetary Fund (hereafter ‘IMF’) recommendations regarding national economic 
policies. These IMF reform packages, influenced by neo-liberalism, dismantled a not-yet-fully-
developed social security safety net. The government moved from securing employment according 
to the IMF labour policy reform programme and began to increase the flexibility of the labour 
market.8 Some Koreans responded by arguing that the state had backed away from its previous 
interventionist approach to redistribution. Moreover, they accused the state of inefficiency. Instead 
of demanding social justice, the Korean people paid more attention to liberal economic rights to 
ensure that the national economy remained internationally competitive. As a result of the IMF crisis, 
a notable number of Koreans ceased to believe in the government’s capacity for social 
redistribution. 
This phenomenon could be understood in a social-psychological perspective. The 1997 
Korean financial crisis left Korean collective memory social-psychologically traumatised. Some 
Koreans still dub it ‘the second national humiliation’, second only to the Japanese colonial 
occupation of Korea in 1910; yet others call it the ‘IMF Curse’. To Koreans, the state means more 
than it might to Western people who have struggled for freedom against state authorities: the 
Korean image of the state is that of an authoritarian and compassionate father, symbolising both 
authoritarian pressure on the one hand and pastoral care on the other. Thus, Koreans panicked when 
the authority of the state collapsed before a global threat. This experience led to another backlash in 
which people achieved benefits through the pursuit of their private interests, instead of pursuing 
communal welfare through solidarity.  
It is not fair to say that this trend was a consequence only of neo-liberalism. Rather, it was 
associated with a movement to rethink the real constitutional meaning of property rights, which had 
been distorted by political and social influences. Before the 1987 Constitutional Amendment, the 
Korean Supreme Court had begun to undertake a constitutional review, even if in reality it was 
reluctant to consider political or liberal rights cases under the authoritarian government. Since the 
                                               
8 Manuel R. Agosin, ‘Korea and Taiwan in the Financial Crisis’ in Ricardo Ffrench-Davis (ed) Financial 
Crises in “Successful” Emerging Economies (United Nations; Brookings Institution Press, 2001) pp.38-64; 
Judith Cherry, Foreign Direct Investment in Post-crisis Korea: European Investors and ‘Mismatched 
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establishment of the Korean Constitutional Court by the 1987 Constitutional Amendment, this 
Court has played a significant role in reviewing all constitutional issues, invalidating early 
scepticism that it might be nothing more than a paper tiger.9 If a citizen argues that the exercise or 
non-exercise of a specific government power (except for a judicial decision) infringes on property 
rights, he or she can raise a constitutional complaint, 10  in which the Court reviews the 
constitutionality of the government action in question.11 Additionally, where a certain statute 
allegedly breaches property protection in a specific case, an ordinary court (the Supreme Court, 
appellate courts or district courts etc.) can request the Constitutional Court to adjudicate the 
constitutionality of the statute in question ex officio or through a motion by the claimant 
concerned.12 The Korean Constitutional Court is composed of nine judges appointed by the 
President.13 However, three positions are appointed from candidates nominated by the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court. The other three Justices are appointed by the President from persons 
chosen by the National Assembly.14 The President of the Constitutional Court is appointed from 
among the Justices by the Korean President with the consent of the National Assembly.15 
Although Justices are appointed by other constitutional organs, the independence and 
impartiality of Justices are institutionally secured because the Constitution guarantees a 6 year term 
of office and prevents them from participating in political parties or any other political activity.16 
Therefore, Constitutional Court Judges – like the judges in an ordinary court – are under an 
obligation to make an independent decision according to their conscience and their interpretation of 
the Constitution and the statutes.17 More importantly, Korean Constitution Court Judges have been 
relatively sensitive to their public reputation for impartiality rather than bowing to the political 
interests of their appointers. When the Korean Constitutional Court was initially established just 
                                               
9 James M. West and Doe Kyu Yoo, ‘The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Korea: Transforming the 
Jurisprudence of the Vortex’ (1992) 40(1) American Journal of Comparative Law; The Constitutional Court 
of Korea, Twenty Years of the Constitutional Court of Korea (The Constitutional Court of Korea, 2008) 
<http://www.ccourt.go.kr/home/att_file/ebook/1297404057391.pdf> accessed 15 April 2012; Tom Ginsburg, 
‘The Constitutional Court and the Judicialization of Korean Politics’ in Andrew Harding and Penelope 
Nicholson (eds), New Courts in Asia (Routledge, 2010) (explaining the general history of the Korean 
Constitutional Court).  
10 Korean Constitutional Court Act Article 68(1). 
11 The Constitution of the Republic of Korea (Korean Constitution) Article 111(1)5. 
12 Korean Constitutional Court Act Article 41(1). The party in the case can submit a constitutional complaint 
directly to the Constitutional Court when the ordinary court declines the motion for adjudication on the 
constitutionality of statutes. See ibid Article 68(2). 
13 Korean Constitution Article 111(2). 
14 ibid Article 111(3). 
15 ibid Artcile 111(4). 
16 ibid Article 112. 
17 ibid Article 103. 
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after Korean democratisation, its authority and future were vulnerable to uncertain political changes, 
although many lay persons expected it to play an active role. Institutions similar to the current 
Constitutional Court had been established in the past for constitutional review purposes. However, 
those institutions were actually defunct because the military authorities just wanted to give an 
appearance of democracy to what was in reality a dictatorship. Of course, even under the current 
system, there is no practical way for the Constitutional Court to enforce its decisions in an extreme 
situation where the state organs involved de facto ignore the efficacy of the decision. In light of this 
situation, the Court has adopted a strategy to build its own authority and autonomy from party 
politics by meeting public demands for the protection of individual rights and political impartiality. 
The Korean people’s perception of the Constitutional Court as a guard for their constitutional 
values, means that strong public support for the Constitutional Court cripples other state organs 
from ignoring the court’s decisions.  
Put differently, the Korean Constitutional Court has developed by echoing the social 
demands of the Korean public, rather than the formalised political influences of other state organs. 
Therefore, the Korean Constitutional Court has taken a more progressive stance than that avoided 
by the Supreme Court due to political pressure under the previous military government. For 
example, the Korean Constitutional Court has considered the constitutionality of the National 
Security Act. This Act was originally supposed to restrict anti-state actions that harm national 
security in favour of North Korea. However, former Korean dictators abused the National Security 
Act in order to suppress democratisation movement by defining all kinds of critical opinion about 
the government as anti-state behaviour. While the Korean ordinary courts in the pre-1987 
constitutional system were silent under government pressure, the Korean Constitutional Court 
boldly declared conditional constitutionality. This served as a ground to restrict unconstitutional 
abuse of the law by holding that the Act was constitutional only on the condition that a relevant act 
could be interpreted in a specific way to define ‘a threat to national existence and security’ as ‘a 
clear danger’.18  
Also, concerning property issues, the Korean Constitutional Court reacted to public attitudes 
towards economic democratisation and the rediscovery of the values of constitutional rights. It 
proposed a total reconsideration of the constitutional understanding of property from scratch in 
several controversial cases, discussed below. Through such careful consideration, the Court hoped 
to distinguish genuine public interest from a bogus one. Indeed, many bureaucratic, corrupt or 
                                               




abusive restrictions on property had been justified without any democratic discussion or any 
elaborate doctrinal analysis. For example, the government had expropriated private land in order to 
build a dam or a nuclear waste disposal facility under the pretext of ‘public interest’ without any 
participatory involvement with residents or environmentalists. In this context, Korean constitutional 
lawyers should have articulated the scope of non-compensable regulation, which is constitutionally 
justified. The scope of this justification should be decided in the light of a balance between the 
individual sphere – whose communicative interactions establish a community – and the communal 
sphere where individuals act.19  
Additionally, Korean scholars have adopted discussions or decisions by German lawyers in 
order to solve the doctrinal problems of Korean Constitutional clauses which correspond to relevant 
clauses of the German Basic Law. The reason for this is that the Korean constitutional system has 
borrowed many elements from Germany. During the Japanese conquest of Korea (1910-1945), 
Korean lawyers were more familiar with Japanese legal theory and process, because they had been 
trained in the Japanese legal system, which was inspired by the German system under Bismarck 
(1871-1890). After liberation from Japan, the German influence on advanced legal education 
continued because many academic researchers had studied law in Germany. For example, the 
property clauses in the Korean, Japanese and German legal systems are remarkably similar.20 
Eventually, such scholarly discussion has implicitly influenced the construction of court rulings. In 
this context, comparative studies – especially with German law – are often helpful to achieving a 
more profound understanding of the Korean legal system, because German legal theory has 
influenced the doctrinal development of Korean Constitutional Law. 
                                               
19 Laura S. Underkuffler, The Idea of Property: Its Meaning and Power (Oxford University Press, 2003) pp.1-
8 (explaining the tension between an individual concept and a communal concept of property protection). This 
tension is universal across the world. In the case of U.S. legal history, there has been a controversy within the 
regulatory state between legal realism, which supported the New Deal welfare state, and classical legalism, 
which insisted on the rule of law against government interventionism. See Morton J. Horwitz, The 
Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (Oxford University Press, 1992) 
pp.213-46, especially pp.30-33. This kind of dispute in the United States is related to modern liberalism, 
which can be understood as a reaction to the fear of totalitarianism, which destroyed individual autonomy. See 
Mark V. Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative 
Constitutional Law (Princeton University Press, 2008) pp.209-21. On the other hand, a group of theorists have 
sought ‘a third way’ between these two ideological directions. See Anthony Giddens, The Third Way: The 
Renewal of Social Democracy (Polity Press, 1998). 
20 Dai-Kwon Choi, ‘Development of Law and Legal Institutions in Korea’ in Bong Duck Chun, William 
Shaw and Dai-Kwon Choi (eds), Traditional Korean Legal Attitudes (University of California Berkeley, 
1980); Chongko Choi, ‘On the Reception of Western Law in Korea’ (1981) 9 Korean Journal of International 
and Comparative Law (explaining the Korean legal background). 
PROTECTION AND RESTRICTION OF PROPERTY IN THE KOREAN CONSTITUTION 
 
20 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY PROTECTION AND RESTRICTION 
Against this social and legal background, Article 23 of the Korean Constitution prescribes 
property rights, as follows:  
(1) Rights of property shall be guaranteed for any citizen. Contents and limitations thereof 
shall be determined by statute. 
(2) Exercise of property rights shall conform to the public welfare. 
(3) Expropriation, use, or restriction of private property for public necessity and 
compensation therefore shall be governed by Act: Provided, that in such a case, just 
compensation shall be paid.21 
A. Tensions between the Rechtstaat (legal state) and the social state 
The first sentence of Article 23(1) of the Korean Constitution prescribes that rights of 
property shall be guaranteed for any citizen (called ‘the guarantee clause’). However, this clause 
does not specify how the constitution protects property. It leaves many questions open: for example, 
does the constitution support an absolute property right that does not allow for any restriction? If 
not, how does the constitution restrict property rights and where are the limits of such restriction? 
Such questions could be understood in the context of the constitutional principles that dominate the 
whole Korean constitution.  
One of the generally recognised constitutional principles is the Rechsstaat (legal state). This 
constitutional principle requires the government to refrain from interfering with private rights. 
Nevertheless, there is no clear definition of the Rechtsstaat in Korea or Germany, because this 
concept has been understood differently under monarchical, democratic and socialist 
governments.22 In spite of such variant understandings, a general notion of the classical Rechtsstaat 
                                               
21 This article is significantly similar to Article 14 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany 
(Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, hereafter ‘the German Basic Law’) [Property—
Inheritance—Expropriation]: 
 
(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their content and limits shall 
be defined by the laws. 
(2) Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good. 
(3) Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good. It may only be ordered by 
or pursuant to a law that determines the nature and extent of compensation. Such 
compensation shall be determined by establishing an equitable balance between the 
public interest and the interests of those affected. In case of dispute concerning the 
amount of compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary courts. 
 
22  Konrad Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (C.F. Müller 




is that the state should protect the private sphere by prohibiting public (state) power according to a 
strictly formalist distinction between public and private. Therefore, this Rechtsstaat has developed 
several formal legal doctrines, such as proportionality or the separation of powers, in order to 
prevent the abuse of state power.23 
This traditional Rechtsstaat (classical  rule  of  law)  has  ceased  to  function  in  the  
contemporary state. Ironically, excessive emphasis on private interests has destroyed the existential 
essence of the very individuals that the Rechtsstaat principle is supposed to protect. In particular, 
the emergence of private power has caused serious social injustice, as seen in industrial monopoly 
and the poor conditions of the working class. The classical Rechsstaat was helpless against such 
private authoritarianism because the formal doctrine of the private/public distinction does not allow 
for any interventionist measures to correct this emerging social injustice. 24  Especially in 
contemporary society, human dignity can be harmed by economic poverty or by inequality. This is 
also the social background of the social state.25  
The idea of the social state emerged as a critical response to the classical Rechstaat; the 
social state originated from the concept of the Sozialstaat enshrined in Articles 20(1) and 28(1) of 
the German Basic Law.26 Some scholars trace the historical origin of the Sozialstaat to the social 
legislation that was enacted in the Bismarck era, or to a medieval notion of mutual obligation 
between a Prince and his people.27 However, the contemporary notion of the Sozialstaat, inspired 
by the German Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – SPD), sprang 
directly from Articles 153 to 155 of the Weimar Constitution of 1919.28 Even if this does not 
                                               
23 Gregory S. Alexander, The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: Lessons for American Takings 
Jurisprudence (University of Chicago Press, 2006) p.105. In this context, this classical German Rechtstaat 
might be translated as the rule of law. However, this translation would be misleading, because the historical 
development of this concept includes other contexts than the rule of law (e.g. social justice as seen below). 
24 A similar discussion was found in American legal theory. See Morris R. Cohen, ‘Property and Sovereignty’ 
(1927) 13(1) Cornell Law Review. 
25 Kay (n 22) pp.324-25. 
26 The German Basic Law prescribes:  
 
Article 20 [Constitutional principles—Right of resistance] 
(1) The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social federal state. […] 
 
Article 28 [Land constitutions—Autonomy of municipalities] 
(1) The constitutional order in the Länder must conform to the principles of a republican, 
democratic and social state governed by the rule of law, within the meaning of this 
Basic Law. […] 
 
27 Alexander (n 23) pp.105-06 (explaining the various historical origins of the German Sozialstaat). 
28 Peter C. Caldwell, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The Theory & 
Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (Duke University Press, 1997) pp.76-77; Kim (n 5) pp.228-29; 
Mahendra P. Singh, German Administrative Law in Common Law Perspective (Springer, 2001) pp.18-20. 
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explain its detailed content, the German Constitutional Court clearly recognised the constitutional 
value of the social state.29 The Korean Constitution likewise does not explicitly mention the 
principle of the social state, but the Korean Constitutional Court presumes that this principle is 
reflected in numerous clauses of the Korean Constitution. Furthermore, the Court held that this 
constitutional principle serves as a significant guideline which provides the Korean government 
with considerable discretion to form an economic-social system according to the Constitution’s 
Preamble and Chapter IX, in addition to a series of social rights clauses.30  
Despite  such  a  clear  adoption  of  the  concept  of  the  social  state,  it  seems  impossible  to  
achieve a unitary definition of this concept because it incorporates various elements, including 
seemingly contradictory ones.31 Nevertheless,  it  is  generally  accepted  that  the  social  state  has  a  
constitutional responsibility to secure the basic needs of the people.32 This is broader than the 
concept of a social safety net, so that the public welfare of the social state includes the elimination 
of poverty and prevention of intolerable social injustice in an affirmative manner.33 Therefore, the 
Korean Constitutional Court defines the social state as one whose constitution incorporates the idea 
of social justice: this social state does not turn a blind eye to unjust social phenomena; rather it 
intervenes, distributes and coordinates in order to establish a just social order in all areas of the 
economy, society and culture. Ultimately, the state has a responsibility to create the conditions in 
which each citizen can enjoy liberty and lead a meaningful life.34 This principle of the social state 
serves as a constitutional goal which all the organs of the state should pursue.  
Here, the legislature has principal discretion to determine the measures which can be taken 
in order to implement the constitutional goals of the social state.35 This is because the redistribution 
of social wealth should be based on public consensus.36 In this context, the legislative branch could 
be the most appropriate institution to have the function of drawing up a social compromise 
regarding the adjustment of restrictions and the protection of property rights according to 
democratic procedures. The Korean Constitutional Court also took the same position in a case 
                                               
29 e.g. 1 BVerfGE 97, 105; 3 BVerfGE 377, 381. 
30 14-2 KCCR 904, 909, 2002Hun-Ma52, December 18, 2002; 16-2(B) KCCR, 195, 204, 2002Hun-Ma328, 
October 28, 2004 (recognising the social state principle within the Korean Constitution). 
31 Kay (n 22) p.327; Jina Cha, ‘Idea and Limits of the Social State’ (2007) 13(3) Constitutional Law Study 
p.167. 
32 Alexander (n 23) p.105. 
33 ibid p.106. 
34 14-2 KCCR 904, 909, 2002Hun-Ma52, December 18, 2002; 16-2(B) KCCR, 195, 204, 2002Hun-Ma328, 
October 28, 2004. 
35 Kay (n 22) p.336; Cha (n 31) p.173; Young-Soo Chang, Constitutional Law (Hongmunsa, 2007) p.226 
footnote 27. 




where the claimant argued that government benefits for disabled people did not meet the minimum 
living cost required by the social state. The Court held that the parliament has a constitutional 
discretion to establish social welfare legislation within the government budget by analysing the 
national socio-economic situation. The Court usually presumes that a governmental measure is 
constitutional unless its content is determined in a manner that is apparently arbitrary. 
Consequently, in the relevant case the Court denied the claimant’s argument because the minimum 
living cost was not calculated in an apparently unreasonable way, given the financial capacity of the 
government and the national economy.37  
In this context, some German and Korean scholars have noted a tension between the social 
state principle and the Rechtsstaat principle. 38  Roughly speaking, the Rechtsstaat protects 
individual liberty in the private sphere, even at the risk of attacking communal welfare. In particular, 
the Rechtsstaat is eager to guarantee private property because it presumes that individual liberty, 
welfare and personality can exist only on the basis of property. Therefore, the infringement of 
property rights requires full compensation because any restriction upon or expropriation of property 
means an existential loss of individual personality. On the other hand, the social state seeks social 
justice even if this might endanger individual liberty. The social state imposes limits on property 
rights in order to reduce social inequality. Such interference with property rights leads to limited 
compensation because full compensation would nullify effective redistribution.39 
B. Social constitutional state (Sozial Rechtsstaat) as a harmonizing concept 
However, this tension could be reconciled by a Sozial Rechtsstaat under the primacy of the 
idea of human dignity. The social state is restricted by a Rechtsstaat, which does not allow any 
arbitrary discretion of the legislature to restrict property under the pretext of the social state.40 On 
the other hand, the principle of classical Rechtstaat is limited by the values of the social state 
principles which mitigate the side effects of an abuse of private rights. As a result, the traditional 
Rechtsstaat, which is criticised by advocates of the social state, has been changed into a material 
                                               
37 16-2(B) KCCR, 195, 195-96, 2002Hun-Ma328, October 28, 2004. See also 9-1 KCCR 543, 554-55, 
94Hun-Ma33, May 29, 1997; 11-1 KCCR 503, 512-13, 97Hun-Ma333, April 29, 1999; 13-2 KCCR 422, 433, 
2000Hun-Ma342, 27 September, 2001. See also Cheol-Su Kim, New Theory of Constitutional Law 
(Bagyeongsa, 2009) pp.796-800 (explaining various discussions over implementing social rights in Korean 
scholarship). 
38 Kay (n 22) pp.330-31. 
39 ibid. 
40 In this context, the Korean Constitutional Court held that social plans and coordination should not interfere 
with the essence of private property and the freedom of economic activities. See 1 KCCR 357, 373-74, 
88Hun-Ga13, December 22, 1989. 
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Rechtsstaat, which supports substantive conditions that allow people to live with human dignity 
guaranteed by the constitution. 41  While the material Rechtsstaat secures human dignity by 
protecting private property, it imposes a constitutional duty to restrict property in the interests of 
human dignity. Therefore, the Rechtsstaat encourages the state to adjust and coordinate the private 
sphere in order to end social injustice.42 Instead, government actions are required to match up with 
other constitutional principles, especially that of human dignity. Finally, the material Rechtsstaat 
could be translated into a constitutional state, in the sense of subordination to constitutional order. 
This constitutional state ultimately leads to the social state;43 here, the concept of the social 
constitutional state (Sozial Rechtsstaat) emerges as a compromise between the social state and the 
Rechtsstaat under the primacy of a constitutional guarantee of human dignity.44  
To summarise, the realisation of property rights under the Korean Constitution is structured 
into three sections. Firstly, the legislative branch defines the scope of restrictions and protections in 
adjusting private and public interests according to public consensus. Secondly, the executive branch 
implements the agreed contents of property rights by exercising its own regulatory powers. Thirdly, 
the judicial branch reviews whether the actions of each branch have been made in accordance with 
the principles of the social constitutional state. The following sections will examine how the above-
mentioned constitutional principles guide judicial interpretation of Article 23 of the Korean 
Constitution.  
The social constitutional state principle reflected in the Korean Constitution protects 
property rights from the perspective of human dignity. This means that property rights can be 
restricted as long as such a restriction is supposed to protect human dignity through social justice. 
Therefore, the Korean Constitution allows the government to restrict property rights under strictly 
circumscribed conditions. To be specific, the Korean Constitution proposes two ways to deal with 
property restrictions under Article 23 of the Korean Constitution. Firstly, the government can 
actually restrict property rights by defining the constitutional meaning of property according to 
Article 23(1) and (2) of the Korean Constitution (Part IV). Secondly, the government can regulate 
the expropriation, use or restriction of property under certain conditions of Article 23(3) of the 
Korean Constitution (Part V). However, this constitutional framework has caused a vexing 
conundrum for Korean lawyers; how these two kinds of property restriction can be distinguished 
                                               
41 Kay (n 22) pp.306-08; Alexander (n 23) p.107ff. 
42 Ernst R Huber, ‘Rechtsstaat und Sozialstaat in der modernen Industriegesellschaft’ in Ernst Forsthoff (ed) 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Sozialstaatlichkeit (Wissenscheftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968) p.598ff. 
43 Kay (n 22) p.308. 




given that the forms of two restrictions appear to be similar but have their different standards and 
purposes? (Part VI) 
IV. COMPENSATION-NOT-REQUIRED REGULATION UNDER THE SOCIAL OBLIGATION 
OF ARTICLE 23(2) 
Although  the  first  sentence  of  Article  23(1),  i.e.  the  guarantee  clause,  (hereafter  ‘Article  
23(1)-1’), prescribes the existence of the institution of property, it does not offer any clear 
procedural and substantive guidance. The second sentence of Article 23(1) (hereafter ‘Article 
23(1)-2’) and Article 23(2) prescribe that the contents and limits of property rights should be 
decided by the legislative authority according to the principles of the social constitutional state.45 
While Article 23(1)-2 makes it clear who has constitutional authority to decide the contents and 
limits of property rights, Article 23(2) prescribes a substantive guideline on what that authority 
should consider in its definition. To be specific, Article 23(2) imposes a duty on the legislature to 
design property rights in such a way that the exercise of property rights conforms to the public 
interest.46 For example, there might possibly and arguably be numerous rights to the land. Here, the 
legislature imposes a limitation by excluding a right to use the land in an environmentally harmful 
way from the contents of constitutional property rights. In this excluded scope, the constitution 
recognises the governmental power to restrict or prevent environmentally harmful use of land. 
Finally, Articles 23(1)-2 and 23(2) order the legislature to define the contents and limits of property 
rights in a way that secures the following situation: even if citizens fully exercise their property 
rights that the legislature defines in advance, the effect of this exercise cannot be against the public 
interest. In this context, defining the content and limits of property rights and recognising regulatory 
power to restrict property rights are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, the German and Korean 
doctrines are discussed in the second sentence of Articles 23(1) and 23(2) together in the same 
context of the so-called content-and-limit clause.47 
 
                                               
45 10-2 KCCR 927, 944, 89Hun-Ma214, 90Hun-Ba16, 97Hun-Ba78, December 24, 1998; 5-2 KCCR 36, 44-
45, 92Hun-Ba20, July 29, 1993; 12-1 KCCR 152, 163, 97Hun-Ba41, February 24, 2000; 20-1 KCCR 510, 
516, 2005Hun-Ba43, April 24, 2008. 
46 Kuk-Won Jeong, ‘Value Decision and the Constitution and Normative Structure of Property Guarantee’ 
(2004) 5(1) Public Law pp.154-57. 
47 Van der Walt (n 2) pp.133-34. 
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A. Constitutionally protectable scope of property rights 
The contents of property rights can be clarified in accordance with the principle of the social 
constitutional state. Therefore, these constitutional property rights are not concerned with whether 
the nature of a right is private or public.48 In other words, which kinds of property rights can be 
constitutionally protected depends on the relationship between the property right and the 
constitutional principle; a closer relationship with the constitutional principle guarantees a stronger 
protection of the property right.  
In the social constitutional state, the constitutional protection of property aims not to secure 
the private sphere against state power, but to generate a private sphere where people lead self-
developing and self-governing lives with dignity. In this context, the German Hamburg Flood 
Control case shows that constitutional property is not related to its market value but to the 
ontological value of the human being.49 In  this  case,  Hamburg  City  converted  all  its  grassland  
classified as ‘dyke land’ into public property in order to prevent a flood risk. In doing so, the city 
terminated all private rights to this property with compensation. The German Constitutional Court, 
validating the regulation, held that the core function of property protection in the constitution is to 
enable the property owner to lead a self-governing life by securing his or her economic liberty. 
Here, the core element that the constitution protects is not an economic value but the personhood 
which is reflected in the property; or the material ground on the basis of which people can lead a 
meaningful life.50 This means that governmental regulatory power should be prohibited if it 
threatens the essence of sound human flourishing.51 To put it differently, a regulatory power such 
as flood control would be upheld as long as it could be supposed to secure conditions of sound 
human flourishing. This reasoning allows many public law entitlements such as pensions to be 
protected as property rights as long as these rights are essential for making the survival of claimants 
possible.52 All things considered, the meaning of constitutional property is related neither to private 
nor public law; and not to pure market values, but those of the constitution.53  
                                               
48 Hesse (n 22) Rn.444; Hee-Yol Kay, Constitutional Law II (Bagyeongsa, 2002) pp.498-99. See also Chang 
(n 35) pp.752-753.  
49 24 BVerfGE 367. See also Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic 
of Germany (Duke University Press, 1997) p.250ff. 
50 Alexander (n 23) pp.112-13. 
51 Kommers (n 49) p.253. 
52 David P. Currie, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (University of Chicago Press, 1994) 
pp.296-97; Alexander (n 23) pp.128-31. 




In a similar vein, the Korean Constitutional Court in the Green Belt case defined property 
rights. 54  Since 1971, the Korean government has designated and maintained development 
restriction areas in the name of public interest. Many Korean people blame land speculators for 
price hikes that have caused unrest in the stable supply of housing; for example, unregulated land 
speculation has made mortgages and rent unaffordable for many low-income people. In response, 
the Korean government has enacted very strong interventionist measures. It can designate certain 
areas as development restriction zones for the sake of public interests, like the prevention of 
reckless urban expansion, environmental protection or national security. In these zones, any 
construction or change in the character of land is prohibited. Whilst this Green Belt regulation has 
prevented any de facto use of land within designated areas, the government did not provide any 
compensation to the owners of land in such zones.55 The Court held that property rights serve as a 
material foundation of a humane and decent life: 
The right to property in reality forms the economic conditions that the people, as the 
subjects of basic rights, need for the autonomous realization of a humane livelihood. 
Therefore, the right to property forms the material basis for the realization of individual 
freedom.56  
However, the protective scope of constitutional property does not include mere benefits 
which are indirectly drawn from regulations. In the Arcade Betting Machine case, a claimant owned 
facilities containing an arcade betting game (coin-operated entertainment machines).57 Initially, the 
business had been registered as a public amusement centre under the Amusement Place Business 
Law. Since early 2000, such businesses had attracted public criticism because betting machines 
caused social problems such as gambling addiction. Consequently, a new statute excluded such 
businesses from the category of amusement place businesses; instead, it required owners to apply 
for registration under the Sound Records, Video Products and Software Games Act. In the instant 
case, the authority denied the registration application of the arcade betting game by categorizing it 
as anti-social speculative gambling on the basis of this latter statute. The claimant argued that this 
                                               
54 10-2 KCCR 927, 89Hun-Ma214, 90Hun-Ba16, 97Hun-Ba78, December 24, 1998. 
55 Chang-Hee Christine Bae, ‘Korea’s Greenbelts: Impacts and Options for Change’ (1998) 7(3) Pacific Rim 
Law & Policy Journal; Won Woo Shuh, ‘Land Use Planning and Compensation in Korea’ in Tsuyohsi 
Kotaka and David L. Callies (eds), Taking Land: Compulsory Purchase and Regulation of Land in Asian-
Pacific Countries (University of Hawaii Press, 2002) pp.169-94; Sung-Bae Kim, ‘The Role of Government in 
the Redistribution of Property Rights: The Case of the Korean Greenbelt’ (2004) 9(1) International Review of 
Public Administration (providing more information on the general social background to the Korean Greenbelt 
policy). 
56 10-2 KCCR 927, 945, 89Hun-Ma214, 90Hun-Ba16, 97Hun-Ba78, December 24, 1998. 
57 14-2 KCCR 29, 99Hun-Ma574, July 18, 2002. 
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regulatory change had interfered with their property right to gain the profit that could have been 
expected under the previous law. In this case, the Court held that the constitutionally protectable 
scope of the property right does not include profits that were indirectly given through a legal order. 
Likewise, in the Failure to Administer Medical Specialist Certification Exam case,58 the Korean 
Medical Service Act and the Medical Specialist Training and Certification Rules did not provide 
the procedure for a Dental Specialist Certification Exam. In terms of career development, therefore, 
dentists were discriminated against, as compared to other medical personnel, like doctors, who 
could gain additional national medical specialist certification after their qualification as general 
practitioners. As a result, all dentists were categorized only as general practitioners, occasioning the 
problem that government-employed dentists would be paid less than other specialist doctors as the 
government is allowed to pay additional benefits only to the specialist doctors. The claimant in that 
case argued that the failure to provide for a medical specialist certification exam was an 
unconstitutional interference with their property rights. This argument was founded on the ground 
that such an omission of administrative action could harm a dentist’s future chances of gaining the 
additional salary that would be paid if there were to be a national dental specialist qualification. 
Ultimately, the Korean Constitutional Court, in the Arcade Betting Machine case and Administer 
Medical Specialist Certification Exam case, held that constitutionally protected property rights do 
not include ‘mere profit, a simple chance to gain profit, or factual or legal settings that are related to 
commercial enterprise’.59 The Court does not consider the relevant arguable interest or loss as the 
protectable scope of property right if it is not directly related to the property itself, but only to 
benefits which come indirectly from the regulatory settings. 
In addition, the Green Belt ruling made clear that future profits expected from existing 
property rights do not constitute a protectable property right. Here, one of the claimants’ arguments 
in attacking the statute was that the designation of a restriction zone would have a negative 
influence on either the land price or opportunities to develop the land in the future. Thus, the 
property owners argued that foreclosure of such reasonably expected future benefits could 
constitute an unconstitutional property restriction or expropriation. However, the Korean 
Constitutional Court understood that 
The expectation that someone could use his or her land for construction or development in 
the future or take advantage of the increase in the land price does not belong in principle to 
                                               
58 10-2 KCCR 283, 96Hun-Ma246, July 16, 1998. 
59 ibid 309-10; 14-2 KCCR 29, 44, 99Hun-Ma574, July 18, 2002. See also 8-2 KCCR 90, 103, 95Hun-Ba36 




the protected extent of the right to property.60  
Further, the Court justified such ‘elimination of development opportunities and the resulting 
decrease in the land price or the relative slowing of the price increase’ on the ground of the 
constitutional social obligation of Article 23(2).61  
B. Social obligation as a limitation on property protection 
Property rights should be constituted in accordance with the doctrine of social obligation, 
which is considered a concretisation of the social constitutional state.62 Article 23(2) imposes a 
social obligation (Sozialbindung) on the exercise of property rights by prescribing that ‘the exercise 
of property rights shall conform to the public welfare’. The Korean Constitutional Court held that 
this social obligation is not a mere ethical duty but also a constitutional one, which is defined as a 
specific obligation in the form of legislative statute.63 The Court understands that the social 
obligation represents a minimum of self-sacrifice or self-concession, not only to guarantee the core 
of private property institutions, but also to prevent the counter-productive effects caused by the 
absolute protection of property.64 This doctrine of social obligation imposes a constitutional duty 
on both the individual and the government: while the property holder is obliged to serve communal 
welfare, the legislature has a constitutional responsibility to force the individual to accept this 
obligation by passing legislation.65 This goes beyond the public nuisance doctrine of common law 
where the property holder does not have any right to cause public harm and the government has a 
police power to prevent public harm. The concept of social obligation includes not only preventing 
affirmative and direct harm but also protecting living conditions against the possible adverse effects 
of the abuse of property rights.66 Its substantive content could be derived from the social 
                                               
60 10-2 KCCR 927, 928, 89Hun-Ma214, 90Hun-Ba16, 97Hun-Ba78, December 24, 1998.  
61 ibid. 
62  Volkmar Götz and Hasso Hofmann, ‘Grundpflichten als verfassungsrechtliche Dimension’ 
Veroffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (VVDStRL); Heft 41 (W. de Gruyter, 
1983 1983) p.30ff.; Brun-Otto Bryde, ‘Art. 14’ in Ingo von Münch (ed) Grundgesetz-Kommentar (Beck, 1985) 
pp.664-665; Kim (n 5) p.227; Jeong (n 46) pp.157-60; Kuk Won Jeong, ‘Social Obligation of Ground Rights’ 
(2005) 11(3) Constitutional Law Study; Hun-Hwan Ko, ‘Legal Theory on the Limitations of Social 
Restriction to Land property Right’ (2006) 24 Law Review pp.61-66. 
63 1 KCCR 357, 371, 88Hun-Ga13, December 22, 1989. See also Kay (n 48) pp.512-13. 
64 1 KCCR 357, 370, 88Hun-Ga13, December 22, 1989. 
65 Alexander (n 23) pp.132-33; Ko (n 62) pp.64-66. 
66  Currie (n 52) p.295; Gregory S. Alexander, ‘Constitutionalising Property: Two Experiences, Two 
Dilemmas’ in Janet McLean (ed) Property and the Constitution (Hart, 1999) pp.94-95; Alexander (n 23) 
p.132; Alexander argues that a similar doctrine to that of social obligation can be found in U.S. property law. 
See Gregory S. Alexander, ‘The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law’ (2009) 94(4) Cornell 
Law Review. 
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constitutional state principle that is enshrined in the Korean Constitution’s chapter on social rights 
and the economy. For example, the Court recognized legislative discretion to improve the 
residential environment in a densely populated district under the social obligation doctrine.67 Here, 
the Court found the constitutional legitimacy of this social obligation doctrine by referring to 
Article 122 of the Korean Constitution’s chapter on the economy.68 Also, in the Green Belt case, 
the Court cited Article 122 in order to define the public interest that is protected by the Green Belt 
policy.69 In this case, a separate opinion (Judge Lee, Young-Mo) added Article 35’s environmental 
right to the original reasoning in order to explain the social obligation doctrine.70  
C. Proportionality between the communal social obligation and individual property 
protection 
The protectable scope of a property right begins when the social obligation doctrine, in 
which the government’s regulatory power prevails over the private interest, is exhausted. In other 
words, the meaning of property rights should be based on a balance between the private interest and 
the public interest. Here, this dynamic of the content and limits of a property right raises the 
question: where is the line between a protectable right and a right that can be restricted according to 
social obligations to be drawn? This is relevant to the constitutionality of certain property 
regulations.  
In order to address this issue, the Korean Constitutional Court has employed the 
proportionality test, which reviews the balance between the public and private interest.71 In fact, 
proportionality, which originated from Article 37(2) of the Korean Constitution, is considered to be 
                                               
67 13-1 KCCR 129, 129-30, 99Hun-Ma636, January 18, 2001. 
68 ibid 137. The Korean Constitution Article 122:  
 
The state may impose, under the conditions as prescribed by Act, restrictions or obligations 
necessary for the efficient and balanced utilization, development and preservation of the 
land of the nation that is the basis for the productive activities and daily lives of all citizens. 
 
69 10-2 KCCR 927, 946, 89Hun-Ma214, 90Hun-Ba16, 97Hun-Ba78, December 24, 1998.  
70 ibid 969. The Korean Constitution, Article 35:  
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housing development policies and the like.  
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one of the constitutional principles that dominate constitutional rights issues.72 Generally speaking, 
this proportionality test consists of three steps. First, a government measure should have a 
legitimate constitutional purpose. Second, the government should take the least intrusive measure to 
achieve that constitutional purpose. Therefore, the Court will strike down a measure when there is 
an alternative that would interfere less with property.73 Third, the private interest that is aggrieved 
by the government measure should be in a rational relation with the public benefit that is achieved 
by that measure.74 Usually, the Court is relatively generous with the first and second steps of the 
proportionality test. Indeed, those factors are related to the government’s ability to anticipate the 
consequences of property restrictions under changeable social conditions.75 Therefore, excessively 
strict requirements concerning the first and the second tests run the risk of shrinking legislative 
power due to the limited capacity of the government to foresee future situations. In this respect, the 
Korean Constitutional Court respects legislative discretion regarding the first and the second tests 
unless the government action clearly arbitrarily or malignantly intends to neglect those 
requirements.76  
Consequently, the Court has a tendency to focus on the third test, using the ‘sliding scale 
approach’77 according to a hierarchy of property rights. Here, the social function of property is an 
important standard by which to balance social obligations with private interests. This can be found 
in Germany’s Small Garden case,  where  a  statute  imposed  a  severe  limitation  on  the  right  of  a  
landowner to terminate a lease contract.78 The German Constitutional Court analysed the change in 
the public purpose of small gardens in German society. Initially, a large landowner had leased a 
small garden for people to use as a means of making a living. Therefore, the small garden had 
served an important financial purpose for the public. There was a social need that protected the 
lease contract against an arbitrary termination by its owners.79 However, as the economic and 
                                               
72 Korean Constitution Article 37 (2):  
 
The freedoms and rights of citizens may be restricted by an Act only when necessary for 
national security, the maintenance of law and order or for public welfare. Even when such 
a restriction is imposed, no essential aspect of the freedom or right shall be violated.  
 
73 10-1 KCCR 541, 555-58, 96Hun-Ga5, May 28, 1998; 14-2 KCCR 882, 888, 2001Hun-Ma370, December 
18, 2002. 
74 Kay (n 48) pp.139-42; Alexander (n 23) p.134ff. 
75 Kay (n 48) p.139. 
76 ibid pp.140-41. See also 10-2 KCCR 621, 631, 97Hun-Ma345, October 29, 1998. 
77 Alexander (n 23) p.138. 
78 52 BVefGE 1. See also Alexander (n 23) pp.136-37. 
79 This logic helped the Court to uphold the right of a tenant on rented land; therefore, the tenant has a 
constitutionally protectable property right that is distinguishable from the landlord’s private legal ownership. 
See 89 BVerfGE 1. See also Kommers (n 49) p.255. 
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social structure of Germany changed, such small gardens have become less relevant to public 
welfare because they have begun to be used for commercial or industrial purposes. Therefore, 
stronger protections for land owners should prevail over the justification for the legislative power to 
regulate the contract for the lessee.80 Finally, the Court found that the property holder’s private 
right can be respected only to the extent that ‘the general public interest does not take priority’.81 
Conversely, greater recognition of the social significance that is inherent in the property leads to 
less protection for the private owner. Therefore, the German Constitutional Court upheld the 
Federal Codetermination Act of 1976, which secured worker participation in the boards of directors 
of large firms (Codetermination Case).82 Here, the Court recognised the public implications of the 
role of large firms in constitutional and economic life. Further, it held that such social relevance of 
property imposed a greater social obligation on the plaintiff, and therefore denied the argument that 
labour participation interfered with private property.83  
Similarly, the Korean Constitutional Court, in the Green Belt case, considered the social 
implications of property when imposing limitations on the social obligation doctrine:  
The permitted scope of restriction on the right to property depends on the meaning that the 
object of that right holds for its subjects individually, and also for the society as a whole. 
The more socially bound the object is and the more important its function is, the more 
broadly legislative restriction is permitted. In other words, if the use or disposal of a 
specific property right does not remain in the domain of the owner’s personal life but 
influences the lives of many, the legislature has a broader authority to regulate that 
individual’s property right for the sake of the interest of the community.84 
Therefore, the court articulated the important social function of the land in the Korean 
socio-economic setting:  
The land cannot be produced or substituted and has a limited supply: the disposable land is 
in an absolute shortage in comparison to the population. All people depend for their 
production or living upon reasonable use of the land. Its social function and national 
economic implications require that the right to landownership be treated differently from 
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other property rights and have built into it the stronger element of public interest.85  
To summarize, each property must be protected or restricted according to the relevance of 
its social function. Therefore, the constitution cannot freeze the meaning of property and the degree 
of property protection because the social function of property changes over time. In fact, many 
things that had not been considered property in the past are now recognised as constitutionally 
protectable property.86 All things considered, the balancing point of the proportionality principle 
might be decided through a case-by-case approach in the changeable social context in which the 
relevant property right is established. The Korean Constitutional Court articulates the detailed 
contents of the proportionality test in a property right case by using the term ‘expropriation-like 
effect’ as will be seen in the following section.  
D. Expropriation-like effect as a standard of the proportionality test 
Despite this clear recognition of social obligation, the Korean Constitutional Court has also 
articulated an undeniable limitation on the imposition of social obligations in the Green Belt case. 
As seen above, less public-related kinds of property could be restricted more easily than others. 
However, the legislature cannot nullify property in its entirety because it is impossible to find a 
constitutional property that has no relation to human self-development or self-governance. Under 
no circumstances can the government encroach upon the minimal and irreducible essence of a right. 
In a pre-Green Belt case,87 the claimant made a constitutional complaint against a regulation that 
allowed the government to have the authority to permit a land transaction. According to this 
legislation, the government could restrict or prevent certain kinds of land transactions in a given 
district in order to curb speculative land transactions. Here, the Court held that a property restriction 
encroaches unconstitutionally on the essence of a constitutional right if the result of the interference 
creates a situation where the property right is nullified and the content of private property is emptied 
to the extent that the original purpose of the property cannot ultimately be achieved.88 However, 
the Court held that the relevant regulation did not constitute an unconstitutional abuse of regulatory 
power because it did not deprive the property owner of all possible use of the land; the property 
holder still had a disposable and controllable share in the property right.  
                                               
85 10-2 KCCR 927, 946, 89Hun-Ma214, 90Hun-Ba16, 97Hun-Ba78, December 24, 1998. See also 1 KCCR 
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86 Chang (n 35) pp.753-55. 
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In the subsequent Green Belt case, the Korean Constitutional Court recognised the 
unconstitutionality of certain parts of the Green Belt policy by reference to this ruling that the 
government should not remove all possibilities for the meaningful use of property. The Court held 
that the Green Belt policy itself was constitutional in the context of the social obligation doctrine. 
Nevertheless, it found that there could be an exceptional unconstitutional situation where the owner 
of a certain kind of land was forced to endure more ‘special property loss’ than other land owners in 
the Green Belt zone.89 To be specific, the bare building lots of the claimants in that case could not 
have been used in any other designated legal way that was consistent with the Green Belt policy 
(e.g. for an agricultural purpose). On this point, the Court ruled that the state’s public policy 
violated the proportionality between the public interest promoted by the restriction and the private 
interests enjoyed by the property owner. The Constitutional Court held:  
[I]f the zone designation forecloses the pre-existing uses or all possible uses, effectively 
blocking all the venues to use or profit from the land, the ownership remains only in name 
and becomes vacuous. Such a result exceeds the social limit that the landowners must 
accept.90  
This reasoning did not clearly articulate the meaning of ‘exceptionally severe interference’ 
with the property. In this context, the Long-term Non-performance of Urban Planning case91 
proposed the term ‘expropriation-like effect’ to describe this unconstitutionally disproportionate 
situation. In this case, the public authority designated the plaintiff’s properties as school sites 
according to urban planning. The relevant legislation prescribed that compensation would be made 
when the project started. However, the public authority delayed the project for more than 15 years. 
The plaintiff argued that this government action caused an intolerable interference with the 
individual property. The Court held that the imposition of such a severe burden provoked a 
governmental obligation to provide compensation because the proportionality principle had been 
breached by causing an ‘expropriation-like effect’.92 This ‘expropriation-like effect’ occurs when 
the governmental action eliminates all possibilities of the private use of land.93 This  term  has  
subsequently been used in other property rights cases.94 
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E. Compensation-like measure as a remedy 
Traditionally, the remedy for a breach of a contents-and-limits clause has principally been 
the restitution of the status quo ante or the disallowance of the intended measure.95 The reason for 
this is that the property protection of Articles 23(1) and (2) is oriented towards securing the 
existence of the property, rather than reimbursing its value retroactively after an interference.96 The 
constitutional principle of German and Korean property law is that the loss of property cannot be 
replaced with equivalently valued property or money because each property has its own original, 
moral and personal value attached to the owner’s personhood.97 Therefore, even if such a 
restriction violates proportionality between the public and private interest, a remedy based on 
Article 23(2) does not require monetary compensation.  
However, the problem is that such remedies based on a breach of Article 23(2) could not 
provide satisfactory measures to support an aggrieved person, especially where state action has 
already caused negative effects. Suppose that the government introduced a restriction on stock 
dealing by preventing a person from selling or buying specific shares. In an unexpected situation – 
for example, if there was a significant decrease in the price of a share for a short time – the mere 
withdrawal of the regulatory measure would not be enough for an aggrieved shareholder to be 
reimbursed for the loss in property value even if that property owner were to regain the status quo 
ante of the property right. Given complicated contemporary economic settings, the traditional 
remedy for a breach of Articles 23 (1)-2 and (2) may effectively be seen as locking the stable door 
after the horse has bolted.  
Theoretically, of course, the claimant could ask for compensation in light of the state’s 
tortious liability under Article 29(1),98 instead of pursuing compensation under Articles 23(1) and 
                                                                                                                                     
396-97, 99Hun-Ba110•2000Hun-Ba46, April 24, 2003; 17-2 KCCR 98, 131, 2002Hun-Ba84, September 23, 
2003 (regarding the separate opinion of Justice Kwon, Seong). 
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96 Kay (n 48) p.505. 
97 On this ground, the plaintiff in the German Hamburg Food Control case was able to challenge the breach of 
Article 14 despite the provision of just compensation. Comparatively speaking, the U.S. Supreme Court seems 
to consider property as a commercial commodity, which can be replaced in the market without any social 
context or personhood. In other words, the U.S. concept of property is based on the idea of a commodity, 
which can be exchanged in the market. See Alexander (n 23) pp.112-13. 
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(2). Tortious liability under Article 29(1) derives from the illegality of a government action; to take 
an example, an aggrieved citizen could ask for tortious compensation for the illegal exercise of 
police powers when a police officer has abused his powers by neglecting demonstration control 
guidelines when bringing a protest under control. This liability under Article 29 is established on 
the basis of the illegality of the official’s action, rather than on the grounds of an interference with 
the property right itself.  
However, to date there has been no case where the plaintiff has requested compensation for 
property interference through a claim under Article 29. To constitute state tortious liability, Article 
29(1) of the Korean Constitution requires the claimant to prove a wilful or negligent breach of duty 
by an individual officer (i.e. the officer’s fault).99 Practically, it is extremely difficult – indeed, 
impossible – to establish state tortious liability for losses caused by unconstitutional legislation itself 
or by administrative action which has been taken according to unconstitutional law.  
Firstly, the claimant might not be able to ask for compensation for loss or grievance caused 
by the unconstitutional legislative statute. Theoretically, the claimant could raise a claim by 
establishing the liability of an individual lawmaker, as long as members of parliament can be 
considered to be ‘public officials’ and the making of an unconstitutional law is interpreted as an 
illegal act. The claimant could therefore argue that legislators neglected their duty of due care to 
abide by the constitution. However, it is not easy to establish the detailed fault (e.g. negligence or 
willfulness) of individual lawmakers in the lawmaking process. In particular, it seems unclear as to 
whether legal liability could be distinguished from the political responsibility of the parliament. In 
relation to this, the fundamental question is how one can clearly prove the tortious fault of 
individual lawmakers. The academic community is very sceptical about recognizing tortious fault 
on the part of lawmakers because the expansion of liability in this manner could shrink legislative 
discretion.100  
Secondly, an aggrieved claimant could ask for compensation by challenging an 
administrative act taken by a public official in accordance with unconstitutional legislation. 
However, Article 47(2) of the Constitutional Court Act recognises the validity of administrative 
acts which have been taken before a constitutional decision on the administrative acts in 
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question.101 In other words, it might be unreasonable to establish the tortious faults of an officer 
who merely followed an unconstitutional regulation, which was presumed to be a valid law before 
any constitutional review was involved.  
In order to deal with these practical problems, the Korean Constitutional Court imposed a 
legislative obligation to make compensation. Here, the Korean Constitutional Court held:  
The legislature, in order to make the instant provisions constitutional, must enact 
compensation provisions to address the exceptional situation and alleviate the cruel burden 
exceeding the permitted scope. Such compensation provisions are necessary provisions 
when the legislature forms the content of the right to property and regulates it for the sake 
of the public interest in accordance with Articles 23 (1) and (2) of the Constitution.102 
In the subsequent cases, this is called a ‘compensation-like measure’ to restore 
proportionality in cases of severe interference with property.103 
However, the legislative branch has the prime authority to implement that constitutional 
duty. Therefore, the claimant cannot ask for individual compensation except for the stopping of the 
government action in question until the government has made amendment by means of 
compensation-like measures. Clearly, the Court does not ask the government to directly and 
individually compensate claimants, but to make an amendment while ordering that ongoing 
government action be stopped. Therefore, individual compensation can be provided only according 
to the new law; in other words, a property owner cannot gain any compensation if the government 
decides to give up the restriction policy. Hypothetically, the government would not take any further 
step towards proportionality if it thought that spending on compensation or compensation-like 
measures would nullify all the benefits of a public policy or be beyond its financial capacity. In 
addition, the specific means of implementing compensation-like measures should be decided by the 
legislature. In other words, the parliament can define the nature of such compensation, which may 
be either monetary or non-monetary as long as it can cure the unconstitutionality. Moreover, the 
extent of such compensation does not need to exceed the level that is sufficient to restore the 
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Any statute or provision thereof decided as unconstitutional shall lose its effect from the 
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constitutionality of Articles 23(1)-2 and (2) by mitigating the disproportionate effect.104 In  the  
Green Belt and Long-term Non-performance of Urban Planning cases, the Constitutional Court 
also held that the legislature has the principal discretion to decide the method of compensation.105 
The Court held:  
The means to restore the proportionality between the public interest and the infringement 
on the right to property does not have to be monetary compensation. The legislature may 
release the land from the zone designation, grant the landowners the right to request the 
state to purchase the land, or use other means to alleviate the loss. The legislature has a 
broad freedom of formation in choosing the appropriate ‘means’ to accomplish the ‘end’ of 
adjusting or alleviating the cruel burden.106 
After the Green Belt decision, the legislature established an Act on Special Measures for the 
Designation and Management of Areas of Restricted Development. This act grants landowners the 
right to request that the state purchase the land if the designation of land as Green Belt zone has 
reduced the usefulness of the property or has removed any meaningful possibility of using it or of 
gaining profits from its original purpose. In addition, the Minister of Construction and 
Transportation can purchase land within a Green Belt zone through negotiations with the relevant 
land owner when this is deemed necessary for the purposes of Green Belt policy. The Court later 
held that this Green Belt regulation was constitutional because the Act on Special Measures for the 
Designation and Management of Areas of Restricted Development includes proper compensation 
which achieves proportionality with the object of the measure.107  
V. COMPENSATION-REQUIRED PUBLIC RESTRICTION UNDER ARTICLE 23(3) 
As discussed above, the Korean Constitutional Court has made three points clear: i) the 
government can establish non-compensated regulation based on social obligations under Article 
23(2); ii) as long as the regulation does not cause expropriation-like effects or the government 
provides compensation-like measures; iii) the government has in principle discretion to decide the 
method of compensation-like measures as long as these are deemed enough to cure the 
disproportionate situation in which the expropriation-like effect occurs.  
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However, the Korean government can make use of another type of property restriction 
(public restriction) which belongs to the concept of public interferences under Article 23(3). Of 
course, usually interference with property should occur within the framework of the social 
obligation doctrine of Article 23(2). However, there are exceptional situations in which the 
government is required to interfere with property beyond this social obligation doctrine. In order to 
address such unusual situations, Article 23(3) of the Korean Constitution permits public 
interference. The typical situation is one of expropriation; physical transfer of title is not allowed 
under Article 23(2) even on the grounds of some desperate requirement of human dignity. However, 
the government inevitably has to take over private property in exceptional situations, namely for 
reasons of public necessity. For example, the army may have to temporarily use people’s cars in 
cases of national emergency; or the local authority has to own private land in order to build a new 
highway or launch an urban redevelopment project. Here, Article 23(3) defines such government 
action as public interference, consisting of three kinds of property interference: namely, 
‘expropriation, use or restriction of private property’. To be specific, public expropriation consists 
of government actions that are taken to deprive a citizen of some part or the entirety of her or his 
property with the physical transfer of title. Next, public use relates to an action that uses a citizen’s 
property temporarily and authoritatively without title transfer. Lastly, public restriction is defined as 
a government action taken to restrict a citizen from using or profiting from her or his property 
without any transfer of title. Among these three types of public interference, public restriction is 
very similar to regulation based on social obligation under Article 23(2), because neither action 
deprives the citizen of her or his property title physically. However, public restriction in the form of 
public interference under Article 23(3) requires the satisfaction of different conditions (public 
necessity and just compensation) from the property restriction under Article 23(2).  
Public interference is allowed only on condition of public necessity and just compensation. 
The scope of public necessity is articulated by proportionality between public and private interest 
according to Article 37(2).108 However, this balancing point of proportionality is different from the 
one found in Article 23(2). In fact, constitutional public interference has a compensation provision 
to reimburse the property loss; unlike restriction under Article 23(2), which allows only for a 
compensation-like measure. Therefore, public necessity is generally considered more broadly than 
the ‘public welfare’ of Article 23(2) in the sense that the restriction of Article 23(3) is an 
interference that cannot be legitimated by the social obligation doctrine.109 The potential illegality 
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of this interference can only be cured by just compensation. In this case, the proportionality test of 
public interference considers the amount of compensation, the degree of interference and public 
necessity (which is broader than social obligation), whereas the proportionality test of Article 23(2) 
considers private interest and social obligation (and compensation-like measures in certain 
situations). Therefore, more compensation for public interference could justify broader reasons 
(public necessity) for the public interference. This doctrine of public necessity could be similar to 
the understanding of public use found in U.S. constitutional doctrine, where a taking could be 
allowed when the governmental measure is ‘rationally related to a conceivable public purpose’. 110 
However, Currie argues that the concept of the ‘public good’ found in Article 14(3) of the German 
Basic  Law (the  ‘public  necessity’  of  the  Korean  Constitution,  Article  23(3))  is  broader  than  the  
public use allowed by the U.S. Supreme Court, in the sense that the German doctrine upheld taking 
for private benefit which promoted social welfare. The German Court allowed a government action 
taken on behalf of a refugee settlement,111 a transmission of private power,112 a test track for a 
private automaker,113 and a private cable car for public recreation,114 as long as it recognised the 
relevance of the public interest.115 Conversely, the German Constitutional Court does not allow for 
public interference merely for governmental financial enlargement unrelated to social welfare.116  
Although all three types of public interference require just compensation, there is 
nevertheless controversy over the meaning of just compensation. Some commentators argue that 
just compensation means the full payment of the objective full market value of the property.117 
Others argue that just compensation means ‘an equitable balance’ between public and private 
interests, rather than the full market value, and this is decided by the social state principle.118 In 
exceptional cases, full compensation would not be appropriate. For example, suppose the 
government expropriated a parcel of land for a public project and that this piece of land had been 
the only source of income for a 70-year old farmer, with no other means of earning a livelihood. It 
may be impossible or too expensive for this person to gain a relevant comparable piece of land. If 
so, just compensation may require more than the full market value because it should cover the cost 
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of living conditions for that farmer in accordance with the constitutional meaning of property in 
Article 23(1), which is based on the social state principle. Conversely, compensation could be less 
than the market value, if the high cost of full market compensation would foreclose proceeding with 
the public project, which could be justified by the social state principle. All things considered, more 
compensation would be paid for the socially weaker and less for socially stronger groups.119  
Contrary to the doctrine of equitable balance, the Korean Constitutional Court has 
consistently held that only full compensation of the objective value of property is constitutional. 
However, full compensation does not cover the profits or losses derived indirectly from the 
property or caused by governmental action.120 Here, the problem is that there is no clear guideline 
to recognise the protectable profits and losses which should be considered in calculating the value 
of compensation. As a matter of fact, one might have difficulties in calculating the precise value 
because of the exceptional nature of property such as land. For example, suppose that the 
government made public a redevelopment plan, in which the authority had to consider 
compensation based on the market value before the redevelopment announcement. However, there 
is a tendency for the price of relevant property and its neighbouring land to increase after the 
government’s announcement of the plan because the project is expected to trigger the subsequent 
new planning on the adjacent land or boost the local economy. Moreover, this temporal price 
difference could encourage speculators to purchase the land. Such an extraordinary increase 
between the previous and current price runs the risk of rendering the government project much 
more difficult or even impossible. In addition, this situation might cause unjust social redistribution 
because the public budget could go to land speculators. Finally, this process runs the risk of 
destroying a sound land market condition and balanced land development. As a result, the Korean 
Public Notice of Values and Appraisal of Real Estate Act requires the Ministry of Land, Transport 
and Maritime Affairs to regularly publish the standard land price of 50,000 major standard lots out 
of a total of all 27,000,000 lots on the land register across the country. The government analyses 
these prices by considering many facts, such as recent land transaction records, and the relevant 
land owner can make an administrative suit against a decision on standard land prices. Once 
published, these prices serve as a standard with which the government calculates compensation in 
the course of carrying out land planning. Regarding this regulatory system, the Korean 
Constitutional Court denied a claimant’s argument that this standard land price policy violates the 
principle of just compensation. The Court held that the standard price could be used in calculating 
                                               
119 Kim (n 37) p.659. 
120 7-1 KCCR 519, 519, 93Hun-Ba20, April 20, 1995; 11-2 KCCR 721, 729, 98Hun-Ba13, December 23, 
1999; 13-1 KCCR 932, 938, 2000Hun-Ba31, April 26, 2000.  
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the full value compensation of Article 23(3) as long as this price reasonably reflects the normal 
market situation by excluding any expected profits or speculative surplus value from land 
planning.121  
VI. BLURRED LINE BETWEEN COMPENSATION-NOT-REQUIRED REGULATION AND 
COMPENSATION-REQUIRED PUBLIC RESTRICTION 
A. Discussions over the structural relation between Articles 23(2) and 23(3)  
Of the three kinds of public interference provided in Article 23(3), public use and public 
expropriation can be easily recognized in that they require the apparent physical transfer of title – 
whether temporarily or permanently. However, there is no clear agreement on the proper 
understanding of public restriction. In particular, it is difficult to draw a clear line between the 
restriction of Article 23(2) and the public restriction of Article 23(3).122 Nevertheless, these two 
restrictions require different remedies. The restriction of Article 23(2) requires non-compensation 
or compensation-like measures which can be decided by the government. By contrast, the public 
restriction of Article 23(3) could be accompanied by full compensation, the amount and degree of 
which are not entirely within governmental discretion.  
This blurred line caused doctrinal controversy in the Green Belt case, where the claimants 
argued that state policy breached Article 23(3).123 Here, the formal appearance of this arguably 
illegal restriction without compensation based on Article 23(3) is exactly the same as a legal 
restriction under Article 23(2) that does not stipulate compensation. Two kinds of restrictions are 
similar particularly in that neither restriction entails any physical transfer of title but merely a 
restriction on the use of property. On the other hand, a breach of Article 23(2) requires the 
amendment of related laws without compensation. Therefore, to rebut the claimant’s argument in 
this instance, the government contended that the restriction was established on the basis of social 
obligation under Article 23(2).124  
                                               
121 13-1 KCCR 932, 2000Hun-Ba31, April 26, 2000. 
122 Ko (n 62) pp.66-67; Nam-Chul Chung, ‘The Differentiation of the Compensable Public Interference 
Subject and Non-compensable Content-and-Limits’ (2010) 31 Kangwon Law Review p.87. 
123 10-2 KCCR 927, 937, 89Hun-Ma214, 90Hun-Ba16, 97Hun-Ba78, December 24, 1998 (Complainants’ 
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Against this backdrop, Korean threshold theory, influenced by the German threshold theory 
(Schwellentheorie), argues that Articles 23(2) and 23(3) are structurally connected. 125  The 
distinction between the restriction of Article 23(2) and the public restriction of Article 23(3) is a 
matter of degree. Therefore, even if the legislature were to establish the law initially according to 
Article 23(2), the government should give the relevant claimant compensation of the kind specified 
in Article 23(3) as long as the final result causes intolerable harm to a specific individual contrary to 
the proportionality principle.126  
 Here, the threshold theory considers the ‘special sacrifice’ doctrine as an important 
indicator for defining public interference.127 The existence of special sacrifice is an element that is 
required to distinguish public interference from other types of intrusive governmental action. The 
recognition of public interference depends on whether a special sacrifice on the part of a particular 
person is required by a government action. However, both Korean and German constitutional 
scholarship suffer from the difficulties of finding a substantive guideline to recognise the 
occurrence of special sacrifice. Initially, a traditional approach focused on the formal appearance of 
causing a burden; therefore, special sacrifice was recognised as occurring when it is apparent that a 
governmental act is intended to apply to a particular group in an unequal way. This approach 
originated from a method that was used by the German Empire Court (Reichgericht) in the Weimar 
era.128 However, the legislation of a contemporary democratic state rarely targets a particular 
person or property. While parliament interferes with property according to generally applicable 
statute, the general application of this principle by the statute causes unequal burdens to fall on 
certain persons. For example, in the Green Belt case, the statute did not intend to discriminate 
against a certain group of persons in appearance and it applied equally to any person who had 
property in the restricted zone. However, its general application led to an unequal situation where 
property owners of bare building lots were forced to assume a greater burden than other property 
owners in the Green Belt zone. Finally, the previous formalist approach has changed in favour of 
more substantive considerations of inequality; several cases before the Federal Court of Justice of 
                                               
125 6 BGHZ 270; 7 BGHZ 296; 10 BGHZ 255; 11 BGHZ 248; 13 BGHZ 371; 13 BGHZ 395. See also Ko (n 
62) pp.67-69. 
126 This doctrine is reminiscent of the regulatory taking doctrine of the U.S. Supreme Court in that it pays 
attention to the severity or consequential effect of property restriction rather than the mode of taking. Here, 
‘while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking’. 
See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). See also Currie (n 52) p.293; Gregory S. 
Alexander, ‘Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Right – the German Example’ (2002) 88(3) Cornell 
Law Review p.757. 
127 Ko (n 62) p.72. 
128 Kay (n 48) p.522. 
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Germany (Bundesgerichtshof, hereafter ‘the German Federal Court of Justice’) started to consider 
various substantive factors, such as the unequal results expected from the general application of 
legislation.129 One of the most influential doctrines in this regard concentrates on the severity of the 
interference.130 The occurrence of special sacrifice is upheld when the suffering caused by a 
government action is intolerable in the context of the social obligation doctrine, when the proper 
function is blocked or seriously impeded, or when the original purpose of the property is changed to 
a completely different one.131  
Interestingly, the meaning of the special sacrifice doctrine has become increasingly similar 
to the effect of disproportionate government action under Article 23(2). In precisely this context, the 
Korean threshold theory identifies the special sacrifice of Article 23(3) with the extremely 
disproportionate situation of Articles 23(1) and (2); thus special sacrifice presents itself as a 
threshold where Article 23(2)’s restriction changes into that of Article 23(3).132 The German 
Federal Court of Justice’s special sacrifice doctrine and the Korean Constitutional Court’s 
expropriation-like effect refer to a situation where all meaningful uses of a property are blocked. 
Therefore, the Korean threshold theory argues that the Court should consider the Green Belt cases 
in the context of Article 23(3) because the government could render the content of a property 
‘empty’ even without any actual taking.133  
Further, threshold theory proponents argue that an aggrieved property owner can ask for 
direct and individual compensation for unconstitutional public restriction without waiting for any 
aftermath measures such as legislative amendments.134 Instead, the government does not need to 
stop ongoing measures because the provision of just compensation cures the unconstitutionality of 
the statute. To summarise, the property owner accepts the severe harm and instead can ask for 
direct compensation which would be expected if such public interference included just 
compensation. Therefore, an ordinary court could issue an order for the government to pay 
compensation calculated hypothetically by that court without any legislative participation. This 
feature reveals that compensation based on threshold theory has a fundamentally different nature 
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131 See generally Kim (n 5) pp.346-54; Kay (n 48) pp.522-25. 
132 Yeon-Joo Jeong, ‘Property Protection and Proportionality’ (2001) 29(3) Public Law pp.59-60; Yeon-Joo 
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from compensation-like measures in terms of the separation of powers because the threshold theory 
does not have any room for legislative control, unlike the compensation-like measures.   
However, a critical problem for the threshold theory is that a court cannot find any 
constitutional ground for a judicial order of direct compensation for particular individuals. If one 
were to apply the threshold theory to the situation in the Green Belt case, an ordinary court could 
not order any compensation, even if it was suspicious about the policy’s constitutionality. The only 
choice open to the ordinary court would be to request that the Constitutional Court adjudicate on the 
constitutionality of the statute according to the Korean Constitutional Court Act, Article 41. Here, 
suppose that the Constitutional Court were to strike down the Green Belt policy on the grounds of a 
violation of Article 23(3), according to the special sacrifice doctrine of the threshold theory. That 
decision would prevent the court and the executive from relying on the unconstitutional statute.135 
Therefore, the government would have to stop the ongoing measure and make amendments in 
order to resume the public interference in accordance with the constitution. Even if the court can 
order the withdrawal of the relevant government action, it, unlike the German courts, does not have 
the power to order that any direct compensation be paid to plaintiffs as a remedy to unconstitutional 
acts; the plaintiff will have to wait for the legislative amendment to include a just compensation 
provision. In Germany, the Federal Court of Justice (the ordinary non-constitutional court) can 
order the government to pay compensation directly to the plaintiff by relying on customary law and 
case law accumulated over a long time, in accordance with Sections 74 and 75 of the Introduction 
to the Prussian General Land Law of 1794 (Einleitung zum Preußischen Allgemeinen Landrecht)136 
However, in Korea there is no such body of customary law or case law upon which the Court might 
rely in order to allow for individual and direct remedy.137  
Despite this formal weakness of the threshold theory, one cannot ignore its practical benefits 
in terms of providing an efficient remedy. Indeed, an aggrieved property owner usually prefers to 
receive direct and immediate compensation rather than waiting for a slow legislative process to be 
                                               
135 Korean Constitutional Court Act, Article 47 (Effect of Decision of Unconstitutionality):  
 
(1) Any decision that statutes are unconstitutional shall bind the ordinary courts, other state 
agencies and local governments.;  
(2) Any statute or provision thereof decided as unconstitutional shall lose its effect from the 
day on which the decision is made: Provided, that the statutes or provisions thereof 
relating to criminal penalties shall lose their effect retroactively. 
 
136 Fritz Ossenbühl, Staatshaftungsrecht (C.H. Beck, 1983) p.117ff.; Jochen Rozek, Die Unterscheidung von 
Eigentumsbindung und Enteignung: eine Bestandsaufnahme zur dogmatischen Struktur des Art. 14 GG nach 
15 Jahren “Naßauskiesung” (Mohr Siebeck, 1998) p.74. 
137 Kim (n 5) p.390; Ryu and Park (n 99) pp.516-18; Chung (n 122) pp.100-01.  
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completed, particularly where a property interference has already caused an excessively severe and 
irretrievable result. For example, suppose that a person had shares to the value of £20,000. However, 
that person has suffered from an extreme loss (around £10,000) in the property value of these shares 
because government action has prevented him or her from selling the shares in good time before a 
slump in the stock market. Here, it does not matter to that person whether he or she can stop an 
unconstitutional action in terms of making up for loss occasioned; just like so-called ‘Monday-
morning quarterbacking’. Otherwise, a property owner would be in an unstable situation until the 
legislature were to take a compensation-like measure or make an amendment, both of which are 
very vulnerable to political influence and are out of a claimant’s control. As such, a claimant would 
prefer  immediate  full  compensation  of  the  property  value  directly  from  the  Court,  even  if  that  
person endures the consequences of the government action. 
B. Uncertain reasoning of the Korean Constitutional Court 
The Korean Constitutional Court has not provided clear guidelines on the definition of 
public interference within the meaning of Article 23(3). In the Green Belt case it failed to address 
the plaintiff’s claim that the Green Belt policy was an unconstitutional public restriction under 
Article 23(3). Here, the Court held that the government action caused an unconstitutionally 
disproportionate effect by blocking all possible land use in the designated area. The Court’s 
reasoning in this regard was very similar to the threshold theory’s logic in finding special sacrifice. 
However, this unconstitutionality did not provide a constitutional ground for allowing direct 
compensation. All things considered, it seems clear that the court did not accept the threshold 
theory because it reviewed the statute only within the context of Articles 23(1) and (2). In 
consequence, the expropriation-like effect of the state action did not trigger the governmental duty 
of compensation under Article 23(3). Rather, the Court appeared to recognise the constitutional 
duty to take compensation-like measures in the context of Articles 23(1) and (2).138 
The compensation-like doctrine invented by the Korean Constitutional Court is very similar 
to the doctrine of equalisation based on the content-and-limit clause (ausgleichpflichtige Inhalts- 
und Schrankenbestimmung).139 The doctrine of equalisation based on the content-and-limit clause 
is based on the German separation theory (Trennungstheorie)  which  presumes  that  the  German  
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Basic Laws 14(2) and 14(3) are structurally separated.140 A series of German Constitutional Court 
cases stopped the previous practice of the German Federal Court of Justice of ordering 
compensation on the basis of unconstitutional expropriation.141 In the famous Groundwater 
(Naßauskiesung) case, the plaintiff had owned and operated a gravel pit in groundwater in 
accordance with the Prussian Water Act of 1931, since 1936. Later, the 1976 amendments to the 
Federal Water Resource Act (first enacted in 1957) allowed a public authority to refuse a permit for 
the use of water for the public interest, namely the prevention of environmental risk. Citing this law, 
the city denied the plaintiff permission to use the groundwater on the grounds of environmental 
danger. The aggrieved party eventually argued that that administrative act was an uncompensated 
expropriation.142 The German Constitutional Court rejected the plaintiff’s claim by holding that 
Article 14(3) of the German Basic Law refers only to a physical taking of property, which is the 
literal meaning of ‘expropriation’.143 Therefore, the relevant administrative act in the Groundwater 
case, despite its severe effect, could not be considered to be an expropriation because permit denial 
does not remove any portion of the physical property.144 Finally, the separation theory presumes 
that there is a fundamental gap between Article 14(2) and Article 14(3). Instead, the German 
Constitutional Court developed a doctrine of state obligation for equalisation based on the content-
and-limits clause. Some German constitutional decisions admitted the state’s obligation to 
compensate for extremely disproportionate legislative acts in the Mandatory Specimen case 
(Pflichtexemplar) case145 and the Monument Protection (Denkmalschutz) case.146 The facts of the 
Monument Protection case are similar to those of the Korean Green Belt case.147 In the Monument 
Protection case, the plaintiff was barred from demolishing his own house, which had been 
designated as a historically valuable building. Here, the Court did not consider any property 
restriction with actual taking as leading to an expropriation claim by following the reasoning in the 
Groundwater case; it made a clear statement that a mere restriction without any actual taking is not 
considered to be an expropriation in the sense of Article 14(3). Nonetheless, the Court held that the 
                                               
140 Ha-Joong Jeong (n 133) pp.67-75; Moon-Hyun Kim, ‘A Study on the Systematic Relation between 
“Eigentumsbindung” and “Enteignung” – Especially on Estimating Reception of “Trennungstheorie” in Korea’ 
(2004) 32(4) Public Law pp.4-9; Ko (n 62) pp.69-70 (explaining the German separation theory).  
141 58 BVerfGE 300.  
142 Kommers (n 49) pp.257-62. 
143 Kim (n 5) pp.338-39. 
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145 58 BVerfGE 137.  
146 100 BVerfGE 226. 
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content-and-limits clause imposed the governmental obligation to compensate the plaintiffs’ for 
suffering caused by extremely disproportionate measures, which blocked any substantial possibility 
of using the property.148 This obligation of the separation theory is not derived from Article 14(3) 
of the German Basic Law but from the content-and-limits clauses, namely Articles 14(1)-2 and 
14(2). 
However, in the textual context of the Korean property rights clause, this separation theory 
is a square peg in a round hole. The German Court recognized the constitutional duty of 
equalisation based on the content-and-limits clause only on the assumption (made in the 
Groundwater case)  that  Article  14(3)  of  the  German  Basic  Law  does  not  apply  to  any  type  of  
property restriction without physical taking. This reasoning suits a literal textual interpretation of 
Article 14(3). In fact, even if Article 14(3) of the German Basic Law defines only ‘expropriation’, 
the German ordinary courts and the threshold theory expanded the meaning of expropriation so as 
to cover such restriction. By contrast, the fundamental premise of the German separation theory is 
that returning to the literal meaning of expropriation helps to draw a clear line between an ordinary 
regulation of the German Basic Law Article 14(2) and the actual taking of Article 14(3). Here, the 
clear and formalist standard of Article 14(3)’s expropriation is whether or not there has been an 
actual taking.   
However, the scope of Article 23(3) of the Korean Constitution is broader than that of the 
Article 14(3) in the German Basic Law. This is because the text of Article 23(3) includes not only 
‘expropriation’ but also ‘restriction’ and ‘use’.149 In particular, the public restriction of property 
under the Korean Constitution occurs without any actual taking, exactly as in the ordinary 
regulation of Article 23(2). By contrast, according to the German separation theory, expropriation 
under Article 14(3) of the German Basic Law does not include a regulation like the Korean public 
restriction which restricts the use of property without any actual taking. While the German 
separation theory deals with whether or not the expropriation takes place, the Korean Constitutional 
Court is required to draw a clear line between two kinds of restriction, namely the restriction of 
Articles 23(1) and (2) and the public restriction of Article 23(3). Finally, separation theory in Korea 
does not help to identify a clear standard that can be used to distinguish the regulation of Articles 
23(1) and (2) from public interference (especially public restriction).150 
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Nevertheless, the Korean Constitutional Court has not yet made any clear statement of the 
grounds for dividing the two kinds of property interference. In fact, equalisation based on the 
content-and-limits clause, which corresponds to the compensation-like measures, can be inferred 
from a clear statement to separate Article 14(1)-2 and (2) from Article 14(3) in the German Basic 
Law (Articles 23(2)-1 and (2) and Article 23(3) in the Korean Constitution). However, the Korean 
Constitutional Court has upheld the constitutional duty of the government under Articles 23(1) and 
(2), rather than Article 23(3), without careful analysis of the definition of public interference. In 
other words, the Court did not deal with the claimant’s argument that the Green Belt policy 
breached Article 23(3). The Court should have explained why this issue should be discussed not in 
relation to Article 23(3) but in relation to Articles 23(1) and (2), if it was going to accept the core 
logic  of  the  separation  theory  that  the  two  articles  are  structurally  separate.  While  the  German  
Constitutional Court found that the reason for this separation was located in the textual meaning of 
expropriation in Article 14(3) of the German Basic Law, the Korean Constitutional Court should 
have found it in elsewhere. In the event, the Court’s unclear ruling meant that it was not able to 
prevent the definition of interference (especially public interference) from becoming a grey area of 
Korean property law. All things considered, that the Korean Constitutional Court clearly accepted 
the German separation theory looks highly suspicious.151  
Another question could be raised regarding the difference between the compensation-like 
measures of Articles 23(1) and (2) and the compensation of Article 23(3). There is a big difference 
in the nature and extent of these remedies. The Constitutional Court decision did not allow a 
plaintiff to request the direct compensation of Article 23(3) from the court order. Further, the 
claimant in the Green Belt case had to wait for a legislative measure to establish a compensation-
like measure. In addition, it is possible for the government to take non-monetary government action 
instead of giving full-market-value-equivalent pecuniary compensation. On the other hand, 
compensation in Article 23(3) means the full payment of objective value (usually in a monetary 
form). In addition, the threshold theory allows an ordinary court to order monetary compensation 
without consideration by the legislature. However, the Korean Constitutional Court seems to allow 
relatively more legislative discretion regarding the nature and extent of compensation-like measures.  
                                                                                                                                     
Korean Constitution coincides with the meaning of ‘Enteignung’ under Article 14(3) of the German Basic 
Law. See Chung (n 122) pp.88-89. However, this argument clearly goes beyond the limit of any textual 
interpretation concerning the Korean Constitution, Article 23(3).  
151 Chang (n 35) p.761, footnote 22. 
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Nevertheless, there have been some recent developments in Korean Constitutional Court 
cases which have further blurred the line between compensation-like measures under Articles 23(1) 
and (2) and compensation under Article 23(3). The Court reviewed compensation-like measures 
which do not include monetary compensation in the Natural Park case. The Natural Parks Act, like 
the Green Belt policy, restricts the land property in the national park zone. In the wake of the Green 
Belt case, the government established many compensation-like measures to meet the 
proportionality requirement, but it excluded monetary compensation. Here, five of the nine Justices 
admitted that the existence of monetary compensation would be closely related to the 
constitutionality of the relevant regulation. They then went on to strike down the regulation on the 
grounds of overall lack of proportionality, though four members of the majority five did not have a 
clear position as to whether disproportionality depends decisively on the absence of monetary 
compensation. On this point, Justice Kwon, Seong’s opinion argued that the regulation was 
unconstitutional as long as it did not contain any monetary compensation for property 
interference.152 Nevertheless, the final decision in this case upheld the constitutionality of the 
regulation because of a procedural matter. According to the Korean Constitutional Court Act, two-
thirds (six out of nine) Justices constitute a quorum for declaring a law unconstitutional; in the 
instant case, only five Justices held the relevant act to be unconstitutional.153 Nevertheless, this case 
is indicative of future doctrinal developments in favour of monetary compensation. Of course, there 
might still be a difference between the monetary amount required by the two kinds of compensation; 
while Articles 23(1) and (2) are oriented on restoring proportionality, Article 23(3) focuses on the 
full reimbursement of property value. Nevertheless, despite these qualitative differences, nobody 
can pronounce firmly that future judicial rulings will not narrow the gap in terms of the final and 
practical consequences of these two types of compensation. In all, claimants might possibly gain 
the same amount and nature of remedy in a different way: while the threshold theory helps property 
owners to get a full compensation directly from a court decision, the Korean Constitutional Court’s 
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future ruling is expected to allow them to gain this indirectly through the legislative procedure. If so, 
one could not find any meaningful difference between the compensation-like measure doctrine and 
the direct compensation of the threshold theory, except for the fact that the claimant has to wait for 
the legislature’s measure in the compensation-like measure doctrine.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
Given the current situation, doctrinal discussion over the structural framework of Article 23 
of the Korean Constitution remains in a state of confusion. Nevertheless, it looks clear that the 
Korean Constitutional Court will follow two steps in reviewing the constitutionality of regulations 
that restrict property without compensation: i) the Court will consider the character of the regulation 
in the course of examining whether it is based on social obligation; ii) the Court will then conduct a 
proportionality test by comparing the social obligation and the degree of negative effect caused by 
the regulation. In any case, the Court will strike down the regulation if, through the proportionality 
test, it recognises the occurrence of an ‘expropriation-like effect’, namely where government policy 
blocks any meaningful use of property without any provision of compensation. In addition to 
upholding the unconstitutionality of such measures, the Court will recognise governmental 
obligation for a compensation-like measure to cure the disproportionate situation, instead of giving 
the claimants direct and full-market value compensation. Such a decision entitles ordinary courts to 
issue a withdrawal order on on-going administrative acts. Also, the government is required to 
propose a new statute in order to accommodate the provision of compensation-like measures. Here, 
the claimant cannot receive any remedies for loss of property until this new act has come into effect. 
Of course, aggrieved property owners can argue about the nature and content of the newly 
established compensation-like measures if they are not satisfied by them when comparing them to 
the full-market-value payment they might otherwise have hoped to receive. Here, it will be 
controversial how the court will articulate conditions (amount or method etc.) to justify a certain 
compensation-like measure under the Korean Constitution. Here, the Court has not yet established 
solid case law specifying the standards for the constitutional nature and amount of compensation-
like measures, even if it shows more sympathy with an argument in favour of monetary 









DOCTRINAL GAPS BETWEEN INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION UNDER THE 
KORUS-FTA AND PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE KOREAN 
CONSTITUTION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine how the future tribunal might consider the doctrine of indirect 
expropriation in investor-state arbitration under the KORUS-FTA. It will do so in order to compare 
the protection and restriction mechanisms of the KORUS-FTA with those of the Korean 
Constitution, discussed in Chapter II. The principle of property protection is incorporated into all 
KORUS-FTA clauses, such as the national treatment1 or minimum standard of treatment clauses,2 
as part of the overall purpose of the KORUS-FTA itself. However, the doctrine of indirect 
expropriation is more directly related to property issues than other clauses. In particular, as outlined 
in Chapter I above, this doctrine has been controversial in a Korean Constitutional context because 
it looks foreign to Korean lawyers. This chapter will therefore focus mainly on the substantive 
doctrine of indirect expropriation and procedural matters relating thereto. It will consider other 
issues only where they are deemed relevant to an understanding of the indirect expropriation 
doctrine.  
Some Korean critical scholars argue that the idea of property as incorporated into the 
KORUS-FTA is fundamentally foreign to that of the Korean Constitution.3 However, such 
criticisms remain vague because they could lead to the following sceptical questions: does the 
                                               
1 Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America (KORUS-FTA) 
Article 11.3. 
2 ibid Article 11.5. 
3 Kuk-Won Jeong, ‘Korea-U.S FTA and the Public Land Law’ (2008) 39 Public Land Law Review p.208; 
Uk-Han Lee, ‘Constitutional Approaches to Indirect Expropriation of the Korea-US FTA’ (2009) 15(1) 
Constitutional Law Studies pp.325-33. 
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Korean Constitution neglect property protection? Does the contemporary idea of international 
investment law reject Korean Constitutional doctrines that carefully distinguish legitimate 
regulatory power controlling the abusive use of property from malignant authoritarianism harming 
the proper enjoyment of property rights? It might be undeniable that there are several gaps between 
the two legal systems in the degree and ways in which they protect property and regulatory power. 
However, more careful substantive analysis is required to determine whether such doctrinal gaps 
could prevent the Korean government from achieving the essential constitutional values of the 
social  state  in  such  a  severe  manner  that  it  outweighs  the  benefits  of  the  KORUS-FTA such  as  
attraction of foreign investment. 
In this regard, Part II of this chapter articulates a fundamental issue around indirect 
expropriation doctrine by describing the chaotic development of that doctrine. Before delving into 
this analysis of substantive doctrines, Part III will examine the procedural issues concerning indirect 
expropriation litigation. Naturally, a significant part of this chapter will be concerned with the 
substantive issues of the indirect expropriation doctrine. However, a brief description of the 
procedural aspects of arbitration under Chapter 11 of the KORUS-FTA is necessary in order to 
understand how the wording of indirect expropriation provisions might be applied and who would 
have the authority to interpret the treaty. The reason is that the procedural issues surrounding 
indirect expropriation are related to the generation and reduction of doctrinal gaps which could 
jeopardise the Korean government’s constitutional mandate. Then, Part IV will then anticipate how 
the tribunal will apply the indirect expropriation doctrine in potential KORUS-FTA claims. Next, 
Part V will scrutinise how successful new wording of the indirect expropriation provisions under 
the KORUS-FTA will be helpful to coping with indirect expropriation concerns by reducing a 
doctrinal gap between the Korean Constitution and the KORUS-FTA. Part VI will nevertheless 
reveal real, fundamental concerns rooted in the operation of the legal system beyond a simple 
analysis of doctrinal similarities and differences. Finally, this part serves as a more concrete and 
clearer linking argument which can build a bridge between the doctrinal discussions of Chapters II, 








II. DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION-NOT-
REQUIRED REGULATION 
A. Chaotic development of indirect expropriation 
The KORUS-FTA protects property of investors under the name of investment. The 
KORUS-FTA Article 11.6.1 prescribes:  
Neither Party may expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either directly or 
indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation or nationalization (expropriation), 
except: 
(a) for a public purpose;  
(b) in a non-discriminatory manner;  
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation; and  
(d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 11.5.1 through 11.5.3. 
In particular, the KORUS-FTA protects ‘a tangible or intangible property right in an 
investment’4 by preventing arbitrary expropriation. Furthermore, Annex 11-B of the KORUS-FTA 
categorizes this into two types of actions, viz. direct and indirect expropriation. Direct expropriation 
deprives an investor of the investment directly ‘through formal transfer of title or outright seizure’.5 
On the other hand, Annex 11-B.3 of the KORUS-FTA also defines the concept of indirect 
expropriation as a situation ‘where an action or series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent 
to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title or outright seizure’.6  In fact, direct 
expropriation can be easily recognized.7 Furthermore, this kind of physical expropriation has 
gradually become increasingly rare because host states are inclined to avoid apparently intrusive 
measures. Many investment-importing states understand that such measures frustrate future 
investors. In comparison to that, the issue of indirect expropriation has emerged as one of biggest 
issues in international investment law for the reasons outlined below.  
The changing regulatory environment in nation-states leads international investment law to 
develop the doctrine of indirect expropriation in order to protect investors from various types of 
                                               
4 KORUS-FTA Annex 11-B.1. 
5 ibid Annex 11-B.2. 
6 A large number of international investment treaties and arbitration decisions incorporate the idea of indirect 
expropriation through the use of various kinds of terminology, such as ‘de facto expropriation,’ ‘creeping 
expropriation,’ or measures ‘tantamount to’ or ‘equivalent to’ expropriation. The Tecmed case conceptualises 
those concepts under the umbrella of ‘indirect expropriation’. See Tecmed v. United Mexican States, ICSID 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 29 May 2003 para.114. 
7 Christopher F. Dugan, Investor-State Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2008) pp.450-51. 
DOCTRINAL GAPS BETWEEN THE KORUS-FTA AND THE KOREAN CONSTITUTION 
 
55 
excessive interference with property. As contemporary states often intervene in private property for 
the public welfare, the greatest challenge faced by investors is government action that nullifies the 
economic value of property indirectly.8 While states are eager to regulate the private sphere in 
order to achieve public political goals such as national prosperity, they do not want to be involved 
in expropriation claims. Therefore, host states can invent numerous creative and tactful alternatives. 
For instance, a contemporary government would be reluctant to directly nationalise a foreign 
company because such an apparent measure could give a negative signal to the future investors, 
even if such nationalisation is beneficial to the public. Instead, it applies other indirect ways to 
affect the operation of a business; for example, by imposing strict conditions for the renewal of a 
business permit. Alternatively, it could establish a new state-run company and make it more 
competitive by providing various governmental supports. Such indirect measures could abate the 
latent  profits  of  its  foreign  competitor  to  the  extent  that  it  leads  to  the  closure  of  the  foreign  
undertaking. However, the investor could not argue that this government action has expropriated 
the investor’s property directly, because there was no transfer of title nor any physical and direct 
interference with the property.9  
In response to such problems, international investment law has tried to give arbitrators 
relatively broad discretion, enabling tribunals to review many kinds of disguised expropriation 
under the concept of indirect expropriation. For example, Article 1110.1 of NAFTA prescribes that 
‘[n]o Party may directly or indirectly nationalise or expropriate an investment of an investor of 
another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalisation or expropriation of 
such an investment’. However, the NAFTA text does not clarify the meaning of a ‘measure 
tantamount to expropriation or nationalisation’. This wording allows international investment 
tribunals to recognize various government measures as indirect expropriation. In other investment 
arbitration cases, such as the CME case, tribunals have considered interference with contract rights 
belonging to an investor’s local partner to be de facto expropriation.10 The  ICSID award  in  the  
Middle East Cement Shipping case held that the revocation of a free zone license, which retarded 
the investor’s business to the point of de facto closure, was indirect expropriation.11 This kind of 
treaty wording gives the benefit of flexibility to an investor who is forced to face hostile and 
devious government measures. 
                                               
8 M. Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment (Cambridge University Press, 2010) p.389. 
9 ibid pp.367-76. 
10 CME v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (Netherlands/Czech Republic BIT), Partial Award, 13 September 
2001. 
11 Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID No. ARB/99/6, 




B. Balancing the legitimate regulatory power of the host state with investment 
protection 
The increased protection of foreign investors of the last 20 years has recently ebbed, leading 
international investment lawyers and policy makers to deal with another challenging task: 
immunizing the legitimate regulatory power of the host state from indirect expropriation claims.12 
Taking a too investor-oriented approach to the meaning of indirect expropriation runs the risk of 
generating other counter-productive consequences; the broad concept of indirect expropriation can 
be applied to attack ordinary government policies that pursue the public interest.13 For example, in 
the Metalclad case,14 the host state refused to grant a construction permit and it designated the area 
as a national protection area for cactuses. The tribunal in this case held that this series of measures 
amounted to indirect expropriation ‘which has the effect of depriving the owner of the reasonably-
to-be-expected economic benefit of property’.15 Additionally, the Canadian company, Methanex, 
submitted a Chapter 11 claim under the NAFTA on the grounds that California’s ban on Methyl 
Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) gasoline additive amounted to an expropriation under Article 1110 of 
NAFTA.16 Although the claim was eventually unsuccessful, this case drew a critical attention from 
civil society because it illustrated that foreign investors can challenge the sovereign power which 
protects the public interest.  
Nonetheless, international investment law does not seem to propose a clear rule to 
distinguish expropriation which may be compensated from that which may not, despite clearly 
recognising the existence of such a rule.17 As the concept of indirect expropriation has been 
expanded, it has suffered from inconsistency and uncertainty in interpretation. In the 
Metalclad case, the Mexican government tried to have the award made by the international 
arbitration  panel  set  aside  before  the  Canadian  court.  Here,  the  Metalclad award was 
partially annulled. The Canadian court’s reasoning for its decision includes sceptical 
commentary on the previous decision by the investment arbitration panel. The Court held 
that even if the Canadian court itself lacked authority to decide the meaning of expropriation, 
                                               
12 OECD, ‘“Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law (Working 
Papers on International Investment No. 2004/4)’ (2004) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/54/33776546.pdf> 
accessed 15 April 2012. 
13 Jesse Williams, ‘Regulating Multinational Polluters in a Post-NAFTA Trade Regime: The Lessons of 
Metalclad v. Mexico and the Case for a Takings Standard’ (2003) 8(2) UCLA Journal of International Law 
and Foreign Affairs (regarding criticism of the Metalclad tribunal’s extensive reading of indirect 
expropriation). 
14 Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, 30 August 2000. 
15 ibid para.103. 
16 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005. 
17 Sornarajah (n 8) p.390. 
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depriving ‘reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefits of property’ could not constitute 
such expropriation. The Court was concerned that such a broad understanding of NAFTA’s 
Article 1110 would encompass legitimate regulation within the jurisdiction of investment 
claims.18 Inconsistency in approach to the indirect expropriation is further indicated by the 
existence of conflicting decisions from different adjudicative forums on the same facts. In 
this instance, the CME case19 was dealt with in Stockholm in accordance to the Netherlands-
Czech  BIT,  but  Lauder,  a  shareholder  of  CME,  made  the  same  claim  before  a  different  
forum in London in accordance with the US-Czech BIT. Contrary to the Stockholm 
arbitration tribunal, the London arbitration decision held that the relevant governmental 
action was not expropriation.20  
To summarise, the purpose of indirect expropriation regulation is to maintain a balance 
between justifiable regulatory power and the protectable property rights of foreign investors. 
Nevertheless, no consistent jurisprudence on indirect expropriation seems to emerge from relevant 
cases. This uncertainty can create anxiety for both governments and investors. 
C. A new generation of indirect expropriation under the KORUS-FTA?  
Given the above situation, the U.S. and Korea seem to agree on the need to control the 
precarious development of indirect expropriation jurisprudence. This new attitude has been 
motivated by several experiences which show that the broad protection of investors is not always 
beneficial for economically stronger states. For example, NAFTA empowered not only U.S. 
investors investing in the territory of another contracting party but also foreign investors within the 
U.S. Therefore, as seen in the Methanex case, NAFTA jurisprudence could be used by foreign 
investors to attack justifiable uses of regulatory power by the United States – even if such claims 
were rarely successful for the investor.21 Moreover, it is possible that the autonomous development 
of NAFTA jurisprudence could surpass the drafters’ original intent. In this context, trade policy 
makers in post-NAFTA treaty negotiations began using carefully-chosen language in order to 
                                               
18 The United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corporation, Reason for Judgment of the Honourable Mr. Justice 
Tysoe, 2 May 2001 para.99. 
19 CME v. Czech Republic (n 10).  
20 Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (United States/Czech Republic BIT), Award, 3 September 2001. 
21 Vicki Been and Joel C. Beauvais, ‘The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections and 
the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine’ (2003) 78(1) New York University 
Law Review pp.32-39; Michael G. Parisi, ‘Moving toward Transparency-An Examination of Regulatory 




narrow the scope of indirect expropriation.22 Indeed, mainstream international investment law no 
longer insists on the absolute insulation of investors from the regulatory schemes of sovereign 
states.23 Accordingly, the Feldman v. Mexico arbitration under the NAFTA held:  
[N]ot all government regulatory activity that makes it difficult or impossible for an investor 
to carry out a particular business, change in the law or change in the application of existing 
laws that makes it uneconomical to continue a particular business, is an expropriation 
under Article 1110.24  
In other words, the investment tribunal admitted that states could not achieve their 
legitimate public goals if reasonable regulation is subject to an obligation of payment of 
compensation only on the ground of the adverse effects of regulation.25  
Today many new investment treaties are drafted in a way that seeks to avoid the latent 
problems of indirect expropriation.26 In concert with this trend, the U.S. and Korea have tried to 
restrict the understanding of indirect expropriation within domestic legal doctrine. Both state parties 
had to deal with criticism of the NAFTA, whose pro-business trend has angered many 
environmentalists and labour activists. For instance, the U.S. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority 
Act of 2002 (hereafter ‘the U.S. Trade Act of 2002’) prescribed that the indirect expropriation 
provision of FTAs must be ‘consistent with United States legal principle and practice’.27 This effort 
to respect legitimate regulatory power is reflected in the 2004 U.S. BIT Model,28 which was 
eventually incorporated into the wording of the KORUS-FTA. 
One can therefore find some evidence of an attempt to strike a balance between national 
regulatory power and investment protection of foreign investors in the KORUS-FTA text. For 
instance, the Preamble of the KORUS-FTA prescribes that foreign investors cannot receive more 
protection of their investment than domestic investors.29 In the KORUS-FTA negotiation, the U.S. 
                                               
22 J. Martin Wagner, ‘International Investment, Expropriation and Environmental Protection’ (1999) 29(3) 
Golden Gate University Law Review pp.465-66; Rachel D. Edsall, ‘Indirect Expropriation under NAFTA and 
DR-CAFTA: Potential Inconsistencies in the Treatment of State Public Welfare Regulations’ (2006) 86(4) 
Boston University Law Review pp.931-33. 
23 Sornarajah (n 8) pp.389-90. 
24 Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID No. ARB(AF)/01/12, Award, 16 December 2002 para.103. 
25 Sornarajah (n 8) p.395. 
26 ibid p.390. 
27 19 U.S.C. §3802(b)(3)(D). See also Williams (n 13) pp.476-77; Mark B. Baker, ‘No Country Left Behind: 
The Exporting of US Legal Norms Under the Guise of Economic Integration’ (2005) 19(3) Emory 
International Law Review pp.1337-39 (explaining the relevant factual backgrounds). 
28 Parisi (n 21) pp.413-23 (explaining the general trend of the U.S. post-NAFTA agreement). 
29 The Preamble to the KORUS-FTA: 
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government initially requested this provision to be adopted30 in light of new U.S. trade policy goals, 
as found in the U.S. Trade Act of 2002.31 Although a Preamble cannot be independently and 
directly binding in and of itself, a tribunal can consider the text of such a Preamble if it has 
difficulty in finding any meaningful guidance for interpretation of a given clause. Under Article 31 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereafter ‘VCLT’), a tribunal can interpret the 
ordinary meaning of a provision in the context of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose. 
Here, ‘the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty’ includes not only ‘the text’ but 
also its ‘preamble and annexes’.32  
In addition, the wording of the KORUS-FTA Chapter 11 appears to prescribe a series of 
terms which are reminiscent of the national doctrines of the two countries, such as the regulatory 
taking and special sacrifice doctrines, as will be seen in the following sections. Nevertheless, the 
new wording of the KORUS-FTA does not change the existing rule of international investment law 
in an apparently opposite way. Rather, it could be said that the drafters of the KORUS-FTA have 
employed an indirect but skilful strategy to deal with this issue, instead of radical change of the 
existing international rules or direct acceptance of the national doctrines. Indeed, the KORUS-
FTA’s wording is observable not only in national legal doctrine and but also in international 
investment law. Whilst accentuating the common elements of both systems, the KORUS-FTA 
drafters have adopted their own national legal terms into the treaty text in a way that is compatible 
with the general rule of international investment law. To be specific, if a doctrinal controversy in 
case law allows several choices for arbitrators in interpreting an expropriation claim, the drafters 
have ensured that the review process is more compatible with the national doctrines by making the 
abstract languages of the treaty clearer in favour of national doctrine to the extent generally allowed 
under international investment law. 
                                                                                                                                     
 
The government of the Republic of Korea (Korea) and the Government of the United 
States of America (United States) (the parties) […] [a]greeing that foreign investors are not 
hereby accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than 
domestic investors under domestic law where, as in the United States, protections of 
investors rights under domestic law equal or exceed those set forth in this Agreement […] 
[h]ave agreed as follows […]. 
 
30 See generally Soo-Bong Jeong, Analysis on KORUS-FTA Investment Chapter (Ministry of Justice in 
Republic of Korea, 2008) pp.348-49. 
31 The U.S. Trade Act of 2002 ensures ‘that foreign investors in the United States are not accorded greater 
substantive rights with respect to investment protections than United States investors in the United States’. See 
19 U.S.C §3802(b)(3).  
32 For example, the Romak case considered the preamble of a BIT in addition to other elements in the course 
of clarifying the ordinary meaning of the investment according to the Article 31 of Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT). See Romak S.A. (Switzerland) v. The Republic of Uzbekistan, PCA Case No. AA280, 




This chapter will examine how successfully the above-mentioned drafting of the KORUS-
FTA will make constitutionally justifiable Korean regulation immune from KORUS-FTA 
investment claims arguing indirect expropriation. Before this, it is necessary to examine procedural 
issues of investment claims in which a gap might occur because this examination is helpful for 
better understanding of substantial analysis of doctrinal comparison.  
III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES RELATING TO INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION CLAIMS 
A. State party’s consent as establishment of arbitration  
As discussed above, Chapter 11 of the KORUS-FTA provides a dispute settlement 
mechanism in which an investor can sue a host state in the event of an allegation of a breach of the 
KORUS-FTA.33 The claimant can submit the claim to arbitration after initial consultation and 
negotiation34 and a six month cooling-off period.35 In such a case, a claimant can choose the 
arbitration forum and its related procedures, including the ICSID, the UNCITRAL or other 
procedures, as depicted in the following figure.36  
 
<Figure III-1> Procedure of Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
                                               
33 KORUS-FTA Article 11.16.1. 
34 ibid Article 11.15. 
35 ibid Article 11.16.3. 
36 ibid. In contrast to the KORUS-FTA, Article 1120.1 of the NAFTA does not allow any other arbitration 
than ICSID and UNCITRAL. However, Article 24(3)(d) of the U.S. Model BIT and Article 11.16 (3)(d) of 
the KORUS-FTA make it possible for a claimant to submit the investment claim under other forms of 
arbitration, such as ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) or LCIA (London Court of International 
Arbitration), SCC (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce), AAA (American Arbitration Association) or KCAB 
(Korean Commercial Arbitration Board) on condition of mutual agreement. 
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Clearly, the establishment of investor-state arbitration is formally justified only by the 
sovereign act of a nation-state, which has authority to conclude the treaty.37 To be specific, the 
establishment of an investor-state dispute settlement mechanism is presumably grounded in Article 
11.17 of the KORUS-FTA, which distinguishes investment arbitration from other dispute 
settlement systems.38  An investor-state dispute settlement mechanism shares some common 
features with other ordinary international commercial arbitration systems in the sense that it 
stipulates the consent of the relevant parties.39 However, one party of investor-state arbitration is 
usually the public authority of the state, unlike in commercial arbitration, which is based on the 
private autonomy of both parties.40 Most importantly and most controversially, treaty-based 
arbitration, like the KORUS-FTA arbitration, gives preliminary and general consent to all possible 
future disputes.41 Paulsson considers this type of arbitration to be ‘arbitration without privity’ in the 
sense that ‘it creates privity at the time of initiating arbitration’.42  
Although Harten argues that Paulsson’s description remains within the theoretical 
framework of private law, he admits that Paulsson sheds some light on the point that the general 
consent clause of an investment treaty makes investment arbitration distinguishable from contract-
based arbitration between a private foreign investor and a state.43 To be specific, in commercial 
arbitration, the state is presumed to act mainly in a private capacity at the international level, 
regardless of its sovereign status at the national level.44 This type of arbitration contains a clear 
jurisdictional limitation.45 For example, even if a contract includes consent to arbitration in advance, 
the effect of such consent is applicable only to the specific relationship between the investor and the 
host state involved. Also, where the consent is given after the occurrence of a dispute, its 
jurisdictional effect will extend only to that particular dispute. However, treaty-based arbitration, 
combined with blanket-consent provisions, allows any potential investor from the state parties to 
have a right to invoke a legal claim against the host state,46 and the state is forced to enter into the 
                                               
37 Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) p.65. 
38 ibid pp.58-71. See also Zachary Douglas, ‘The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration’ 
(2004) 74(1) British Yearbook of International Law (regarding general description of hybrid features of 
investment treaty arbitration systems). 
39 Jan Paulsson, ‘Arbitration without Privity’ (1995) 10(2) ICSID Review. 
40 Harten (n 37) pp.58-59. 
41 ibid p.63. 
42 Paulsson (n 39) p.247. 
43 Harten (n 37) pp.64-65. 
44 ibid pp.62-63. 
45 ibid p.62. 




litigation according to this consent clause, as long as the claim meets jurisdictional and procedural 
requirements.47  
B. Choice of dispute settlement  
While the contracting states to the KORUS-FTA have given their prior written consent to 
arbitration under Article 11.17.1, Article 11.18.2 – similarly to Article 1121.2(b) of the NAFTA48 – 
requires claimants to forswear other national or international remedies for the relevant measure, 
including consent to arbitration in another forum. This provision prevents a claimant from using an 
investment arbitration mechanism in parallel to a national court or other judicial forums for policy 
reasons. It does so to ensure unnecessary additional protections are not granted to investors and to 
prevent the multiplication of jurisdictions. Also, this provision is intended to control a possible 
conflict between the domestic judicial decisions and arbitration rulings on the same issue.49 Some 
categorise this NAFTA provision as a ‘fork in the road’ provision that does not allow claimants to 
change their initial forum choice after the initiation of proceedings.50 
Dolzer and Schreuer cast some doubt on this position.51 The investor in a NAFTA case is 
allowed to take a U-turn and go back to investment arbitration. The same applies to the KORUS-
FTA provision; suppose a Korean investor could submit a dispute to a U.S. court. The claimant 
could give up ‘continuing’ before the U.S. court by deciding not to appeal to the higher court and 
could then initiate the KORUS-FTA arbitration. In addition, the tribunal in the Waste Management 
II case made it clear that Article 1121.2.(b) of NAFTA is not a typical ‘fork in the road’ provision, 
                                               
47 Harten (n 37) pp.62-63. 
48 NAFTA, Article 1121.2:  
 
A disputing investor may submit a claim under Article 1117 to arbitration only if both the 
investor and the enterprise:  
(a) consent to arbitration in accordance with the procedures set out in this Agreement; and 
(b) waive their right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under 
the law of any Party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with 
respect to the measure of the disputing Party that is alleged to be a breach referred to in 
Article 1117, except for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary 
relief, not involving the payment of damages, before an administrative tribunal or court 
under the law of the disputing Party. 
 
49 See generally David A. Gantz, ‘The Evolution of FTA Investment Provisions: From NAFTA to the United 
States-Chile Free Trade Agreement’ (2003) 19(4) American University International Law Review pp.755-58; 
Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 
2008) pp.216-17. 
50 e.g. Harten (n 37) p.69. 
51 Dolzer and Schreuer (n 49) p.216 footnote 19. 
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because a waiver is required of the investor only when the investor submit a claim under Article 
1120, regardless of the commencement of any prior national remedy.52  
If there were not Annex 11-E of the KORUS-FTA, the waiver clause would run a risk of 
being at odds with Korean constitutional arrangements, where the Court can consider international 
law as a legal source for proceeding without any implementing legislation. Indeed, the KORUS-
FTA prevents a U.S. investor from withdrawing her or his initial choice of remedy due to the 
difference in the constitutional practices of both countries.  
The Korean Courts could consider the treaty to be an applicable legal source in accordance 
with Article 6(1) of the Korean Constitution.53 In fact, there is controversy over the meaning of 
‘generally recognised rules of international law’. Especially, the Korean Court has not made a clear 
case law as to whether the Article 6(1) of the Korean Constitution includes the international laws 
which are not formally concluded and promulgated by the Korean government but generally 
respected by many countries.54 For example, where the claimant argued that ILO Conventions No. 
87 and No. 151 were considered as generally recognised rules of international law, the Korean 
Constitutional Court denied their domestic effect simply on the ground that the Korean government 
has not ratified those conventions. The Court did not recognise those conventions as a generally 
recognised rule of international law without any further reasoning for its conceptual conditions.55 
However, it is generally agreed that a Korean court can use a treaty as a formal legal source 
equivalent to national statutes if the Korean National Assembly has approved the treaty in 
accordance with Article 60(1) of the Korean Constitution.56 In addition, a foreign legal person can, 
in principle, have equal access to the court in terms of constitutional right unless the treaty 
                                               
52 Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States (Number 2), ICSID No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Jurisdiction 
(for second claim), 30 April 2004 paras.29-30. 
53 Korean Constitution, Article 6 (1): ‘Treaties duly concluded and promulgated under the Constitution and 
the generally recognized rules of international law shall have the same force and effect of law as the domestic 
laws of the Republic of Korea’. 
54 Kyoug Soo Jung, ‘Korean Legal System and Experience on Domestic Application of International Law’ 
(2008) 28 Korea International Law Review pp.105-06. 
55 19-2 KCCR 213, 233-34, 2003 Hun-Ba51, August 30 2007. 
56 Bokhyeon Nam and others, International Treaty and Constitutional Review (Korean Constitutional Court, 
2007) pp.377-87; Jung (n 54) pp.106-07. Korean Constitutional Court cases are consistent with this argument. 
See 10-2 KCCR 685, 686, 97Hun-Ba65, November 26, 1998; 11-1 KCCR 273, 282-83, 97Hun-Ga14, April 
29, 1999; 13-2 KCCR 322, 322, 2000Hun-Ba20, September 27, 2000. For example, the Korean Supreme 
Court invalidated the municipal ordinance that encouraged the dining facilities of local schools to use local 
agricultural products according to the Agreement on Government Procurement of the WTO. See Supreme 




prescribes otherwise.57 This means that a U.S. investor could initiate judicial proceedings before 
the Korean courts on the grounds of a breach of the KORUS-FTA, provided that this is not 
otherwise prescribed by the treaty or by relevant national laws.  
Given this setting, if there were not any additional provisions, a U.S. investor could give up 
continuing a further remedy before a Korean court and instead he or she could start the KORUS-
FTA arbitration procedure. Here, suppose that the Korean court rejects the claimant’s argument by 
interpreting  the  same  clause  of  the  KORUS-FTA  in  an  opposite  way.  If  so,  there  may  be  an  
interpretive conflict over the same KORUS-FTA provision on the same government action 
between the Korean courts and the KORUS-FTA arbitration tribunal. In order to address this 
problem, the KORUS-FTA has made an additional rule for Korea, similar to that concerning 
Mexico in Article 1120.1 of the NAFTA. Here, a U.S. investor’s initial choice of judicial forum is 
final and irreversible.58  
On the other hand, the U.S. legal system does not entail such a possibility of judicial conflict 
between national courts and investment tribunals in interpreting the same KORUS-FTA clauses. 
This is because the KORUS-FTA is not considered to be a domestically effective treaty to which 
U.S. courts can refer under the U.S. Constitution. Similarly to Article 6(1) of the Korean 
Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2, of the U.S. Constitution, considers ‘all treaties made, or which 
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States’ to be ‘the supreme Law of the Land’ which 
binds ‘the Judges in every State’. Therefore, these treaties principally prevail over any state law 
within the U.S.59 In relation to treaty making, the U.S. Constitution requires the U.S. President to 
conclude treaties ‘by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties provided two 
thirds of the Senators concur’.60 In practice, however, it is difficult to obtain the consent of two 
thirds of Senators for various political reasons; for example, the two-party political system hinders 
                                               
57 There is a general agreement that a basic right of Korean Constitutional Law is applicable to a foreign legal 
person unless a treaty, such as the FTA, prescribes otherwise. Of course, some rights, such as the right to 
election, might be of limited application to foreigners due to their inherent nature. Even if there is controversy 
over the scope of the right of a foreign corporation, such rights could certainly be guaranteed at least within 
national legislation and treaties. See Young-Soo Chang, Constitutional Law (Hongmunsa, 2007) pp.472-75; 
Cheol-Su Kim, New Theory of Constitutional Law (Bagyeongsa, 2009) pp.308-10 (explaining the scholarly 
discussion concerning protection of a foreigner’s property). See 6-2 KCCR 477, 93Hun-Ma120, December 29, 
1994; 13-2 KCCR 714, 99Hun-Ma494, November 29, 2001 (regarding the Constitutional Court cases which 
address the property rights of foreigners). From a legislative perspective, Article 3 of the Framework Act on 
the Treatment of Foreigners Residing in the Republic of Korea guarantees the economic activities of 
foreigners in Korea.  
58 KORUS-FTA Annex 11-E.2. 
59 State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
60 The Constitution of the United States Article II, Section 2, Clause 2. 
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treaties proposed by one party from obtaining overwhelming support from the Senate. Therefore, 
the U.S. executive branch has a long tradition of constitutional practice that concludes many 
international agreements in the form of an executive agreement, circumventing the rigorous 
constitutional requirements of treaty-making.61 However, some kinds of executive agreement such 
as free trade agreements are established in the form of a congressional executive agreement, under 
the oversight of Congress.62 To be specific, the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 prescribes that a free trade 
agreement such as the KORUS-FTA can be domestically effective on the condition of enactment of 
implementing legislation, which reflects the content of the treaty.63 Section 102(a) of the United 
States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (hereafter ‘US KORUS-FTA 
Implementation Act’) prescribes that U.S. law prevails over arguably conflicting KORUS-FTA.64 
Also, a Korean investor cannot ask for a legal remedy in any U.S. court on the ground of a breach 
of the KORUS-FTA.65 Even so, Korean investors can challenge government measures before the 
U.S. courts on the basis of U.S. laws implementing the KORUS-FTA or other U.S. laws applicable 
                                               
61 See generally Congressional Research Service Library of Congress, Treaties and Other International 
Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate (U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001) 
<http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT-106SPRT66922.pdf> accessed 15 April 
2012. The U.S. Supreme Court has generally upheld the power of the President to conclude these executive 
agreements. See also United State v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 
(1981); United State v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
62 Congressional Research Service Library of Congress (n 61) p.5, p.79 and p.240; Emily C. Barbour, ‘Trade 
Promotion Authority and the U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement’ (2011) pp.1-2 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41544.pdf> accessed 15 April 2012. 
63 19 U.S.C §3805(a). 
64 United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (U.S. KORUS-FTA Implementation Act), 
Pub. L. 112-41, §102(a), 125 Stat. 428, 430 (2011):  
 
Relationship of Agreement to United States Law.— 
(1) United States Law to Prevail in Conflict.—No provision of the Agreement, nor the 
application of any such provision to any person or circumstance, which is inconsistent 
with any law of the United States shall have effect. 
(2) Construction.—Nothing in this Act shall be construed— 
(A) to amend or modify any law of the United States, or 
(B) to limit any authority conferred under any law of the United States, unless 
specifically provided for in this Act. 
 
65 U.S. KORUS-FTA Implementation Act United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, 
Pub. L. 112-41, §102(c), 125 Stat. 428, 430-431 (2011):  
 
Effect of Agreement with Respect to Private Remedies.— 
No person other than the United States— 
(1) shall have any cause of action or defense under the Agreement or by virtue of 
congressional approval thereof; or 
(2) may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action or inaction 
by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or 
any political subdivision of a State, on the ground that such action or inaction is 





to U.S. nationals. Alternatively, Korean investors can trigger the Chapter 11 arbitration directly 
before investor-state arbitration on the grounds of KORUS-FTA.  
Some Koreans accuse this U.S. implementation act of procedural unfairness.66 They argue 
that the U.S. legal system prevents Korean investors from using any national remedy based on the 
KORUS-FTA, whereas the Korean legal system allows U.S. investors to use the KORUS-FTA as a 
legal source before its national courts. Therefore, it is said that this mechanism would discriminate 
against Korean investors when the implementation acts of the US allegedly fail to guarantee a level 
of investment protection that the KORUS-FTA intends. In the case of Korea, a U.S. investor could 
submit a legal claim to a Korean court by arguing that the Korean legislation for KORUS-FTA 
implementation violates the treaty obligation through direct reference to KORUS-FTA clauses. On 
the other hand, a Korean investor could not raise a claim before a U.S. court on the grounds of 
violation of the relevant KORUS-FTA clauses. Consequently, the Korean investor is effectively 
forced to choose investment arbitration.  
Contrary to such a popular criticism, it is doubtful that the current procedures of the 
KORUS-FTA under the two countries’ constitutional arrangements avail absolutely in favour of 
U.S. claimants. When a host state legislates in violation of the KORUS-FTA, it is true that the U.S. 
investor in Korea could file a case against the Korean government by direct reference to the 
KORUS-FTA.  In  deciding  to  raise  a  KORUS-FTA claim in  Korea,  however,  the  U.S.  claimant  
would undertake the risk that any other remedy would not be available after the Korean court 
repudiates the claim. This is because the KORUS-FTA’s Article 11.18.2(b) and Annex 11-E 
prevents a losing claimant from turning back to Chapter 11 arbitration after losing the case. More 
importantly, this risk would become more palpable given that the Korean court reviews breaches of 
KORUS-FTA obligations by reference to Korean legal sources and under Korean constitutional 
principles.67 Therefore,  it  may  be  much  safer  for  the  U.S.  investor  to  raise  a  claim  based  on  a  
breach of Korean national law or the constitution once he or she decides to ask for any national 
remedy in Korea. Taking the example of an expropriation claim, it may be a wiser strategy for a 
U.S. investor to refer to Article 23 of the Korean Constitution or other relevant national statutes 
than to Article 11.6 or Annex 11-B of the KORUS-FTA. This is because the U.S. investor would 
not thereby extinguish an opportunity for further Chapter 11 Arbitration by direct reference to the 
                                               
66 Eun-Joo Jung, ‘Only an American Investor Can Raise a Claim... Only Korean Is Obligated to Revise the 
Law in the Case of Conflict between the KORUS-FTA and Korean Law’ The Hankyoreh (4 October 2011) 
<http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/economy/economy_general/499305.html> accessed 15 April 2012. 
67 See Chapter III. Part VI (explaining the risks that foreign investor should assume when the national court 
applies the KORUS-FTA without recourse to investor-state arbitration).  
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KORUS-FTA. In consequence, it is highly questionable that U.S. investors would have more 
choices in terms of strategy for legal remedies than Korean investors. In the perspective of the risk 
assessment, U.S. investors may rarely use the KORUS-FTA as a legal source when considering 
national remedies to governmental measures. 
Although the waiver clause of the KORUS-FTA allows the host state to respond with an 
objection to deny access to the international investment arbitration on the ground of an investor’s 
previous use of other remedies, tribunals have recognized this objection by the state only when the 
host state can prove that the same person has raised the same dispute involving the same cause of 
action.68 For example, in the CMS case, a subsidiary company of investors made a legal claim on a 
contractual arrangement under the licence according to Argentine national proceedings.69 The 
Argentine government argued that the company’s involvement in the national proceedings should 
be construed as waiving the rights of the investor to submit the dispute to arbitration according to a 
waiver provision.70 This argument is based on the presumption that an investor is factually 
identical to a company shareholder initiating a national legal remedy before the investment 
arbitration.71 Nevertheless, the tribunal repudiated this objection to jurisdiction, and distinguished 
the involved investor from its company.72 In relation to this issue, the KORUS-FTA requires 
written waivers ‘of any right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under 
the law of either Party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceeding’ regarding the 
relevant dispute, not only from the investor but also from the investors’ enterprise.73 Therefore, the 
KORUS-FTA reduces the burden on the tribunal to identify the investor and its subsidiary. In the 
CMS case, the arbitration tribunal also examined the identity of the causes of action in the two 
                                               
68 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims – the Vivendi I 
Case Considered’ in Todd Weiler (ed) International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading Cases from the 
ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law (Cameron May, 2005) pp.301-07; 
Dolzer and Schreuer (n 49) pp.216-17. 
69 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, ICSID No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 17 July 
2003. 
70 ibid para.77. 
71 The Treaty between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, Article VII 3.(a):  
 
Provided that the national or company concerned has not submitted the dispute for 
resolution under paragraph 2 (a) or (b) [national procedures] and that six months have 
elapsed from the date on which the dispute arose, the national or company concerned may 
choose to consent in writing to the submission of the dispute for settlement by binding 
arbitration […]. 
 
72 CMS v. Argentina (n 69) para.80. 




relevant procedures.74 On this point, the tribunal held that the cause of action before the national 
court involved a contractual arrangement under the licence, whereas the relevant claim before the 
arbitration tribunal dealt with a breach of the investors’ rights under the Argentina-US BIT.75 This 
reasoning is compatible with the Middle East Cement case,76 where the host state seized and 
auctioned the claimant’s ship. In response to this measure, the claimant sought remedy from the 
Egyptian government to nullify the auction. The tribunal held that a dispute brought in the national 
courts is not related to a dispute between a claimant and the host state under the Egypt-Greece BIT. 
Therefore, this use of national litigation does not exclude the admissibility of arbitration.77 This 
means that not every appearance before a national court would preclude resort to international 
investment arbitration, as long as the investor could successfully dispute the identity of the two 
legal disputes.78  
C. Applicable laws in arbitration for independent review of the tribunal 
KORUS-FTA arbitration tribunals are composed of three arbitrators unless the disputing 
parties agree otherwise. Each party can appoint one person; and the presiding arbitrator should be 
appointed through agreement of the two parties.79 The ICSID Secretary-General retains authority 
to appoint arbitrators or the presiding arbitrator in a case where the disputing parties can not draw 
up a mutual agreement.80 When the Secretary General exercises the authority of appointment, she 
or he should exclude a national of either party from acting as presiding arbitrator.81  
Arbitrators do not act in favour of the particular parties who appoint them. Many arbitration 
rules, including Article 14(1) of the ICSID convention, and Articles 9 and 12 of the UNCITRAL 
rule, prescribe a series of qualifications, such as morality, neutrality or speciality, and so on. In 
addition, Articles 20 and 21 of the KORUS-FTA are concerned with the transparency and 
neutrality of arbitration. The most important point is that an arbitrator should stick only to the 
governing laws of the KORUS-FTA and that they themselves should be independent of any 
national bias.  
                                               
74 CMS v. Argentina (n 69) para.80. 
75 ibid para.80. See also Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID No. 
ARB/01/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 14 January 2004 paras.97-98. 
76 Middle East Cement Shipping v. Egypt (n 11). 
77 ibid para.70. 
78 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Travelling the BIT Route: of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the 
Road’ (2004) 5(2) Journal of World Investment and Trade p.241. 
79 KORUS-FTA Article 11.19.1. 
80 ibid Article 11.19.2. 
81 ibid Article 11.19.3. 
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The KORUS-FTA arbitration tribunal considers, as its governing laws, the KORUS-FTA 
treaty and the applicable rule of international law when the claim is concerned with treaty 
obligations.82 In particular, arbitrators83 frequently rely on several principles of treaty interpretation 
enshrined in Article 31 of the VCLT.84 Additionally, tribunals sometimes consider ‘supplementary 
means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion’ under the Article 3285 of the VCLT in the course of applying Article 31.86 
In addition, Article 11.22.3 of the KORUS-FTA prescribes that the interpretation of the 
treaty is bound by the declarations of the KORUS-FTA Joint Committee, established in accordance 
with Article 22.2 of the KORUS-FTA. This committee is co-chaired by the United States Trade 
Representative and the Minister for Trade of Korea; its main tasks are to supervise and manage the 
overall implementation and administrative issues of the treaty and to seek resolution regarding its 
interpretation and application.87 Additionally, it can issue interpretations of the KORUS-FTA 
provisions in relation to the governing laws of Chapter 11.88 The nature and effect of these 
                                               
82 ibid Article 11.22.1. 
83 e.g. Methanex v. United States of America (n 16) Part II, Ch. B, para.16; Siemens A.G v. The Republic of 
Argentina, ICSID No. ARB/02/8, Decision on Jurisdiction, 3 August 2004 para.80. 
84 VCLT, Article 31(General rule of interpretation): 
 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty.  
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.  
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.  
 
85 VCLT Article 32 (Supplementary means of interpretation):  
 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the 
interpretation according to article 31:  
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.  
 
86 See Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID No. ARB/01/11, Award, 12 October 2005 para.50. 
87 KORUS-FTA Article 22.2.2. 




interpretations may be controversial, however, as shown in NAFTA’s Pope & Talbot case. During 
litigation proceedings, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission (hereafter ‘FTC’), which is similar to 
the KORUS-FTA Joint Committee, issued an interpretative statement to narrow down the 
applicable scope of the minimum standard of treatment. The arbitration tribunal was suspicious 
about whether this interpretation was merely an interpretation or a disguised amendment.89 Despite 
this uncertainty, the tribunal in the Pope & Talbot case regarded the interpretative statement as 
binding on the tribunal’s own interpretation.90 This respect for the FTC’s interpretation was further 
upheld in subsequent NAFTA cases.91 For example, the ADF arbitration panel did not seem to 
deny this line of case law, although it held that a Chapter 11 tribunal does not have any authority to 
determine whether an ‘interpretation’ is actually an amendment or not.92  
Moreover, other international investment decisions could be considered in applying the 
treaty to any given case, even if the treaty text does not explicitly prescribe this. Tribunals often rely 
on previous decisions in other cases of investment arbitration when they cannot find instructive 
guidance from any other source of international law or the investment treaty text itself.93 This does 
not mean that a doctrine of precedent, similar to that found in common law, is established in 
international investment law.94 Indeed, individual decisions do not have any supremacy over the 
treaty and any formally binding precedential value over future decisions. This is because each 
tribunal  is  established ‘ad hoc for  the particular  case’.95 More importantly, Article 11.26.5 of the 
KORUS-FTA denies any ‘binding force except between the disputing parties and in respect of the 
particular case’. Nevertheless, the denial of the formally binding effect of previous decisions does 
not necessarily prevent future tribunals in different cases from referring to the reasoning of a 
previous arbitration decision. Tribunals have consistently held that they can consider the decisions 
                                               
89 See generally Gantz (n 49) pp.716-20; Matthew C. Porterfield, ‘An International Common Law of Investor 
Rights?’ (2006) 27(1) University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law pp.88-92. See also 
Charles H. Browe II, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment under NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’ (2002) 96 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) p.10 (regarding critical 
comments on the issuing of the interpretive statement).  
90 Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award in Respect of Damage, May 
31, 2002 paras.43-51. 
91 Mondev International Ltd. v. United States of America, ICSID No. ARB(AF)/99/2, Award, 11 October 
2002 paras.94-126. 
92 ADF Group Inc. v. United States of America, ICSID No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, 9 January 2003 para.177. 
93 Christoph Schreuer, ‘Diversity and Harmonization of Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration’ in M. 
Fitzmaurice, O. A. Elias and Panos Merkouris (eds), Treaty interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) p.139. 
94 ibid. 
95 ibid. In a similar vein, there is some controversy over the precedential value of Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
decisions, even though many current arbitrations refer to them in practice. See generally Charles Nelson 
Brower and Jason D. Brueschke, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Martinus Nijhoff, 1998) pp.651-54. 
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produced by other arbitration bodies, despite the absence of formal binding effects, as long as they 
deem those decisions illustrative of interpretation on the same clause or dealing with similar 
issues.96  
IV. KORUS-FTA TRIBUNAL’S REVIEW OF INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION CLAIMS 
While the previous part examined the procedural structure in which expropriation doctrines 
are produced, the following part conducts a comparative analysis in order to examine a doctrinal 
gap between the two legal systems at issue. This doctrinal analysis will help us to know whether a 
constitutionally justifiable regulation under the Korean Constitution could be challenged by a 
foreign investor or investment tribunal on the ground that it breaches the indirect expropriation 
provision under the KORUS-FTA. This research will go on to examine whether this substantive 
gap is too broad to be negotiable in light of the essential goals of the Korean Constitution and 
international investment law. In this regard, the following part will explore how tribunals under the 
KORUS-FTA will review substantive issues relating to investment protection and restriction in the 
course of indirect expropriation claims, especially by examining how the Korean and U.S. Courts 
decide similar issues. This will also concern analysis of how the new wording of the KORUS-FTA, 
inspired by indirect expropriation concerns, would affect a future tribunal’s review in terms of 
protecting the regulatory power of the host state.  
A. Conditions for the constitution of indirect expropriation claims 
The indirect expropriation provisions of KORUS-FTA deal only with governmental 
measures that indirectly expropriate the covered investments.97 In this context, the meaning of 
‘covered investments’ and relevant ‘measures’ should be clarified as they control the scope of the 
indirect expropriation doctrine.  
 
 
                                               
96 Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Ad hoc 
Committee Decision on the Application for Annulment, 16 May, 1986 para.44; AWG Group v. The Argentine 
Republic, UNCITRAL (UK/Argentina BIT), Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010 para.189; Liberian Eastern 
Timber Corporation(LETCO) v. Republic of Liberia, ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2, Award, March 31, 1986, p.9. 
Additionally, a NAFTA case under the ICSID Additional Facility followed the same line. See Feldman v. 
Mexico (n 24) para.107. 




i) The meaning of investment 
The doctrine of indirect expropriation is applicable only to ‘covered investments’. 98 
Articulating the term ‘investment’ therefore serves as one of the preliminary stages to controlling 
the applicable scope of the indirect expropriation doctrine. As a matter of fact, the concept of 
investment comes from the economic or everyday notion.99 On the other hand, investment treaties 
and laws are oriented on the reciprocal economic development of the state party. Therefore, too 
broad or purely-economic a notion of investment would cover ordinary commercial transactions, 
going beyond the intentions of the contracting states. Such ordinary commercial transactions, 
established between private actors and the state acting as another private actor, should be 
considered according to international commercial law without reference to the investment treaty 
and the ICSID system. For example, ICSID arbitration excludes pure commercial transactions from 
the types of investment falling within the jurisdiction of the ICSID Convention.100 Additionally, 
ICSID’s Secretary-General has refused to register a case raised in connection with a simple sale of 
goods by excluding it from the investments covered by the ICSID Convention.101 Despite the 
significance of the concept of investment, the meaning of ‘investment’ is still one of the most 
controversial and complicated issues in the international investment law.102  
Tribunals take their departure for interpreting the term ‘investment’ by articulating the terms 
of the relevant treaty text according to Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.103 The KORUS-FTA 
essentially maintains a broad, open-ended definition; as such, a tribunal can recognize anything that 
                                               
98 ibid. 
99 Noah Rubin, ‘The Notion of “Investment” in International Investment Arbitration’ in Norbert Horn and 
Stefan Kröll (eds), Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes (Kluwer Law International, 2004) pp.283-284. 
See also Rudolf Dolzer, ‘The Notion of Investment in Recent Practice’ in Steve Charnovitz, Debra P. Steger 
and Peter van den Bossche (eds), Law in the Service of Human Dignity: Essays in Honour of Florentino 
Feliciano (Cambridge University Press, 2005) p.263 (explaining an economic understanding of investment). 
See also Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2010) pp.18-19 
(explaining an ordinary understanding of investment). 
100 Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/11, 
Award, 1 December 2010 para.56. 
101 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata and Antonio R. Parra, ‘The Experience of the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes’ (1999) 14(2) ICSID Review: Foreign Investment Law Journal p.308. 
102 Devashish Krishan, ‘A Notion of ICSID Investment’ in Todd Weiler (ed) Investment Treaty Arbitration 
and International Law. Vol. 1 (JurisNet, 2008); Sébastien Manciaux, ‘The Notion of Investment: New 
Controversies’ (2008) 9(6) The Journal of World Investment & Trade; Emmanuel Gaillard, ‘Identify or 
Define? Reflections on the Evolution of the Concept of Investment in ICSID Practice’ in Christina Binder (ed) 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
103 Global Trading Resource v. Ukraine (n 100) para.47. 
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has the characteristics of an investment by following a general trend found in other BITs.104 This 
broad conception of an investment is compatible with the complicated economic settings in which 
an investment might exist in various forms, such as physical or non-physical assets, cash or 
securities. In articulating the definition of a ‘covered investment’ in the Article 11.1.1(b) of the 
KORUS-FTA, Article 11.28 of KORUS-FTA considers an investment as being ‘every asset that an 
investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment’. 
Thereafter, the Article provides a series of examples (footnote omitted): 
(a) an enterprise;  
(b) shares, stocks, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise;  
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; 
(d) futures, options, and other derivatives;  
(e) turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenue-sharing, and other 
similar contracts; 
(f) intellectual property rights;  
(g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to domestic law; 
and  
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property 
rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges. 
Some forms of investment are more specifically defined for clarity. For example, ‘[s]ome 
forms of debt, such as bonds, debentures, and long-term notes are more likely to have the character 
of investments’.105 In addition, orders or judicial decisions, such as administrative or judicial 
actions, are excluded from the definition of an investment.106 Licenses, authorizations, permits and 
similar rights, however, could be recognized as investments as long as one could identify amongst 
them the characteristics of an investment by examining the relevant domestic law.107 
The list enumerated in Article 11.28 is not exhaustive, and ‘the characteristics of an 
investment’108 define whether a certain type of investment belongs to those addressed by the 
KORUS-FTA. ICSID arbitration decisions can be considered as very influential sources of 
guidance in defining the meaning of investment. For example, the Romak tribunal, constituted 
                                               
104 Antonio Parra, ‘The Scope of New Investment Laws and International Instruments’ in Robert Pritchard 
(ed) Economic Development, Foreign Investment and the Law: Issues of Private Sector Involvement, Foreign 
Investment and the Rule of Law in a New Era (Kluwer Law International, 1996) p.35; Alan Redfern and 
Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) pp.570-
71; Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) pp.25-31 
(providing definitions prescribed in other BITs).  
105 KORUS-FTA Article 11.28 footnote 10. 
106 ibid Article 11.28 footnote 12. 
107 ibid Article 11.28 footnote 11. 




under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, began by articulating the ordinary meaning of 
‘investment’ under the Switzerland-Uzbekistan BIT in accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the 
VCLT.109 It held that there is an objective meaning of investment that goes beyond literal or 
mechanical interpretations by focusing on the ‘context’ or ‘object and purpose’ of the treaty as per 
Article 31 of VCLT.110 In addition, the tribunal argued that a mechanical interpretation could cause 
an absurd or unreasonable result in the context of Article 32(b) of the VCLT.111 The Romak 
tribunal concluded that ICSID arbitration decisions are helpful in drawing an outline of the 
objective meaning of the term ‘investment’.112 Indeed, such ICSID cases are produced in the 
course of dealing with the jurisdictional issues relative to Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.113 
This Article prescribes that ‘[t]he jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment’ between the parties. Therefore, the ICSID tribunal’s Convention can 
deny jurisdiction for claims where the investment in question is not compatible with the objective 
and autonomous meaning of investment in the ICSID Convention, irrespective of whether the 
relevant investment meets the conceptual criteria for investment under the treaty.114 In this context, 
the claimant in the Romak case argued that the conceptual scope of investment before the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration procedure is different from that under ICSID Arbitration.115 However, the 
tribunal did not admit this argument because such an interpretation could lead to the unreasonable 
result that the forum choice affects the degree of substantive investment protection.116 In this 
context, UNCITAL Arbitration panels in the Romak case can consider ICSID reasoning in the 
sense that arbitrations are required to determine the inherent and ordinary meaning of investment – 
whether under the BIT or ICSID Convention.117  
In short, leading ICSID arbitration decisions could be cited for use as meaningful guidelines 
for a KORUS-FTA tribunal to articulate the conceptual scope of investment. The Fedax case is one 
of the early cases in which investment arbitration attempted to articulate the notion of an 
                                               
109 Romak v. Uzbekistan (n 32) paras.173ff. 
110 ibid paras.180-83. 
111 ibid paras.184-87. 
112 ibid para.190. 
113 ibid para.192. 
114 Christoph Schreuer, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary (University of Cambridge, 2009) p.117-19. 
See also Global Trading Resource v. Ukraine (n 100) para.43-46; Joy Mining v. Egypt, ICSID No. 
ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004 para.50; Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/20, Award, 14 July 2010 paras.108-09. 
115 Romak v. Uzbekistan (n 32) para.193. 
116 ibid para.194. 
117 ibid para.194-95. 
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investment.118 Here, the claimant, incorporated in the Netherlands, acquired a promissory note 
issued by the Venezuelan government in the secondary market by endorsement. The respondent 
government refused to pay for the promissory note. The arbitration tribunal, established by the 
Netherlands-Venezuela BIT, rejected the Venezuelan government’s contention that a promissory 
note is not included as a classic type of investment. The tribunal held that ‘it is a standard feature of 
many international finance transactions that the funds involved are not physically transferred to the 
territory of the host country but are at its disposal elsewhere’.119 This reasoning shows that the 
notion of investment is indifferent as to whether a physical form of a certain asset is involved in the 
inflow into the host state.120 Instead, the tribunal held that ‘the basic features of an investment have 
been described as involving a certain duration, a certain regularity of profits and returns, an 
assumption of risk, a substantial commitment and a significance for the host state’s 
development’.121 Under those requirements, the tribunal defined a promissory note as being an 
investment; in particular, the tribunal found a correlation between the transaction and the host 
state’s development by examining the law governing the promissory note. Indeed, the government 
could maintain the sound development of public finances for a certain duration when the claimant 
has a promissory note for long-term regular profits.122  
These principles have been developed more elaborately in the Salini case in 2001. Here, the 
tribunal held that the term ‘investment’ covered a motorway construction contract that was 
established by an Italian construction company and a Moroccan government-controlled company. 
In order to recognize the contract as an investment, the arbitrator proposed four criteria (the Salini 
test);123 namely, i) a contribution by the investor, ii) a certain duration of the project, iii) the 
existence of operational risk, and iv) a contribution to the host state’s development.124 It is useful to 
examine the elements of Salini test because the KORUS-FTA already proposes several concepts of 
Salini test as examples of the characteristics possessed by an investment; e.g. ‘the commitment of 
capital or other resources’, ‘the assumption of risk’.125  
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a) Contribution of the investor: Any financial resource or transfer of know-how, equipment 
or personnel can be considered to be a ‘contribution’. In Salini, the tribunal readily upheld the 
contribution of the investors in putting their financial or personal resources into the relevant road 
construction.126  
b) A certain duration of the project: Regarding the duration of the contribution in the second 
factor, while records of the negotiation of the ICSID convention reveal that state parties suggested 
that five years was appropriate, subsequent arbitration decisions have established that duration need 
not be excessively rigorous,127 holding that a two-year period could be considered sufficient.128 
The Salini tribunal upheld the 36 months that the company spent on performing the contract as an 
appropriate duration.129  
c) Existence of operational risk: An investment usually entails some risk because of its long 
duration and the uncertainty of expected profits. For example, the exploration of natural resources 
usually involves a significant risk that the company will not find the wanted natural resources. If so, 
the company may not reimburse any spending in the case of failure in searching for the natural 
resource. To take another instance, a long-term project such as an infrastructure construction plan 
tends to involve more unexpected risks which are outside the investor’s control. These risks can be 
recognised only by a careful analysis of the nature of the relevant investments, because the risks 
might vary from case to case.130 In the Salini case, the claimants took part in a construction plan 
even though they had considered a series of risks which might occur due to unexpected changes in 
the situation. To take one example, the Italian company argued that it tolerated a risk by admitting 
the possible increment in the cost which might be caused by an amendment to Moroccan law.131  
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d) Contribution to the host state’s development: Lastly, the national contribution of an 
investment represents an element that can be used to describe its characteristics.132 The Salini case 
held that this factor could be justified by the Preamble of the ICSID Convention which considers 
the economic development of a host state as being one of the goals of the convention.133 A 
KORUS-FTA  tribunal  could  possibly  consider  this  factor  on  the  basis  of  the  Preamble  to  the  
KORUS-FTA, which states that it intends to advance the national economic development in both 
state parties. This last factor, however, is highly controversial;134 although some tribunals consider 
this factor in defining the investment,135 they do not seem to draw any consistent rule on the 
necessary extent of the contribution to national economic development. For example, the 
Malaysian Historical Salvors case recognized only the significant contribution of an investment,136 
whereas the Patrick Mitchell case  held  the  it  does  not  matter  whether  or  not  the  contribution  is  
significant.137 The Malaysian Historical Salvors award was eventually annulled by an ad hoc 
committee.138 On the other hand, the LESI Dipenta case held that a tribunal does not need to 
consider this factor separately because the fourth factor in Salini is difficult to be recognised and is 
implicitly incorporated into the other three factors.139 In the recent Saba Fakes case,  the tribunal  
argued that the contribution that an investment makes to the economic development of a host state 
is just ‘an expected consequence, not a separate requirement, of the investment’.140  
Even if many tribunals present different characteristics for indentifying an investment, they 
at least seem to reach a general consensus on three criteria: ‘(i) contribution (ii) a certain duration 
(iii) a element of risk’141 In applying the Salini test, there is no consensus on whether those 
standards must be met cumulatively.142 Schreuer argues that even if one or two elements of the 
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Salini test is missing, a tribunal can recognise the existence of an investment because the elements 
are proposed simply as examples.143 This assertion is grounded on the assumption that such a 
understanding of the Salini test runs a risk of restricting the scope of protectable investment.144 On 
the other hand, in practice the tribunal attempts to understand the concept of investment for 
jurisdictional requirements by using fixed standards.145 Proponents of this approach argue that 
Schreur’s flexible approach de facto abandons the objective definition of the term ‘investment’.146 
As a result, if certain factors are recognised as elements of the definition of investment, they should 
be assessed in a totality based on the particular circumstances of the individual case.147 
ii) Conditions for expropriation claims under the KORUS-FTA 
As discussed in the Chapter II, the Korean Constitution actually restricts property rights and 
expands the regulatory power of the government by adjusting the contents of the notion of property. 
Similarly, the KORUS-FTA controls the protectable scope of an investment by adjusting the 
contents of investment.  
Firstly,  claims  under  Article  11.6  of  the  KORUS  FTA  can  be  raised  only  when  a  
governmental measure ‘interferes with a tangible or intangible property in an investment’.148 This 
wording is different from the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, which the KORUS-FTA drafters considered to 
be a basic model; specifically, this Model BIT clearly prescribes ‘property interests in an 
investment’ as a ground for an expropriation claim, 149  whereas the KORUS-FTA drafters 
attempted to exclude ‘property interests’ from the content of investment protection secured under 
Article 11.6 of the KORUS-FTA.150 The concept of property interests was initially discussed in the 
previous NAFTA Pope & Talbot case.151 In this case, a U.S. investor owned a wood product 
company. In 1996, the Canadian and U.S. governments established a bilateral agreement, the 
Softwood Lumber Agreement, which controlled the free export of softwood lumber. The claimant 
argued that measures taken by the Canadian government under this agreement violated the NAFTA, 
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Chapter 11. Here, the Canadian government argued that the definition of investment in Chapter 11 
does not cover access to the U.S. market.152 However,  the  tribunal  in  this  case  held  that  the  
‘investment’s access to the US market is a property interest subject to protection’ and therefore 
subject to the protection of the NAFTA direct or indirect expropriation clause.153 Subsequently, the 
2004 U.S. Model BIT made it clearer that property interests should be protected.154 In comparison, 
Annex 11-B.1 of the KORUS-FTA has attempted to deny the doctrine of property interests by 
omitting that term. Of course, such a property interest is still protected under other clauses of 
Chapter 11 of the KORUS-FTA than Article 11.6. However, it might look certain that the claimant 
could not raise an indirect expropriation claim solely on the ground of interference with a property 
interest.  
Secondly, the Feldman v. Mexico tribunal held that not all kinds of reduction in profit 
constitute expropriation because the government can change a law or regulation that influences 
profit in business.155 This implies that the protectable scope of an investment under the indirect 
expropriation doctrine is not related to mere profit diminution caused by the regulation.156  
Such modification and legal practices would make the KORUS-FTA’s indirect 
expropriation more compatible with Korean constitutional doctrine157 excluding ‘mere profit, a 
simple chance to gain profit or the factual or legal environment of a commercial enterprise’ from 
being protectable property.158 
iii) The meaning of ‘measure’ 
The meaning of ‘measure’ is another issue in KORUS-FTA indirect expropriation claims as 
one aspect of a property restriction is defined by the scope of a measure ‘adopted and maintained’ 
by the government or by non-governmental bodies delegated by the government.159 Recognition of 
government measures encompassing a broad scope tends to enable investment tribunals to consider 
a greater variety of government action under the name of investment. The definition of a measure in 
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Article 11.1.3 of the KORUS-FTA is specified in Article 1.4, which states that a ‘measure includes 
any law, regulation, procedure, requirement, or practice’. This wording is exactly the same as 
Article 1 of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT and Article 201 of NAFTA. Regarding NAFTA’s Article 
201, the Canadian Statement on Implementation states that ‘measure’ is ‘a non-exhaustive 
definition of the ways in which governments impose discipline in their respective jurisdictions’.160  
This broad definition was discussed in the Loewen case, where the claimant argued that 
unfair and inappropriate administration of justice in U.S. courts violated the investment protection 
clauses enumerated in Chapter 11, including the expropriation provisions.161 In  this  case,  the  
NAFTA tribunal rejected the respondent state’s contention that judicial acts are not covered by the 
jurisdiction of NAFTA arbitration.162 The tribunal referred to a series of the International Court of 
Justice or the European Court of Justice cases163 which attempted to articulate the meaning of a 
measure.164 Finally, the tribunal considered the conduct of any organ of the state as an act of state, 
regardless of its position in the organization of that state; it therefore included legislative, executive 
and judicial actions as per Article 4 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.165  
B. Three factors for tribunal reviews 
The tribunal will reject an investment claim when the government has exercised its 
regulatory power in accordance with several conditions: i) for a legitimate public purpose; ii) in a 
non-discriminatory way; and iii) with prompt, adequate and effective compensation. In addition, 
that regulatory power should be exercised in accordance with due process and a minimum standard 
of treatment.166 Nevertheless, these conditions do not suffice to solve all latent problems. Therefore, 
the U.S. and Korean governments tried to codify a recent trend of international arbitration cases and 
the national legal doctrine in Annex 11-B of the KORUS-FTA in order to guide expropriation 
claims and their review, as illustrated in the following section.  
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Firstly, (indirect or direct) expropriation is defined as an action or a series of actions by the 
host state which interferes with a tangible or intangible property right in an investment.167 Annex 
11-B of the KORUS-FTA attempts to define indirect expropriation as a situation ‘where an action 
or a series of actions by a Party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal 
transfer of title or outright seizure’.168  
The guidance for the indirect expropriation review by an arbitration tribunal is further 
specified  by  Annex  11-B.3(a)  and  (b)  of  the  KORUS-FTA.  Here,  the  KORUS-FTA attempts  to  
control how a tribunal might rule on indirect expropriation claims. Firstly, the tribunal’s review 
should be based on a case-by-case and fact-based analysis. This wording accentuates that factual 
circumstances, rather than a particular doctrine, are more useful in dealing with indirect 
expropriation claims. Indeed, many international investment lawyers support this approach.169 
Furthermore, the KORUS-FTA requires the tribunal’s inquiry into indirect expropriation to 
consider at least the following three factors, prescribed in Annex 11-B.3(a): i) ‘the economic impact 
of the government action’ (the effect of the measure); ii) ‘the character of the government action’; 
and iii) ‘the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-
backed expectations’ (legitimate expectation).  
Regarding these three factors, some scholars understand that this new wording incorporates 
the U.S. legal doctrine of regulatory taking.170 This doctrine originated in the Pennsylvania Coal 
case, which held that ‘while property may be regulated, to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far 
it will be recognized as a taking’.171 In fact, this doctrine has raised the controversial constitutional 
issue of whether a clear line exists between mere regulation and taking.172 The  aftermath  of  the  
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Pennsylvania Coal case has created an extremely complicated and inconsistent area of U.S. law.173 
The U.S. Supreme Court finally handed down a landmark decision regarding regulatory taking in 
the Penn Central Transportation case. The Court ruled on New York City’s landmarks 
preservation law, which restricted historic landmarks from undergoing development. It identified 
several factors that should be considered when determining a regulatory taking case:  
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of 
course, relevant considerations. […] So, too, is the character of the governmental action.174  
Whether or not the drafters of the KORUS-FTA and the 2004 U.S. Model BIT were 
inspired by U.S regulatory taking, it would be an exaggeration to claim that the indirect 
expropriation doctrine under the treaty is dominated only by U.S. regulatory taking. First of all, in 
the course of drafting the KORUS-FTA drafters considered not only U.S. legal doctrines but also 
Korean ones, as seen in the following sections. Indeed, in negotiating the KORUS-FTA, U.S. trade 
policy makers seem to have incorporated the legal doctrines of their partner state more extensively 
than in other previous post-NAFTA U.S. investment treaties.  
Most importantly, it is worth noting that the three above factors were already observable in 
international investment law at the time of drafting. In this context, the new wording is nothing 
more than a clear codification of current trends found in many investment arbitrations. Therefore, 
tribunals interpret those factors in the context of international investment law by referring not to 
national legal decisions but to other investment cases.175 It might be appropriate to recognise that 
these three factors are universally found in general notions of property in any legal systems. In other 
words, international and national lawyers seem to deal with a common legal issue in a similar way 
and in the same context of a tension between property protection and regulatory power.176 As some 
terms provide clearer guidance to a KORUS-FTA tribunal facing several doctrinal controversies, 
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such guidance could implicitly work to promote a greater affinity with national property law. 
Nevertheless, this wording is not fundamentally against the principles of international investment 
law.   
In this sense, the following sections will focus predominantly on demonstrating how a 
tribunal under the KORUS-FTA would interpret the above three factors from an international 
investment law perspective. Additionally, this thesis will consider the U.S. doctrine of regulatory 
taking and the reasoning in the Korean Greenbelt case, in order to show how differently and 
similarly national and international legal systems deal with the same issue from the comparative 
perspective. 
i) Effects of the measures 
It  might  generally  be  accepted  that  the  effect  of  a  measure  is  one  of  the  most  important  
elements for constituting indirect expropriation in international investment law.177 While the 
KORUS-FTA also considers this factor, it prevents a tribunal from considering only the 
consequential effects of governmental measures by forcing it to consider other factors also. In other 
words,  in  a  case  where  the  effect  of  a  measure  is  the  only  grounds  to  constitute  indirect  
expropriation, a tribunal would repudiate the claimant’s assertion of indirect expropriation. 
Therefore, Annex-B.3(a)(ii) of the KORUS-FTA prescribes that ‘the economic impact of the 
government action […] standing alone’ does not constitute expropriation. This understanding is 
consistent with the Penn Central reasoning; while the court analyzes the factual effect of regulation, 
it is required to consider other factors such as the character of investment-backed expectations or 
government action.178 
This codification is clearly directed against the so-called sole effect doctrine. Indeed, some 
early investment arbitration cases appear to have employed this controversial doctrine, which 
requires the tribunal to focus only on the effect of a governmental measure holding other 
circumstantial elements, such as the purpose of the regulation, to be either less relevant or not 
relevant at all. Thus, the distinguishable feature of the sole effect doctrine is that the tribunal does 
not consider any factors other than the actual effect of the governmental measure.179  
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The approach of sole effect can be seen in the Trippetts case before the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal.180 Here, a U.S. company had been involved in the Tehran International Airport 
project, establishing a joint venture with an Iranian company. This joint venture was controlled by 
mutually equal rights between the two partner companies. After the Iranian revolution, however, 
the Iranian government appointed a new manager to the Iranian company, which was authorized to 
exclusively control the management of the joint venture. The tribunal regarded this appointment as 
a kind of expropriation which deprived the U.S. company owner of the full value of the property. 
Here, the tribunal held that ‘[t]he intent of the government is less important than the effects of the 
measure on the owner, and the form of the measure of control or interference is less important than 
the reality of their impact’.181 The later Biloune case was consistent with this ruling.182 In that case, 
government authorities had interrupted the investor’s enterprise by way of a number of 
governmental actions and inactions, including financial scrutiny, the issuance of a working stop 
order and the detention and deportation of the investors. The respondents contended that those 
actions were justified according to the national law of the host state and that they were not related to 
the investment. However, the tribunal found that whilst the intention of the government was 
ambiguous, its effect was clear enough to constitute constructive expropriation. Consequently, the 
tribunal upheld the claim of constructive expropriation by relying only on the effect of the 
governmental action.183 Finally, the NAFTA arbitration in the Metalclad case seems to follow the 
Biloune ruling in holding that interrupting a land fill enterprise in an ecological preservation zone 
was a case of indirect expropriation;184 the tribunal held that it did not need to decide or consider 
the motivation or intention behind the government action, such as environmental protection, in 
assessing the existence of indirect expropriation.185  
Contrary to this, another approach requires the tribunal to consider other elements, such as 
the government’s purpose in carrying out expropriation.186 For example, in the Oscar Chinn case 
the tribunal addressed a Belgian government regulation to control transportation prices in favour of 
Chinn’s competitor, Unatra,187 by helping to reduce Unatra’s transportation fee. As a result, Chinn 
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became less competitive, to the extent that it was no longer able to run its enterprise. The Permanent 
Court of International Justice, however, did not recognize any taking to have occurred, holding that 
‘[f]avourable business conditions and good will are transient circumstances, subject to inevitable 
changes’.188 The general idea of this approach was followed by the Sea-Land case  in  the  Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal. Here the claimant argued that a series of governmental actions, such 
as the inappropriate operation of container terminals or remiss attitudes of staff, deprived the 
company of the use of terminal facilities. This adverse effect of the government action affected the 
claimant’s worldwide flow of containers. The tribunal considered, however, as the important 
factors for the recognition of expropriation, a series of circumstantial elements leading the 
government to behave thus. It found that the deterioration in terminal administration was affected 
by unavoidable national upheaval occasioned by the Iranian revolution or that the alleged 
governmental interruption was concerned with exercising justifiable regulatory power.189 This 
trend was recognized in the NAFTA case of S.D. Myers.190 In that case, the plaintiff was a U.S. 
corporation involved in the disposal and processing of the toxic chemical substance, 
polychlorinated biphenyl (hereafter ‘PCB’) waste. The company entered the Canadian PCB 
disposal market in 1993, and gained the U.S. government’s approval to import PCB waste from 
Canada to the US. Its Canadian competitors were worried that this export of PCB waste to the U.S. 
had dismantled the competitive situation of the Canadian PCB disposal market because S.D Myers 
could dispose of much of the PCB waste in its U.S. plant. In response to this situation, the Canadian 
government banned the export of PCB waste from its territory. Finally, S.D. Myers invoked an 
investment claim, including an alleged violation of NAFTA, Article 1110; namely that the 
Canadian ban on PCB waste exports indirectly expropriated their investment by removing any 
possibility of bringing and disposing of PCB waste in the U.S. plant, with accompanying claims 
concerning the violation of other provisions, like NAFTA Articles 1102 (National Treatment), 1105 
(Minimum Standard of Treatment) and 1106 (Performance Requirements). While the tribunal 
upheld the violation of Articles 1102 and 1105, it rejected the claimant’s arguments in respect of 
Articles 1106 and 1110 (expropriation provisions). In particular, the reasoning in its partial award 
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held that the assessment of the expropriation considered ‘the real interests involved and the purpose 
and effect of the government measure’ rather than ‘technical or facial considerations’.191 
In any case, an all-or-nothing approach is unacceptable in terms of current notions of the 
indirect expropriation doctrine. Of course, the sole effect doctrine could foreclose any disguised 
public interest by denying all kinds of public interest. Indeed, public purpose or public interest are 
such extremely abstract concepts that a government could take advantage of their conceptual 
flexibility in order to strike down a claim. The simplest way of avoiding this ambiguity, therefore, is 
to prevent a tribunal from touching on these issues from the outset. Certainly, no one could deny 
that the sole effect approach could fundamentally and efficiently block any abuse of governmental 
power. However, the problem is that this black-or-white approach runs a risk of eliminating all 
scope for the exercise of justifiable regulatory power by the host state, just as too strong a pesticide 
exterminates not only harmful insects but also beneficial ones. Looking at it from the other side, 
although it is certainly guaranteed that the sole effect doctrine would firmly protect all private 
interests, this might require a tribunal to turn a blind eye to the abusive use of private rights by 
neglecting a government’s legitimate purpose in producing regulations. As outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter, the idea of investment protection is to develop not an all-or-nothing 
logic but an elaborate a framework that can carefully distinguish mere abuse of private rights from 
justifiable regulatory power and the protectable right of an investor.  
In this context, Dolzer and Bloch conclude that an assessment of the regulatory effect 
should be placed within the broader context to balance it with an assessment of other relevant 
factors.192 Of course, the severity of a regulation will still serve to be an undeniably important 
factor in distinguishing taking from mere justifiable regulation. The Glamis Gold tribunal argued 
that assessing the degree of adverse impact on an investment (‘the severity of the economic impact 
and the duration of that impact’) is a ‘foundational threshold inquiry’ although other elements can 
be considered for inquiry for indirect expropriation.193 In addition, it could be said that the effect of 
government measures is more relevant than their purpose.194 However, the indirect expropriation 
cannot be constituted solely by assessing severity of regulatory effect to the same extent that a mere 
reference to the purpose or intention of a regulation would not render a host state immune from an 
investment claim. In addition, the Chemtura tribunal argued that the degree to which a government 
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measure has an adverse impact is determined differently depending on the specific circumstances. 
Therefore, it found that it could not conduct an appropriate inquiry of indirect expropriation without 
considering other circumstantial elements related to the facts of the case.195 In this context, the 
wording of the KORUS-FTA clearly binds the tribunal to consider other aspects of a regulation 
than its severity. This is consistently supported by other NAFTA arbitration.196  
Interestingly, a similar doctrinal debate can be found in Korean property law. In fact, there 
has been controversy over whether the government should pay compensation even for unintentional 
or non-purposive government actions which interfere with property;197 this  comes  from  the  
German doctrine of expropriatory interference (enteignender Eingriff). This doctrine represents an 
expansion of the threshold theory, paying particular attention to the severity of the regulation. 
Therefore, the doctrine goes further than the threshold theory, to the extent that even a legal 
administrative act requires compensation as long as its consequences would harm a particular 
property holder in a disproportionate way.198 The Korean Constitutional Court has been silent on 
this issue and Korean scholarship is still very cautious about accepting the doctrine.199 The reason 
for this reticence is similar to the criticisms of the sole-effect doctrine; while the concept of 
expropriatory interference could be useful in preventing a government action which was conducted 
accidentally on purpose, it runs the risk of attacking the public protection of social justice. Given 
the current debate regarding this doctrine, it looks highly questionable whether a plaintiff could 
argue for just compensation for a government action solely on the grounds of severity. 
ii) Legitimate expectation 
The legitimate expectation of the investor would serve as one of the important factors in 
assessing the severity of the adverse effects of a regulation. Generally speaking, an investor usually 
expects a future situation in the phase of planning the investment. For instance, the investor could 
decide to build a landfill site on the basis of a reasonable expectation that the authority would not 
revoke the construction permit suddenly and arbitrarily. In this case, if the government neglects 
such a legitimate expectation, that action would constitute an expropriation. Similarly, U.S. taking 
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doctrine protects the reasonable expectations of the property holder;200 this reasonable expectation 
would be established on the basis of an investor’s consideration of circumstantial evidence, such as 
the risk inherent in the industry, and the relationship between the property and the relevant 
regulatory schemes. The scope of this reasonably-justified expectation is in proportion with the 
regulatory circumstances in which the government exercises power.201 Therefore  it  is  harder  to  
claim the rightful recognition of a reasonable expectation when the property owner is informed that 
the property is situated in a more densely-regulated and more changeable area.202 
In this context, the KORUS-FTA considers the extent to which reasonable investment-
backed expectations are protected through the Annex 11-B.3(a)(ii) of the KORUS-FTA. Actually, 
this doctrine has been more frequently used in the context of fair and equitable standards of 
treatment.203 For example, the Thunderbird case attempted to define a legitimate expectation:  
The concept of ‘legitimate expectations’ relates, […] to a situation where a Contracting 
Party’s conduct creates reasonable and justifiable expectations on the part of an investor (or 
investment) to act in reliance on said conduct, such that a failure by the NAFTA party to 
honour those expectations could cause the investor (or investment) to suffer damages.204  
However, international arbitration tribunals have also relied on this doctrine in a number of 
indirect expropriation cases. Among the NAFTA cases, the Metalclad case held that a belief based 
on a representation by the Mexican government and the absence of a timely, orderly, or substantive 
basis for the denial by the municipality of the local construction were protectable and legitimate 
expectations. 205  In the Azurix case, the tribunal held that legitimate expectations ‘are not 
necessarily based on a contract but on assurances explicit or implicit, or on representations, made 
by the State which the investor took into account in making the investment’.206 This doctrine was 
somewhat controversial; in partially annulling the arbitration award in Metalclad case, the Canadian 
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court warned that the indirect expropriation doctrine ran a risk of including legitimate regulation by 
covering interferences with the ‘reasonably-to-be-expected benefit of property’.207  
As many different elements should be considered, the protection of a reasonable and distinct 
expectation might vary on a case-by-case basis according to the specific factual context of the 
regulation. Of course, the expectation should be generated by the government in accordance with 
an appropriate understanding of the normative system of relevant contracts or actions.208 Another 
important index of legitimate expectation is changeability of the past regulatory circumstances in 
which the investment was made.209 In the Oscar Chinn case, the tribunal pointed out that the 
investor might have been aware of the changeable circumstances in which the river transport 
system could be heavily affected by the host states.210 In other words, reasonably predictable 
changes in the law cannot constitute the violation of a legitimate expectation. In this context, the 
KORUS-FTA prescribes that the reasonableness of investment-backed expectations varies ‘in part 
on the nature and extent of governmental regulation in the relevant sector’.211 To be specific, the 
scope of a legitimate expectation might become narrower if the investor should have already 
recognized the fact that the host state exercises a strong regulatory power over the relevant business 
sector. For example, ‘an investor’s expectations that regulations will not change are less likely to be 
reasonable in a heavily regulated sector than in a less heavily regulated sector’.212 This is in 
accordance with recent NAFTA cases, like the Methanex case. Here, such legitimate expectations 
could not be recognized because it was found that the investor decided to make an investment in 
spite of the clear recognition of the fact that California maintains a heavily regulated environmental 
policy. This is evidenced by the investor’s previous actions in hiring a lobbyist to deal with such 
regulatory obstacles.213 
Some leading scholars argue that legitimate expectations originate from a general principle 
of domestic law which is shared by many other countries.214 The logic of legitimate expectation 
also applies to Korean legal principles. Korean property law protects this expectation under a 
general principle of law: the principle of faith protection. In the Green Belt case, the Court held that 
the constitutional guarantee of property rights prevented a legal change that would suddenly 
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decrease or decimate the value of the property owned. Further, the Court understood that the value 
of land would be guaranteed if such value was created on the basis of a faith that the government 
would maintain the pre-existing legal order.215 Therefore, the governmental measures in the 
Metalclad case could be challengeable in Korean courts, as long as the claimant proves that the 
investment decision is based on reasonable faith regarding whether or to what extent the law will 
change.  
iii) The character of government action 
The tribunal of the KORUS-FTA should consider the character of government action, such 
as its objective and context.216 The tribunal in El Paso Energy International Company case217 held:   
In sum, a general regulation is a lawful act rather than an expropriation if it is non-
discriminatory, made for a public purpose and taken in conformity with due process. In 
other words, in principle, general non-discriminatory regulatory measures, adopted in 
accordance with the rules of good faith and due process, do not entail a duty of 
compensation.218 
Similarly, Article 11.6 of the KORUS-FTA recognises the legality of regulation as long as it 
is taken ‘(a) for a public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner; (c) on payment of prompt, 
adequate, and effective compensation; and (d) in accordance with due process of law and Article 
11.5.1 through 11.5.3’. As a result, an investment tribunal is required to analyse the character of 
government action in order to review whether the measure in question was taken in conformity 
with the above mentioned conditions. 
The Saluka tribunal discussed the character of government action in the process of 
reviewing a governmental measure, namely, the forced administration of a bank, which had been 
executed for the purpose of securing the stability of the national banking system.219 The tribunal 
indentified a police powers exception; here, the host state is allowed to undertake non-compensable 
expropriation in the form of ‘bona fide regulations’ which are purported to achieve ‘the general 
welfare’ ‘in a non-discriminatory manner’. 220  This reasoning is supported by many legal 
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sources;221 for example, the tribunal referred to Article 10(5) of the Harvard Draft Convention on 
the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, 222  the United States Third 
Restatement of the Law of Foreign Relations in 1987223 and the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on 
the Protection of Foreign Property,224 which recognise the principle right to regulate property in the 
public interest in the context of the political or social ends of the sovereign state. This approach is 
not foreign to U.S. regulatory taking; notably, the Penn Central case scrutinised the character of the 
government measure in order to assess whether the relevant regulation ‘arises from a public 
program that adjusts the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good’;225 
further the court, through this examination, determined to uphold the regulatory taking if the 
regulation did not substantially advance legitimate state interest.226 
In conformity with this general principle of international investment law, the KORUS-FTA 
has tried to guide an investment tribunal to analyse the character of a government measure in a 
specific way by reflecting some of the legal sources and doctrines found in various jurisdictions. 
Most interestingly, the KORUS-FTA attempts to incorporate the special sacrifice doctrine227 used 
by Korean constitutional theory to differentiate a compensation-not-required regulation from a 
compensation-required one. To be specific, the KORUS-FTA provides that in considering the 
character of a government action, the tribunal could analyze ‘whether the government action 
imposes a special sacrifice on the particular investor or investment that exceeds what the investor or 
investment should be expected to endure for the public interest’.228 This wording is very similar to 
the Korean Green Belt ruling, in which the Court recognized the expropriation-like effect in the 
exceptional case where a property owner is forced to endure disproportionally special or 
exceptionally severe burdens in comparison to the constitutional public obligations assumed by 
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other ordinary people in the public interest. This expropriation-like effect presents government 
action as effectively blocking any meaningful use of a property.229  
A similar logic is also found in the U.S. taking doctrine,230 despite the Trade and 
Environment Policy Advisory Committee (hereafter ‘TEPAC’) criticising this concept by claiming 
that the doctrine of a special sacrifice is foreign to U.S. legal principles.231 In the Lucas case before 
the U.S. Supreme Court, the plaintiff argued that the government prevented any construction of a 
habitable building on the coast line under its coastal protection plan. Here the Court described 
‘extraordinary circumstances’ and ‘a relatively rare situation’ of taking in which the regulation 
‘denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land’.232 In addition, the special sacrifice 
doctrine is compatible with the purposes of the taking clause. The basic precept behind the special 
sacrifice doctrine is that an individual’s special sacrifice for public purposes should be compensated 
at the communal level once the individual loss surpasses the communal obligation that the public 
can be expected to assume.233 Similarly, the Armstrong case held that,  
[T]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a public use 
without just compensation was designed to bar the Government from forcing some people 
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.234 
The character of a government action could be determined by its objectives and context. 
This issue is associated with the ‘legitimate public welfare objectives’ that the government seeks to 
achieve through regulatory action. The ‘legitimate public welfare objectives’ of the KORUS-FTA 
include ‘public health, safety, the environment, and real estate stabilisation’.235 In particular, this 
provision allows the government to take a measure ‘to improve the housing conditions for low-
income households’.236 This reflects the Korean situation in which unregulated land speculation 
has increased the cost of housing to such an unreasonable level that many low-paid people cannot 
afford to own houses or even to pay rent. In addition, Article 11.10 of the KORUS-FTA guarantees 
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the regulatory power of the state to protect the environment in contrast to its protection of 
investment. Those clauses cover a significant portion of the constitutionally justifiable measures of 
the Korean government, such as environmental protection237 or public policy relating to housing 
supply.238239 Lastly, the tribunal and the respondent state could suggest other kinds of legitimate 
public welfare objectives because the enumeration of such objectives in the treaty text is not 
exhaustive. This conceptual flexibility could help a government to protect a minimum scope for the 
exercise of justifiable regulatory power.  
Of course, in considering the character of government action one runs a risk of causing 
further uncertainty. Indeed, it is rare for the modern democratic state to restrict property for reasons 
other than in the public interest. Consequently, the police powers exception could be abused by 
respondent states seeking to avoid indirect expropriation claims.240 In this vein, the Saluka tribunal 
also seems to admit that this doctrine is not absolute enough to justify all kinds of property 
restriction taken under the pretext of the public interest.241 In addition, the S.D Myer tribunal 
attempted to both ‘examine the purpose and effect of governmental measures’.242 Finally, it is 
necessary to specify how to consider all three factors in an appropriate way. In this context, the 
KORUS-FTA proposes the proportionality test, as illustrated in the following. 
C. Proportionality principle 
Annex 11-B.3(a) does not provide clear direction as to how to use the above-mentioned 
factors in treaty interpretation. Such guidance is elaborated in paragraph 3(b), which prescribes that 
regulatory actions do not constitute indirect expropriation as long as i) those actions are intended to 
protect  legitimate  public  welfare  objectives;  and  ii)  those  actions  take  the  form  of  non-
discriminatory regulations. Therefore, the first step of the tribunal’s review is to consider the 
characteristics of a government act in order to clarify that the alleged regulation is intended to 
pursue a legitimate public welfare objective and that it is designed to be exercised in a non-
discriminatory way. After the first step, the tribunal should go on to review whether those 
regulations put the investor or the investment into a ‘rare circumstance’,  which  is  prescribed  in  
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Annex-B.3(b) of the KORUS-FTA. Passing the first step would not work in favour of the 
respondent state as long as the tribunal recognizes that the alleged regulation is involved in this rare 
circumstance. Here, the KORUS-FTA proposes a more detailed exemplary situation where ‘an 
action or a series of actions is extremely severe or disproportionate in light of its purpose or 
effect’.243 This leads the tribunal to review the proportionality between the adverse effect of a 
regulation and the public interests pursued by that regulation.  
This interpretation is compatible with several recent international investment tribunal cases 
which pay attention to the principle of proportionality.244 In particular, the Tecmed and Azurix 
cases245 show one possible application of the proportionality principle by reference to the reasoning 
of the European Court of Human Rights.246 The Tecmed tribunal dealt with similar facts to the 
Metalclad case, ruling on a government refusal to renew a landfill operation permit. In this case, the 
tribunal scrutinised the severity of the regulation in order to establish that the effect of the 
government measure nearly led to the closure of the landfill operation.247 A relevant action in the 
public interest cannot be immune from the tribunal’s review as long as that action nullifies an 
investment effectively and completely.248 Therefore, the tribunal examined ‘whether such actions 
or measures are proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the 
protection legally granted to investment’.249 Here, the tribunal applied the proportionality test that 
‘[t]here must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the charge or weight imposed 
to the foreign investor and the aim sought to be realized by any expropriatory measure’.250 In this 
vein, the El Paso Energy International Company case held that a regulation should not cause 
unreasonable inference with the property, and that one example of unreasonable regulation 
                                               
243 KORUS-FTA Annex-B.3(b). 
244 Fortier and Drymer (n 169) pp.324-25; Jack J. Coe Jr and Noah Rubins, ‘Regulartory Expropriation and 
the Tecmed Case: Context and Contributions’ in Todd Weiler (ed) International Investment Law and 
Arbitration: Leading Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law 
(Cameron May, 2005) pp.664-65; Xiuli Han, ‘The Application of the Principle of Proportionality in Tecmed v. 
Mexico’ (2007) 6(3) Chinese Journal of International Law pp.324-25; Sornarajah (n 8) p.395. 
245 Azurix v. Argentine Republic (n 204); Tecmed v. United Mexican States (n 6). 
246 e.g. James and Others v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1986, §50, Series A no. 98; Mellacher and 
Others v. Austria, 19 December 1989, §48-56, Series A no. 169; Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others 
v. Belgium, 20 November 1995, §38-44, Series A no. 332. 
247 Tecmed v. United Mexican States (n 6) paras.115-17. 
248 ibid para.121. 
249 ibid para.122. 
250 ibid. See also Azurix v. Argentine Republic (n 204) para.311; Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. 
United Mexican States, ICSID No. ARB(AF)/02/1, Award, 17 July 2006 para.176. 
DOCTRINAL GAPS BETWEEN THE KORUS-FTA AND THE KOREAN CONSTITUTION 
 
95 
situations is when the regulation is disproportionate to the purposes of the host state.251 Finally, the 
LG&E Energy Corp.252 tribunal clearly held:  
With respect to the power of the State to adopt its policies, it can generally be said that the 
State has the right to adopt measures having a social or general welfare purpose. In such a 
case, the measure must be accepted without any imposition of liability, except in cases 
where the State’s action is obviously disproportionate to the need being addressed.253  
Based on this standard, the Tecmed tribunal conducted a fact-based inquiry on the nexus 
between the public purpose of the government act and consequential effect of the regulation. The 
tribunal recognized that the operation of the investment neither impaired environmental protection 
and public health nor did it cause a genuine social crisis.254 Rather, the tribunal identified that the 
public authority issued a refusal of permit renewal in order to respond to community pressure in 
particular political and social circumstances.255 The tribunal attempted to decide whether this 
government response dealt with the relevant problems appropriately and rationally; in effect it 
analysed whether or not the governmental measure was proportionate to the adverse effect of this 
action.256 After careful analysis, the tribunal held that the community pressure precipitating the 
measure was not directly related to the activities referred to by the public authority as their reason 
for the revocation, finding that the relevant circumstances were not serious enough to require the 
refusal of the permit renewal.257 Indeed, the tribunal found that the community pressure was more 
directly related to relocating the landfill business, than the closure of its operations, the harmfulness 
of which had not been clearly evidenced.258 All in all, it held that the governmental action was not 
proportionate in the light of its purpose and effect if the measure were to lead to the closure of the 
business itself, despite the investor’s efforts regarding the relocation commitment.259 
The Azurix case provides another example of the application of the proportionality test.260 
In this case, a U.S. investor won a bid for a 30 year concession for water distribution and sewerage 
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treatment through a privatisation project introduced by Argentina. After the business was in 
operation, the municipal authorities of Argentina took a series of betrayal measures after the public 
criticised the private company for charging unreasonable fees. These measures eventually forced 
the investor to file for bankruptcy, leading the claimant to argue that the government violated the 
BIT by interfering with the tariff regime and failing to comply with its obligation under the 
concession. The tribunal examined whether the public purpose existed within the measures, in 
addition to assessing their effects.261 In the course of applying the proportionality test of the 
Tecmed case,262 the tribunal conducted a fact-based inquiry of the action argued by the claimant. 
This inquiry focused on the investor’s legitimate expectation;263 more specifically, whether those 
expectations were formed with a convincing understanding of the normative system applicable to 
the concession, and how severely the expectations were ignored to the extent that they constituted a 
deprivation of the property.264 The tribunal recognised that the actions of the local authorities 
politicised the concession agreement beyond the contractual rights of that agreement.265 It also 
found hostile attitudes and an intention to ignore the investor’s rights on the part of the 
authorities.266 However, the tribunal assessed that the financial difficulties that the investor faced 
were not solely attributable to the government’s actions and that some of the expectations of the 
governmental commitment to the concession were based on an unconvincing understanding of the 
relevant law and concession agreement.267 The tribunal eventually concluded that the extent of the 
impact of measures on the investment was not enough to constitute the expropriation.268 In 
particular, the tribunal pointed out that despite a series of state acts the investors maintained a 
significant portion of ownership in the investment.269 
This is similar to the so-called ‘Dolan-Nollan’ test, which requires a court to examine the 
correlation between the public interest and the involved burden that the plaintiff should assume.270 
The Nollan decision required the existence of a nexus between the regulation and its purpose; here, 
the Californian Coastal Commission required the dedication of an easement across the plaintiff’s 
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property as a condition of the approval of a rebuilding permit. The public authority in this case 
argued that this condition was intended to promote a legitimate state interest by dealing with a 
‘blockage of the view of the ocean’,271 which the plaintiff’s building plan caused. The court 
admitted that the government has the authority to secure the public’s view of the beach from the 
street.272 However, the relevant regulation did not serve the purpose of securing the view of the 
beach, but rather only public access to the beach.273 The court eventually upheld the taking on the 
ground of an insufficient nexus between the regulation and its purpose.274 Following the Nollan 
case, the Dolan case added another standard to this test, namely rough proportionality. In that case, 
a city allowed an investor to expand onto property adjacent to a floodplain on the condition he or 
she created a public greenway and bicycle path. Here, the court upheld the nexus between the 
relevant condition and the public purpose of preventing flooding and traffic congestion. 275 
However, the court examined the reasonable relationship between the conditions of the 
development permit and the impact of the development.276 In other words, an individual property 
owner’s suffering as a result of the imposition of the condition should be roughly proportionate to 
the public harm of the proposed land use.277 Based on this standard, the court held that the city had 
used unnecessary and excessive means, even if the same goal could have been achieved through an 
extant zoning requirement.278 In addition, the court pointed out that the city had suggested only a 
very vague possibility that the creation of a bicycle and pedestrian pathway would reduce traffic 
congestion.279  
To  summarise,  a  KORUS-FTA  tribunal  might  take  several  steps  in  order  to  review  the  
alleged breach of the indirect expropriation clause: first, the tribunal should decide whether the 
involved regulation protects legitimate public welfare objectives and whether it is implemented in a 
non-discriminatory way; and secondly, the tribunal is required to scrutinise whether the relevant 
regulation generates a situation that is disproportionate to the government’s purpose in protecting 
the general welfare. Here the tribunal could use the reasoning of the Tecmed case.  As  such,  a  
regulation should be considered in an arbitration,  even if  it  protects  legitimate public  welfare,  as  
long as it causes severe enough effects to close down the effective operation of an investment. 
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Finally, the tribunal would hold a regulation as constituting an indirect expropriation when it could 
establish that the investor was suffering an inordinate burden by weighing the adverse effects 
against the public interest pursued.  
A similar reasoning is found in the Korean Green Belt case; the court can order the 
government to take compensation-like measures when it finds a breach of the proportionality 
principle.280 In order to conduct a proportionality test, the court reviews whether the Green Belt 
policy pursues the public interest, which is considered to be a social obligation under Article 23(2) 
of the Korean Constitution. The Korean Court and the investment tribunal under the KORUS-FTA 
principally presume that the regulatory interference is non-compensable as long as it serves the 
public interest which is prescribed as a ‘legitimate public welfare objective’ under the KORUS-
FTA and a ‘social obligation’ under the Korean Constitution.281 Next, the Korean court examines 
how severe a burden the plaintiff has been forced to bear; specifically, whether the general 
application of the government regulation was implemented in a discriminatory way that imposed an 
unequal burden on a particular land owner. In international investment law, a regulation can 
constitute indirect expropriation when the general application of a regulation could affect the 
claimant in a discriminatory way.282 Lastly, the court considers the proportional relationship 
between the public purpose and its effect. The investment tribunal also conducts a proportionality 
test; the regulation is less likely to be compensable where the public interest outweighs the private 
interests of investors.283 
D. Meaning of ‘prompt, adequate, and effective’ compensation 
The KORUS-FTA requires only ‘payment of prompt, adequate, and effective 
compensation’.284 This provision reflects the so-called ‘Hull formula’ which was first proposed by 
the U.S. Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, in a dispute regarding the Mexican expropriation of 
property belonging to U.S. citizens. This formula has been heavily applied to determine the 
standard of compensation for expropriation under many investment treaties.285 It requires the host 
state intending to directly or indirectly expropriate property to make adequate payment of the fair 
market value for the loss in the property, promptly, without any undue delay, and effectively, in a 
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convertible currency.286 Tribunals have held that the standard of adequate compensation refers to 
the full payment of fair market value.287  
This is very similar to the standard for compensation for public interference under Article 
23(3) of the Korean Constitution which requires full compensation of the objective value of the 
interfered property.288 Another similarity is the scope of full compensation, which in Korean law 
excludes profits or losses (e.g. any speculative surplus on the land) which are added to the property 
by the government action or intention; 289  under Article 11.6.2(c) of the KORUS-FTA, 
compensation for the expropriation does ‘not reflect any change in value occurring because the 
intended expropriation had become known earlier’. 
V. ENDURABLE OR REDUCIBLE SUBSTANTIVE DOCTRINAL GAPS  
A. Remaining specific gaps in substantive aspects of the doctrine  
This thesis has highlighted that there are more commonalities than might be expected 
between the property protection offered by the Korean Constitution and the investment protection 
conferred by the KORUS-FTA. Generally speaking, both systems pursue a balance between 
property rights and public regulatory power by adopting the proportionality principle. In addition, 
the KORUS-FTA’s proportionality test incorporates many legal elements from the two countries, 
such as the U.S. Penn Central doctrines and the Korean sacrifice doctrine. Nevertheless, one might 
still undeniably find several doctrinal gaps, as illustrated in the following sections. 
i) Gap between just compensation and compensation-like measures 
The Korean Constitutional Court is not clear about whether a breach of proportionality leads 
to the recognition of public interference. In fact, the concept of indirect expropriation is most 
similar to the public restriction of the Article 23(3) of the Korean Constitution, among other Korean 
legal concepts, in the sense that it requires just compensation even if a physical taking does not 
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actually occur.290 However, the Korean Constitutional Court in the Green Belt case did not make it 
clear whether recognition of a severe burden on a property owner serves as a ground to consider the 
relevant regulation as an expropriation or a public restriction under Article 23(3) of the Korean 
Constitution. Instead, the Korean Court surmised that a disproportionate restriction of property is 
associated with a breach of the social obligation doctrine according to Article 23(2) of the Korean 
Constitution.291 This ambiguous language remains a source of controversy in Korean property law, 
as seen in the previous chapter.  
The Green Belt ruling just suggested that a breach of proportionality causes the government 
to assume an obligation not of the compensation of Article 23(3), but of compensation-like 
measures under Article 23(2). Here a compensation-like measure is not identical to the 
compensation required by Article 23(3) of the Korean Constitution. A judicial order for a 
compensation-like measure allows the government to consider many other alternatives to cure a 
disproportionate situation.292 Firstly, the government does not have to pay more than the amount of 
money required to strike a balance between the public interest and the private right. Secondly, 
instead of paying monetary compensation at the full market value, this could make room for the 
public authority to invent less intrusive administrative actions. In terms of policy considerations, 
this doctrine of compensation-like measures could allow the government to avoid the incredible 
financial burden of direct full market value compensation. 
The problem is that a breach of the proportionality test does not trigger an obligation of 
compensation under Article 23(3) of the Korean Constitution, but of a compensation-like measure 
under Article 23(2). As seen above, the KORUS-FTA adopts the Hull formula, which is similar to 
Article 23(3) of the Korean Constitution. Given that fact, a foreign investor is given an additional 
chance to challenge a government action on the basis that compensation remains unsatisfied 
because a Korean compensation-like measure does not necessarily meet the conditions of the just 
compensation prescribed in the KORUS-FTA. Suppose that the property of a foreign investor were 
to be severely restricted by a government regulation. The government, avoiding the full monetary 
payment of compensation, provides other administrative remedies like a compensation-like 
measure in accordance with the Green Belt ruling. The Korean Court would therefore recognize the 
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regulation as justified as long as it includes a compensation-like measure to cure any 
disproportionality.293 However, the Korean government may be faced with a different perspective 
on the same regulation under the KORUS-FTA; a foreign investor could argue a breach of the 
indirect expropriation provision on the grounds of an absence of just compensation. In another case, 
a U.S. investor could raise a legal suit if the amount of money paid by the government to restore 
proportionality does not reach the fair market value to restore the value loss.  
ii) ‘Legitimate public welfare objective’ and ‘social obligation’ 
It  is  not  clear  whether  the  ‘legitimate  public  welfare  objective’  of  the  KORUS-FTA  is  
identical to the public goal of the Korean Constitution. For example, the government has argued 
that its Green Belt policy was established to prevent ‘traffic or water supply problems that arise out 
of the expansion of a city, preserving healthy farming and a city’s natural surroundings, leaving 
some lands unused inside the city, and making the urban space for disaster prevention’.294 This 
purpose may not be recognized during arbitration if a tribunal understands those purposes not to be 
directly related to public health, safety, the environment and real estate stabilization (improvement 
of housing conditions for low-income households), as per Annex 11-B of the KORUS-FTA. 
In particular, there may be greater uncertainty as to whether the public concept of land could 
be accepted in international investment arbitration. Korean constitutional theorists and lawmakers 
have often argued for ‘the public concept of land’ based on Article 122 of the Korean Constitution. 
This puts greater weight on the state’s social obligation by underscoring the public characteristics of 
land property with a focus on the role of land in promoting public welfare.295 In practice, the 
Korean Constitutional Court has denied the constitutionality of some statutes inspired by the public 
concept of land theory.296 However, the government often challenges the Court’s negative attitudes 
by proposing land regulations based on the public concept of land, whenever land speculation 
emerges as a serious social issue. In this context, many policy makers and scholars argue that 
judicial attitudes on this point should change.297 Additionally, the Korean Constitution also admits 
the possibility that the government restrict land property under the public concept of land although 
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such restriction is somewhat limited. The Court has also justified a piece of legislation to levy tax 
on land excess-profit by reference to the public concept of land.298 Given this, it might be highly 
questionable if a KORUS-FTA tribunal will uphold those government actions as ‘legitimate public 
welfare objectives’.  
B. Overall convergence between the Korean Constitution and the KORUS-FTA  
Such doctrinal gaps are expected to be endurable and reducible for both a foreign investor 
and the Korean government in the current practice of both Korean law and international investment 
law. In other words, the extent of these doctrinal gaps is not expected to hinder the Korean 
government in achieving its own constitutional goals in usual situations too severely. Generally 
speaking, it is questionable that the Korean legal system is too poorly developed to protect foreign 
investment according to the global standards generally agreed upon by international investment 
lawyers. In addition, a tribunal would not accept unreasonable claims which have risk of making it 
difficult for the Korean government to fulfil its essential constitutional functions.  
To take an example, the review process of a KORUS-FTA tribunal bears a striking 
resemblance to that of the Korean Constitutional Court. Let us suppose that a Korean government 
regulation causes an expropriation-like effect on an investor’s property in protecting the public 
interest. The Korean government would prepare a compensation-like measure in advance because it 
should avoid possible constitutional claims, in accord with the Green Belt ruling. As long as the 
Korean government takes appropriate measures under the Korean Constitution, an investment 
tribunal is unlikely to strike down the government regulation on unreasonable grounds.  
Firstly, investment tribunals and the Korean court are relatively generous regarding the 
public purposes of a regulation. Of course, there is a possibility that a KORUS-FTA tribunal would 
deem the relevant regulations established in pursuit of a Korean constitutional goal as not belonging 
to the category of ‘legitimate public welfare objectives’. However, an arbitrator could flexibly 
expand the recognizable scope of the legitimate purpose of a regulation because the list of 
‘legitimate public welfare objectives’ is not exhaustive.299 Concurrently, the Korean legal system is 
gradually showing more deference to individual property rights. In fact, as the Korean economy 
grows, it needs greater and more active participation by private actors nationally and globally. 
Nevertheless, Korean constitutional practice has not paid sufficient attention to private rights in 
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order to promote private investment. In other words, the Korean government has abused its 
regulatory rights by feigning public welfare.300 Meanwhile, the Korean Court has shown a very 
passive attitude towards expanding the scope of compensation-required government action. In light 
of this, critics argue that the emergent Korean legal system would be induced to pay greater 
attention to individual rights. They insist that the government would have to reconsider more 
indirect regulation, thus seeking to cause less interference with private interests in designing the 
regulations.301 In this vein, the Korean courts have shown a meaningful orientation towards respect 
of individual property rights. To take the example of the public concept of land, many academic 
commentators argue that this concept should be adjusted by proposing a so-called ‘market-friendly 
public concept of land’ as Korean legal scholars argue that bogus public interests need to be 
carefully distinguished in order to protect the constitutional rights of property.302 In addition, it is 
highly doubtful that property protection based on compensation-like measures could not satisfy U.S. 
investors. The Korean Court has, in separate opinions, expressed some very cautious but promising 
suggestions to make the amount and the nature of compensation-like measures under Article 23(2) 
of the Korean Constitution more closely identical to the just compensation of Article 23(3).303 
Furthermore, one commentator argues that Korean legal practices need to become habituated to the 
global standard in the area of property protection.304  
All things considered, the severity of the above-mentioned doctrinal gaps might be durable, 
and at least reducible in the future, both for a foreign investor and the host state where there is a 
broader convergence of property law. From a Korean perspective, a series of recent constitutional 
cases concerning property law seems to suggest that the level of property protection afforded to 
investors would not regress from the current level. To the extent that property protection is 
strengthened in the Korean legal system, the current practices of international investment law 
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shows more respect for government regulatory power, especially in the area of public interests, 
such as the environment or human rights.305 In sum, it becomes gradually less likely that 
regulations that are considered to be legitimate laws in the national legal system constitute indirect 
expropriation at the level of international investment law.  
VI. CONCLUSION: INERADICABLE RISKS UNDER THE KORUS-FTA 
As discussed above, the current trend in the indirect expropriation doctrine shares many 
common substantive features with the Korean legal doctrine of property rights. First of all, an 
investment tribunal and a Korean court are required to tackle the same issue of how to draw a 
discrete line between a legitimate government action exercising sovereign power against abusive 
use of a property right and capricious authoritarianism against a protectable individual right. 
Secondly, both legal systems seem to solve this problem in a similar way, namely using a 
proportionality test. Of course, several gaps remain within this context; the factors that a tribunal 
considers in determining proportionality are not exactly the same as those taken into account by a 
Korean court. Nevertheless, this gap would not pose an unacceptable challenge to Korean public 
authorities or individual foreign investors in ordinary situations. Figuratively speaking, two cooks 
can concoct similar tasting dishes using slightly different ingredients under a similar recipe; one 
may sweeten the dish with maple syrup, the other with honey. A customer would not complain 
aggressively as long as the taste could satisfy her or his essential needs in an ordinary case. In the 
present context, a practitioner expects decisions by any of the other forums to secure similar or 
acceptable consequences, just as ‘a rose by any other name would smell as sweet’.306 At minimum, 
indirect expropriation would not precipitate disastrous consequences for the national regulatory 
system.307  
However, such doctrinal similarities between the national and international law cannot 
eliminate all relevant risks of conflict between a host state and a foreign investor. A conflict 
occasioning a disastrous consequence for the host state occurs unexpectedly and in unusual 
circumstances. Here, serious challenges for the Korean government take place not because of 
substantive differences in wording, but due to the operation of the treaty, i.e. the application 
                                               
305 Sornarajah (n 8) pp.398-400. 
306  Barry Appleton, ‘Regulatory Takings: The International Law Perspective’ (2002) 11(1) New York 
University Environmental Law Journal p.46. 
307 Ibid. 
DOCTRINAL GAPS BETWEEN THE KORUS-FTA AND THE KOREAN CONSTITUTION 
 
105 
procedure like Chapter 11 arbitration. Indeed, even if Korean law and international investment law 
had shared the exact same doctrines on property protection and restriction, there would remain the 
possibility of conflict between a foreign investor and the Korean government.  
The reason for this is that all the actors in the global investment field are fair-weather friends; 
in peaceful periods, a host state will attract and protect foreign investment in order to foster the 
national economy. Concurrently, a foreign investor will cooperate with the host state because 
investment cannot be profitable without hospitable treatment from the government. Although a 
minor conflict could occur, a foreign investor would prefer a national remedy because investor-state 
arbitration costs a lot of time and money. In a sense, a U.S. investor might feel comfortable with a 
Korean national remedy, given that Korean legal practice and academic discussion have taken a 
great deal from U.S. property law and other developed countries.  
However, this kind of friendship ends where the ultimate substantive goals of a host state 
and foreign investor can no longer be compromised. This is because the two actors operate 
principally according to their own rationalities; for instance, the host state works in order to win the 
next election, whereas the private foreign investor pursues its economic interests. Therefore, they 
are cooperative only to a certain limited extent. Suppose that Walmart were to dominate the 
distribution industry in a way to ruin small and medium retailers in Korea. If this situation caused 
such public concern that could affect the next election, the foreseeable political benefits of echoing 
such public criticism could overwhelm the extant political benefits of attracting the investment.  
This is the point at which the Korean government starts to think of intervening in the market 
in accordance with Article 119(2) of the Korean Constitution.308 For example, the Korean National 
Assembly recently amended the Distribution Industry Development Act in order to regulate the 
uncontrolled expansion of supermarkets. Of course, a foreign investor would be amenable to 
Korean public policy as long as government action is not expected to seriously harm his or her own 
economic benefit. This cooperation is also based on an economic rationality in the sense that 
neglecting such public concerns has risks of damaging Walmart’s reputation resulting in tacit 
hostility from the host state and its customers. However, the investor will lose this self-control when 
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forced to suffer apparently unacceptable burdens to the point that he or she is unable to continue the 
business.309  
This is the juncture at which the foreign investor starts to think about engaging the investor-
state arbitration procedure. Here, Chapter 11 arbitration is invoked not in the usual 99% of 
situations but in the unusual 1%. In such an unusual situation, the Korean government, despite 
impressive textual similarities, will not eliminate the risk of an investment claim on constitutionally 
justifiable government regulations. The reason is that legal conflicts happen not because of textual 
differences but because of interpretative disagreements. To take an example of a constitutional 
claim at the national level, a plaintiff can sue the government even though both parties share the 
same constitutional text. In other words, constitutional claims arise due to differences in the 
interpretation of textual meaning between the parties; initially, the government takes action on the 
basis of an interpretation that this very action is constitutionally permitted. Nevertheless, the 
plaintiff contends that the government’s reading is wrong by arguing that the action involved 
violates the constitution. Similarly, even had the KORUS-FTA been drafted to ensure that its 
expropriation provisions were identical to Korean constitutional law, a foreign investor and the 
Korean government can still interpret the same text in different ways to further their own interests. 
For instance, suppose that the Korean government takes a particular government action based on 
the assumption that this very action protects the ‘legitimate public welfare objectives’ of Annex 11-
B.3(a)(iii) of the KORUS-FTA. Regardless of the government’s interpretation, a foreign investor 
could still sue by interpreting the relevant provisions so that the government action is not associated 
with ‘legitimate public welfare objectives’.  
If such a conflict in an extreme case were resolved within the national system, the national 
government would face less risk as long as its measures are taken in accordance with Korean 
constitutional principles and legal sources. In relation to the national remedies available to the 
foreign investor, one could suppose many different situations. Firstly, if the investor relied only on 
relevant national legal sources, such as Korean Constitution or national law (Situation (a)), the 
national court would conduct a proportionality test in accordance with the Green Belt doctrine. In 
this situation, the Korean government can secure its regulatory power as long as the measure is 
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taken according to the Korean constitutional doctrine. Protection of both the foreign investment and 
the regulatory power is not guaranteed beyond the constitutionally justifiable scope. Secondly, a 
U.S. investor attempts to challenge a governmental measure before the Korean courts by 
questioning a breach of the KORUS-FTA clauses, or a violation of the Korean Constitution 
(Situation (b)). Whether the court will consider the KORUS-FTA depends on the context in which 
the governmental measure is taken. Situation (b) will ramify into several possible scenarios. Firstly, 
if the measure is based on an administrative ordinance or rule, or municipal ordinance subordinated 
to an ordinary legislative statute, the court will review whether the measure violates the KORUS-
FTA (Situation (b)-1). Secondly, if the measure is taken in accordance with a legislative statute 
which is equivalent to the treaty under the Article 6(1) of the Korean Constitution, the national 
court will recognise the applicable law according the general principle of a conflict of norms 
(Situation (b)-2); for example, a recent case before the Korean Supreme Court held that the 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Carriage by Air treaty as 
lex specialis prevails over the Korean Civil Act and the Commercial Act as lex generali in the 
respect of international air carriage.310 Nevertheless, the Korean courts have not established a 
consistent doctrine to resolve conflicts between national law and international treaties. Thus, the 
national application of the KORUS-FTA remains dependent on the specific context of the case and 
the nature of the national law.311 If a national court did not recognise the KORUS-FTA as an 
applicable law in Situation (b)-2, it would review the relevant measure according to the national law 
proposed by the government – the foreign investor would naturally lose as long as the government 
took the measure legally. Eventually, the only choice available to the foreign investor would be to 
ask the ordinary court to request a constitutional review by questioning the constitutionality of the 
relevant national law. This eventually leads to Situation (a). On the other hand, if the court 
recognises the KORUS-FTA as an applicable law, it will review the measure in the same way as in 
Situation (b)-1; namely, it would need to interpret the KORUS-FTA text. When the Korean court 
applies the indirect expropriation clauses of the KORUS-FTA, it may apply a similar methodology 
to that of the international investment tribunal, which is required to assess whether the public 
welfare of the relevant measure is proportionate compared to the adverse impact on the property 
according to the Annex 11-B of the KORUS-FTA. However, the Korean court would articulate the 
ordinary meaning of the relevant KORUS-FTA clauses by referring to national legal sources. Thus, 
the Korean court would cite Korean legal decisions rather than previous investment arbitration 
decisions when it is unable to gain a meaningful understanding from the text itself. The investment 
                                               
310 Supreme Court of Korea Decision 2001Da67164 Declared July 22, 2004. 




tribunal and Korean national court would concur as long as the fundamental values of two systems 
are negotiable or compatible. However, using a national remedy in an unusual case could make a 
significant difference when compared to using Chapter 11 arbitration. The Korean judiciary is 
naturally independent from any abuse of Korean regulatory power because Korean courts, 
especially the Constitutional Court, have established their authority by garnering public support in 
fighting against inappropriate political influence.312 Therefore, both a foreigner and a Korean 
national are protected if the Korean government exercises its power beyond its constitutional limits. 
This analysis leads to another assumption that the Korean court operates within the general values 
of constitutional principle, including the social state, which is approved by the Korean people. In 
other words, the Korean judicial system is accountable not to the executive branch but abstractly to 
the national people. At the same time, the proportionality test is not a firmly fixed mathematical 
formula stipulating a specific factual inquiry. In addition, Article 16 of the Korean Trade Procedure 
Act prescribes that no clause of a trade treaty shall be interpreted in such a way as to infringe upon 
the legitimate economic rights and interests of Korea. Therefore, national remedy logically entails 
the possibility that a Korean court might support a national measure by understanding 
proportionality differently from the general stream of international investment law in the rare but 
extreme cases in which investment disputes often occur.  
On the other hand, a nation-state cannot not maintain tight control over legal conflicts, as 
long as it delegates its sovereign power of conflict resolution to an investment arbitration 
mechanism by agreeing to consent to arbitration. In relation to a conflict resolution, the investor-
state arbitration mechanism produces its own rules to interpret the treaty text. The investment 
tribunal has principal authority to interpret the treaty text once the treaty itself is concluded. Of 
course, the investment tribunal could expand the category of ‘legitimate public welfare objectives’ 
in order to avoid a possible conflict with national public goals. However, it is the tribunal that has 
the final discretion over whether to expand this concept. Here the tribunal will be inclined to refer to 
the independent rules of interpretation unless the treaty text or an interpretative statement from the 
KORUS-FTA Joint Committee specifies another meaning. Those independent rules are developed 
through the accumulation of other previous arbitration decisions without any direct influence from 
the nation-states. Of course, current international investment rules stays within tacit sympathy with 
common legal doctrines found in many other countries. Nevertheless, individual nation-states 
cannot directly control the general future direction of international investment law as they cannot 
secure doctrinal affinity once the indirect expropriation doctrine launches its own autonomous path 
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and diverges from national law. For example, there is circumstantial evidence that the initial 
development of indirect expropriation was influenced by the regulatory taking doctrine of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.313 However, in investment tribunals this doctrine has been developed in a manner 
that was relatively distant from the U.S. development path of regulatory taking resulting in its use to 
attack U.S. regulations established under the U.S. regulatory taking doctrine, as seen in many 
NAFTA cases. As such, arbitration may be more likely to develop an interpretative rule of 
‘legitimate public welfare objectives’ by citing previous investment arbitration decisions, rather 
than Korean or U.S. court cases. Consequently, despite the rewording of the indirect expropriation 
provision in the treaty, the Korean government still suffers the risk of uncertainty or unpredictability. 
As a result, in practice the nation-state must consider transnational mechanisms and their 
substantive rules whenever it makes a public policy proposal.  
In this context, some commentators point out that international investment law has 
developed into an autonomous system that goes beyond the state’s original intentions. For example, 
critics of ‘New Constitutionalism’ argue that the autonomy of international investment law 
exercises a disciplinary effect of de facto higher law over individual nation-states and their legal 
systems, just as a national constitution prevails over its subordinate ordinary laws at the national 
level.314 
Of course, a transnational mechanism can be established or rejected by the formal, legal 
implementation of a nation-state’s political intentions.315 As long as a new world government does 
not emerge, few transnational mechanisms can operate without the aegis of sovereign state power. 
The current global investment system was not formed until nation-states formally delegated their 
own powers to transnational mechanisms. For example, many nation-states agreed to create 
institutional foundations for investor-state arbitration through multilateral treaties such as the ICSID 
Convention. Concurrently, State Parties to the KORUS-FTA consent to arbitration over any 
                                               
313 Actually, the Iran-US Claims Tribunal refined the jurisprudence of taking law in international investment 
law, and many of arbitrators in the Tribunal were influenced by and educated in the American legal context. 
Although this link is quite arguable and tangential, it is hard to deny that the reasoning of many international 
investment arbitrations seems to be indirectly or directly susceptible to various national legal traditions and 
philosophies. See Sornarajah (n 8) pp.364-76. 
314 David Schneiderman, ‘Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism’ (2000) 25(3) Law & Social 
Inquiry; David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and 
Democracy’s Promise (Cambridge University Press, 2008). See also David Schneiderman, ‘NAFTA’s 
Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to Canada’ (1996) 46(4) The University of Toronto Law 
Journal; Stephen Gill, ‘New Constitutionalism, Democratisation and Global Political Economy’ (1998) 10(1) 
Global Change, Peace & Security. 





relevant dispute raised in the context of a treaty violation.316 In light of its constitutional law, the 
sovereign state can allow its own judicial body to resolve a dispute between a foreign investor and a 
state organ within its own territory. Nevertheless, the Korean government consents to arbitration in 
KORUS-FTA disputes with foreign investors, which entails handing decision making to an 
independent tribunal outside Korean jurisdiction. Constitutional theory understands this practice as 
‘international delegation’, where the state allows international institutions to take up a function 
which the sovereign state is traditionally presumed to hold.317 In any case, it is hard to say that all 
kinds of international delegation under the KORUS-FTA are absolutely unconstitutional in any 
circumstance. It would be an exaggeration to claim that the Korean government through Chapter 11 
arbitration gives up all sovereign powers. State parties retain formal rights to amend or even 
withdraw from treaties such as the KORUS-FTA and ICSID Convention.318 In addition, the 
tribunal should not interpret the treaty text or any interpretative statement beyond the State parties’ 
intentions. 
Such an analysis broaches the following question: why do nation-states voluntarily tie their 
own hands through the over 3,000 investment treaties despite such unavoidable risks, even if there 
are many other alternatives? For instance, national courts could handle conflict resolution regarding 
the interpretation of indirect expropriation. They could then interpret the relevant treaty text in 
accordance with Korean constitutional doctrine if there is a conflict between international and 
national rules. If so, the executive branch would not need to be subject to any legal source other 
than Korean law. Alternatively, the nation-state could maintain national control over legal conflicts 
through the use of state-to-state dispute settlement after exhaustion of the local remedies, as seen in 
the US-Australia FTA.319 Nevertheless, the Korean government chooses to rely on the system of 
investor-state arbitration in order to deal with dispute settlement. Regarding this policy choice, 
some Korean critical activist groups and the opposition party argue that Korean trade policy makers 
                                               
316 KORUS-FTA Article 11.17. 
317 See generally Curtis A. Bradley, ‘International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-self-
execution’ (2003) 55(5) Stanford Law Review; Edward Swaine, ‘The Constitutionality of International 
Delegations’ (2004) 104(6) Columbia Law Review. See also Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United 
States Constitution (Clarendon Press, 1996) pp.247-73; Lori Fisler Damrosch, ‘Sovereignty and International 
Organizations’ (1997) 3(2) University of California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy; George A. 
Bermann, ‘Constitutional Implications of US Participation in Regional Integration’ (1998) 46 American 
Journal of Comparative Law Supplement; Brian F. Havel, ‘The Constitution in an Era of Supranational 
Adjudication’ (1999) 78(2) North Carolina Law Review; Julian G. Ku, ‘The Delegation of Federal Power to 
International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions’ (2000) 85(1) Minnesota Law Review. 
318 Harten (n 315). 
319  See generally William. S. Dodge, ‘Investor-state Dispute Settlement between Developed Countries: 
Reflections on the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 39(1) Vanderbilt Journal of 
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are captured by a neo-liberal model or are puppets of American imperialism.320 This analysis 
logically proposes as an alternative, enlightenment or the politics of resistance which smashes the 
global setting that impairs national interests.  
Even if such a critical analysis were partly true, it cannot show the entire picture regarding 
the rationale behind accepting the transnational mechanism. Of course, the risk for the U.S. 
government is relatively less than for the Korean government because the KORUS-FTA text 
incorporates more U.S. national legal doctrine than Korean. Nevertheless, the American 
government  is  also  not  completely  immune  from  investor-state  arbitration,  as  the  TEPAC  
noticed.321 At the same time, a foreign investor will also endure some degree of risk regarding the 
establishment of investment and unfamiliar legal circumstances in the foreign state. Nobody could 
deny the existence of such risks because the investment tribunal does not always work in favour of 
investors; the fundamental principle of international investment law is to strike a balance between 
the private interests of foreign investors and the justifiable regulatory power of the host state. All 
things considered, all actors in the global investment field share greater or lesser degrees of risks – 
although the risks relative to investment practices are unfairly distributed. 
In this regard, the following Chapters IV and V will touch upon more profound questions 
within a theoretical framework to describe the broader picture of the global investment field: why 
do all the actors in the global investment field voluntarily share such risks by relying on the global 
investment legal system? Of particular concern to this thesis, what kinds of benefits could the 
nation-state enjoy through this mechanism in exchange for the corresponding risks? Is there any 
alternative to the legal system to allocate such risks in a fairer way? Specifically, what is the 
alterative for the nation-state to palliate unjustifiable, redundant risks on the one hand, and expand 
justifiable, requisite benefits in this global setting, on the other?  
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THE EMERGENCE OF A GLOBAL INVESTMENT LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE 
GLOBAL INVESTMENT REGIME 
I. INTRODUCTION  
As discussed in the previous chapter, a substantive doctrinal convergence between two legal 
systems cannot eliminate all latent risks caused by indirect expropriation claims. In this context, this 
chapter proposes a theoretical framework to explain the rationale which drives the nation-state to be 
voluntarily involved in the global mechanism of investment law despite its ineradicable risks. In 
order to do so, this thesis employs Teubner’s concept of ‘global law’ to the global investment field 
in the context of the systems theory.1  
From this perspective, the chapter starts by analysing globalisation as providing the setting 
in which the current investment field is operating. As Part II of this chapter describes, systems 
theory defines globalisation as a process of functional differentiation, where world society is 
transnationally sectorialised into various autopoietic sub-societies according to their own innate 
functions taken for the sustainability of social communications. As those sub-societies compete and 
cooperate around common global issues, the interactions among the sub-societies are observable 
through interplays among the actors that represent corresponding sub-societies. Eventually, such 
forms of cooperation and conflict produce various communicative spheres which Teubner defines 
as a global regime. This theoretical framework can be used to explain the dynamics of the 
formation of the global investment regime (hereafter ‘GIR’) as a grand but temporary process of 
bargaining by global actors as functionally differentiated autopoietic sub-societies emerge in the 
course of globalisation in the global investment field – this thesis pays particular attention to the 
participation of the nation-state in this GIR.  
                                               
1 Here, the terms ‘global law’ and ‘global legal system’ are basically interchangeable because systems theory 
understands that the law can exist only in the form of a ‘system’, as will be discussed in this chapter.  
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 Part III points out that this global regime is destined to vanish at the embryonic stage if it 
cannot manage conflicts in a stable way. Therefore, the GIR is also vulnerable to external impacts 
in the future, and global investment law or global investment legal system (hereafter ‘GIL’) is 
gradually required to cure the instability of the GIR over time. This is the point at which the 
development of a global regime gradually requires law to serve a greater function in stabilising the 
normative expectations of all regime members over time. Part III shows that this function can be 
fulfilled due to the autopoietic nature of the legal system. If one applies Teubner’s understanding of 
autopoiesis to global law, global law does not exhibit the perfect type of autopoiesis. However, this 
thesis shows that the partiality of autopoiesis does not interrupt global law from fulfilling the 
function of law. In turn, Part IV points out that global law can be called a legal system as long as it 
can fulfil the function of law, despite its partial autopoiesis. Global law protects the robustness and 
effectiveness of the regime by making it reflexive to the long-term benefits of relevant actors on 
one hand and protectable from challenges intended to gain short-term benefits, on the other hand. 
On the basis of this analysis, the thesis proposes two essential elements of the global legal system in 
its functionalist aspects – namely, participation and independent dispute settlement. If one finds 
these two elements to exist, one can say that some degree of autopoiesis is starting to emerge, and 
thus a given normative system can be recognised as a legal system, because these two elements of 
the legal system are sufficiently present to fulfil the function of law successfully. Within this 
framework, this chapter concludes that GIL is emerging as one example of global law by showing 
that these two elements of law exist in GIL.  
II. THE GLOBAL INVESTMENT REGIME AS AN EXAMPLE OF A GLOBAL REGIME 
A. Rudimentary logic and the assumption of global regime formation 
The global regime, as an issue-driven communicative network, is a result of competition 
and cooperation among states and non-state actors to deal with common global issues. In fact, in 
attempting to understand the same issues in ways that expand their own interests, actors in the 
global field are competing with each other. Global actors tend to act so indifferent of one another 
that they do not consider what result one actor causes for another operating according to a different 
logic. What is worse, they attempt to dominate each other under their own rationality. Notably, the 
expansion of the global economic system prevails over other social values such as public health or 
environmental protection. Nonetheless, each global actor in this closely connected world cannot 




indifference and severe competition increase the risk of self-destruction which will destroy this 
closely connected world as a whole. However strong the global economy is, it could not survive 
extreme political upheaval or public resistance. At the same time, the collapse of the economic 
system would certainly influence the political and public health system in turn. Finally, fear of the 
worst possible scenario drives each stakeholder in the global investment field to make compromises 
to secure long-term benefits and concede short-term losses.  
Many political science theories concerning the organisation of the nation-state provide 
fruitful insights for understanding the underlying logic of global regime formation, even if those 
theories are not directly applicable to global regime formation, as will be discussed in the following 
sections. For example, the formation of a global regime is reminiscent of the core idea of social 
contract theory; individuals unite and establish a society to avoid a state of anarchic chaos 
characterised by naked violence or conflict. In the end, individuals delegate their sovereignty to the 
state authority as, in exchange, the government promises to protect these individuals under a certain 
order. Social contract theory, especially Locke’s theory, explicates the idea that the rationality of 
human self-interest propels individuals to give up their absolute rights voluntarily in order to 
achieve the long-term benefits of a political or economic order.2 This  logic  can  be  seen  in  the  
formation of order in international societies. For example, even if it cannot be directly applied to the 
international perspective, the domestic analogy applies the core logic of social contract theory to 
international relations by replacing individual people with individual states.3 
Against such an intellectual background, the international regime theory, developed in the 
international relations scholarship, explains that individual sovereign states voluntarily delegate 
their absolute powers to global entities. The concept of a regime was introduced in order to 
illuminate what makes competing individual nation-states agree to cooperate without a dominant 
coercive power.4 Initially, regime theory was developed in the post-Cold War period, when 
superpowers such as the U.S. or the U.S.S.R could no longer control individual states. In other 
words, despite the absence of a conspicuous central controller, an order has developed to guide 
                                               
2 See generally John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Published 1698, Mark Goldie ed, Everyman, 
1993). 
3  See generally Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge 
University Press, 1989); Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Palgrave, 
2002). 
4 See generally Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variable’ in Stehpen D. Krasner (ed) International Regimes (Cornell University Press, 1983); Stephen D. 
Krasner, Power, the State, and Sovereignty: Essays on International Relations (Routledge, 2009). 
EMERGENCE OF A GIL IN THE GIR 
 
115 
competing states towards cooperation on universal issues, like environmental protection and 
terrorism. 
Finally, the rudimentary framework of international regime theory could be applicable to 
the globalised world from a systems theory perspective. In international relations scholarship, the 
focus of regime theorists has been on the nation-state. In comparison, actors in a systems theory 
application of regime theory extend beyond state actors to include non-state actors that represent the 
rationalities of social systems such as the economy or public health. This theoretical construction is 
based on the assumption that the world is per se an autopoietic social system consisting of 
competing autopoietic sub-systems. In this context, the research described at the outset briefly 
attempts to sketch the outline and core concepts of systems theory in order to reconceptualise the 
global regime as the result of interplays between these sub-systems.  
B. Emergence of autopoietic social systems 
i) Concept of autopoiesis as self-referential logic 
Systems theorists consider society to be an autopoietic social system comprised of 
communications.5 An autopoietic system6 produces and reproduces its own elements, operations, 
structures and boundaries. In other words, the system produces its own organisations in which 
components interact with one another in the circular process of the system itself and continuously 
engender other inter-systemic components required for the conservation of the system. 7 
Autopoiesis does not make a system self-sufficient because no system can exist without 
contributions from its environment.8 Certainly, an autopoietic system is required to be cognitively 
                                               
5 Nilkas Luhmann, ‘The Unity of the Legal System’ in Gunther Teubner (ed) Autopoietic Law: A New 
Approach to Law and Society (Walter de Gruyter, 1988) p.18. 
6 Initially, the term autopoiesis was coined by the Chilean neurobiologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
Varela. In fact, Maturana came up with this neologism consisting of the Greek components auto (self) and 
poiesis (production) in order to describe the common features found in the organisation of all living systems. 
See Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living 
(D. Reidel, 1980) p.xvii; Humberto R. Maturana, ‘Autopoiesis’ in Milan Zeleny (ed) Autopoiesis: A Theory of 
Living Organization (North Holland, 1981); Niklas Luhmann, Einführung in die Systemtheorie (Car-Auer-
System Verlag, 2002) pp.110-11. See also John Mingers, Self-producing Systems: Implications and 
Applications of Autopoiesis (Plenum Press, 1995), pp.9-17. See also Michael King, ‘The Construction and 
Demolition of the Luhmann Heresy’ (2001) 12 Law and Critique (regarding critical analysis over various 
understandings of Luhmann’s idea).  
7 Georg Kneer and Armin Nassehi, Niklas Luhmanns Theorie sozialer Systeme: eine Einführung (W. Fink, 
2000) pp.48-49. See also Gunther Teubner, ‘Autopoiesis in Law and Society: A Rejoinder to Blankenburg’ 
(1984) 18(2) Law & Society Review pp.292-93; Gunther Teubner, Law as an Autopoietic System (Blackwell 
Publishers, 1993) p.22.  




open because it needs to maintain exchanges with its environment or with other systems, just as a 
biological cell exists by absorbing water and heat from the environment.9 Nevertheless, autopoiesis 
means operational closure to the environment, so that the system is not simply the receiver, but is 
the regulator (or selector) of environmental influences; for example, the exchange of energy and 
matter between a cell and its environment is controlled entirely in accordance with the internal state 
of the cell. That is to say, an autopoietic system chooses to accept the elements required for its 
organisation only by reference to the internal selectivity of the system.10 Seen from this point of 
view, the concept of self-reference might be one of the most appropriate qualifiers to describe the 
feature of autopoiesis. Furthermore, the system reconstructs accepted external elements into its own 
internal elements in its own way, so that these internally constructed elements gain totally different 
emerging properties from those they had in the environment.  
ii) Communication as a building block of society 
The logic of self-referential operations in an autopoietic system may become more 
convincing when one considers communication as a conceptual building block of a social system. 
Even if the concept of autopoiesis is applicable to biology and psychology, many commentators, 
even autopoietic theorists in natural science, are reluctant to directly apply the concept of 
autopoiesis to the social context.11 Here, social systems theorists make theoretical alterations by 
replacing autopoiesis among cells or humans with autopoiesis among communications. In other 
words, autopoiesis works in the social system only if one considers communications as the 
conceptual building blocks of society, rather than other material things such as cells or humans.12  
Moreover, systems theory raises ontological questions as to what really exists in society. 
According to (social) systems theory, production is not associated with materialistic connotations 
because it is a meaning that is produced and processed within the social system.13 In relation to the 
production of meanings, the meaning of a certain being is defined or produced differently according 
                                               
9 Kneer and Nassehi (n 7) p.50. 
10 ibid pp.50-51. 
11 Niklas Luhmann, ‘The Autopoiesis of Social Systems’ in R. Felix Geyer and Johannes van der Zouwen 
(eds), Sociocybernetic Paradoxes: Observation, Control and Evolution of Self-steering Systems (Sage, 1986) 
p.172; Gunther Teubner, ‘Evolution of Autopoietic Law’ in Gunther Teubner (ed) Autopoietic Law: A New 
Approach to Law and Society (Walter de Gruyter, 1988) p.221; Niklas Luhmann, Essays on Self-reference 
(Columbia University Press, 1990) p.176; Teubner (1993) (n 7) pp.28-29; Niklas Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft 
der Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp, 1997) pp.24-35. See also Kneer and Nassehi (n 7) p.55; Michael King and Chris 
Thornhill, ‘“Will the Real Niklas Luhmann Stand up, Please”. A Reply to John Mingers’ (2003) 51(2) The 
Sociological Review p.279. 
12 Michael King, ‘The “Truth” about Autopoiesis’ (1993) 20(2) Journal of Law and Society pp.219-20. 
13 Luhmann (1990) (n 11) pp.21-79. 
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to the communicative contexts in which the being is situated. Although a specific human as a 
biological organism or as an individual psychic subject makes essential contributions to the 
production of meanings, they are replaced by or vanish into the temporal flux of social 
communications.14 They are originally anonymous because they can be specified only in particular 
communicative contexts. For example, George Bush, as one of 6 billion biological and 
psychological beings in the world, can be replaced with Barack Obama or some other person at any 
time according to the political rationality that is related to the production of collectively binding 
decisions. There is no necessary logical reason why that particular human being has to be George 
Bush beyond a specific communicative context. A human being can make a play of being Barack 
Obama as a Harvard Law School graduate, a lawyer, a former Chicago Law School professor, and 
the first African-American U.S. President, because he was and is all of these things – coincidently 
or randomly – in particular communicative contexts. Likewise, social structures and institutions 
constantly change in accordance with their communicative contexts. The parliamentary system of 
government can be changed into a presidential system at any time according to political rationality. 
Who or what institution will be chosen at a particular time and place ultimately depends on which 
person or which institution will gain public support. Conversely, any changes in institutions or 
personnel within a communicative system cannot alter the social system’s fundamental rationality 
which serves as a rationale for these very same institutional and personal changes. Seen from this 
point of view, what is most meaningful to society is communication, because only communication 
can make society decide whether to introduce the various meanings of biological and psychological 
being into society itself.15  
                                               
14  Daniel Chernilo, A Social Theory of the Nation-state: The Political Forms of Modernity beyond 
Methodological Nationalism (Routledge, 2007) pp.145-46. 
15 Actually, his view is not related to misanthropic approaches which undervalue the significance of the 
individual; his systems theory uses communication, rather than human beings, as the building block of society 
because he takes the individual seriously. See Nilkas Luhmann, ‘Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: 
The Differentiation of the Legal System’ (1992) 13(5) Cardozo Law Review. p.1422. Luhmann argues that an 
individual thought or body should not be seen just as one part of society under the name of a human being that 
could be construed arbitrarily. In this context, the systems theorist criticises humanistic views because so-
called human-centred approaches ironically attempt to restrict thought and bodies to a universal unity of 
human beings or human rationality. The fundamental problem with the humanistic view is that no concrete or 
universal consensus exists on human rationality or on how to organise society. These theoretical difficulties 
expose an individual to quite arbitrary interpretations which sometimes ironically generate authoritarian 
influences that organise and suppress the psychical, and even biological, operations of individuals under a 
certain kind of human-based rational rule. Consequently, the humanistic theory of society, which liberated the 
individual from religious metaphysics, was recaptured by another kind of metaphysics which controls the 
individual under the rule of social rationality. In this context, it is reasonable to assume that Luhmann intends 
to criticise the pressure for unilateral unity between society and the individual by keeping the individual at a 
relative distance from society. See Teubner (1993) (n 7) pp.44-46. See also Michael King and Chris Thornhill, 





Taking into account the importance of communications in society, it is necessary to 
articulate the concept of communication; systems theory understands communication as comprising 
the steps of selection, such as information (Information), utterance (Mitteilung) and understanding 
(Verstehen).16 The social system has to make a series of selections about which meaning, of all the 
possible meanings, will enter into communication according to its own internal logic. Briefly, 
‘[c]ommunication is the processing of the selection’.17 Firstly, information is a selection from 
many possibilities from among the thoughts of the psychic system.18 Through this process, some 
meanings could enter the communication process as communicable meanings while others remain 
meaningless in the environment (a psychic system). In this sense, one particular kind of utterance 
has to be selected from various possibilities because not all information is uttered in the same 
way.19 Finally, communication occurs only when the uttered information can be understood in a 
certain way. In fact, understanding is not related to the ability to recognise what is true, nor to the 
appropriate receipt of information. As with any other steps of the communication process, 
understanding is also a selection process because it requires selection from various possibilities 
whereby the same meaning can be understood in many different ways.20 Furthermore, whether 
understanding is successful or not depends on whether it is responded to by a subsequent 
communication.21 According to Luhmann, ‘[u]nderstanding is never the mere duplication of the 
utterance in another consciousness but a condition of connection with further communication in the 
communication system’.22  In this regard, even misunderstanding – namely, when one gets 
something wrong – could be a form of understanding in the sense that it provokes another 
communication which thematises that misunderstanding.23 
Luhmann defines society as an exceptional type of social system, which ‘includes all 
communications, reproduces all communications and constitutes meaningful horizons for further 
                                                                                                                                     
‘Niklas Luhmann’s Political Theory: Politics after Metaphysics?’ in Michael King and Chris Thornhill (eds), 
Luhmann on Law and Politics: Critical Appraisals and Applications (Hart, 2006) pp.80-81; Chris Thornhill, 
German Political Philosophy: The Metaphysics of Law (Routledge, 2007) pp.328-31 (regarding Luhmann’s 
criticisms of the existing humanistic view). 
16 Niklas Luhmann, ‘What is Communication?’ (1992) 2(3) Communication Theory p.252. See generally 
Claudio Baraldi, Giancarlo Corsi and Elena Esposito, GLU: Glossar zu Niklas Luhmanns Theorie sozialer 
Systeme (Suhrkamp, 1997) pp.89-93; Kneer and Nassehi (n 7) pp.81-95. 
17 Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (Stanford University Press, 1995) p.140. 
18 Kneer and Nassehi (n 7) p.83. 
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20 ibid p.85. 
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communications’.24 In other words, society as a social system exists only on the condition that 
previous communications can be connected to subsequent communications.25 This idea is not 
foreign to other theoretical traditions, such as philosophical phenomenology or hermeneutics, 
which recognise that the current understanding of something is heavily influenced by previous 
understanding, which is engendered by the intentionality of consciousness (Intentionalität des 
Bewußtseins).26 In addition, hermeneutics focuses on the point that a particular understanding of 
one part occurs through a tacit understanding of the other parts, or the whole – namely, that one can 
elicit a new meaning through pre-understanding (Vorverständnis) or prejudice. This inherent 
circularity of the understanding process, the hermeneutic circle, is similar to those self-referential 
structures whereby one meaning of a system refers to another meaning of the system itself. To sum 
up, ‘[w]e cannot communicate with each other except by drawing from the existing forms of 
communication, although we may use communications in novel ways’.27  
iii) Double contingency as an auto-catalyser for the formation of a social 
system 
Although securing the connectivity of communications is necessary for the existence of a 
society, communications in a society suffer from incredible difficulties of double contingency 
which cripple the continuous production and reproduction of communications. The philosophical 
meaning of contingency is the state in which one thing is randomly selected among various 
alternatives without any logical necessity.28 In other words, contingency implies the possibility that 
one  thing  could  be  referred  to  in  other  ways  the  next  time  –  just  as  when  one  throws  a  dice.  
Therefore, contingency is always accompanied by a risk of disappointment, in which systemic 
selection happens differently from what is expected from an external perspective.29 Double 
contingency emerges when the problem of contingency occurs at the social level, where sections of 
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two meaning-constituting systems depend on each other.30 In other words, double contingency 
refers to a situation in which every selection of the ego as a meaning-constituting system depends 
not only on the ego itself, but also on the alter ego as another meaning-constituting system.31 This 
double contingency is based on two theoretical assumptions. Firstly, no one can take an action 
without considering how the other is supposed to act. In this sense, systems theory explicates the 
fact that the selectivity of one system depends on the selectivity of the other system.32 Secondly, 
two mutually dependent parties do not know each other’s selection in advance because they operate 
indifferently. In fact, two social systems operate by selecting a particular meaning from among 
numerous possible meanings in its environment according to their own different logic, in a self-
referential way. In this situation, one actor in the external environment is not informed of which 
meaning will be selected by the other actor because the selection standards of one system may be 
blind to the actors of the other system. In this sense, systems theory argues that one system looks 
like a black box to the other one.33 Each system considers the other as its environment and it can 
observe only the external input-output process between the system and the environment without 
any knowledge of the internal self-referential process of selection.34 For example, driver A’s action 
at an intersection depends on the selection of driver B, who is coming from a different direction; 
driver A can cross the road only when driver A can expect that driver B will stop his or her car for 
driver A. However, the two drivers cannot anticipate each other’s exact reaction without any prior 
guidance because the two parties cannot swap their own brains with one another. Indeed, system A 
can guess system B’s selection only on the basis of system A’s internal logic – that is, system A 
cannot exactly guess system B’s real selection, but rather the not-yet-unfolding selection that is 
constructed by system A.35  In this setting of mutual dependence and indifference, double 
contingency emerges as a repeated circularity that cripples the respective parties’ communicative 
actions. The two systems cannot progress in communication because they constantly have to refer 
to each other: ‘I will do what you want when you do what I want’.36  
Nevertheless, this double contingency serves as an auto-catalyst for the formation of social 
systems. According to systems theory, the dilemma of double contingency is ultimately managed 
because this double contingency puts pressure on society by interrupting the connection of 
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35 ibid p.39. 
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communications. Of course, the society has no necessary obligation to solve these double 
contingency problems. However, as long as society wants to exist in the form of a continuum of 
communications, it needs to deal with this pressure; if it cannot or will not solve this problem, it 
disappears. As a result, double contingency always provokes a specific problem-solving process, 
which leads to the emergence of the social system as it continuously encounters problems and 
propels actors to resolve those problems.37 Finally,  the  social  system is  formed  in  the  course  of  
structuralising the possibility of communication in the condition of uncertainty brought about by 
double contingency.38  
iv) The role of expectation in dealing with double contingency 
Expectation plays an important role in dealing with the double contingency problem at the 
level of the social system. In systems theory, an expectation is not a reference to the conventional 
notion of ‘an actual state of consciousness of a given individual human being’.39 Luhmann 
explains that ‘expectations indicate what a given meaning situation foresees’.40 In other words, an 
expectation is a typical situation that an actor conventionally anticipates before taking an action. 
Expectations are socially generated through historical patterning of repeated social behaviours. The 
expectation is condensed and confirmed very gradually as social actors deal with similar situations 
over a long time.  
It is undeniable that the mere formation of an expectation does not eliminate all risk of 
double contingency, but merely transforms it into a problem of the expectation of expectation – 
namely, the production of expectation and the management of disappointment. For instance, 
expectation alone does not allow driver A to expect driver B’s reaction because driver A’s 
expectation of that reaction is what is reconstructed by driver A, who hypothetically puts him- or 
herself in driver B’s situation. In other words, actor A has to expect what actor B expects of what 
actor A expects of what actor B expects and so on and so on, so that social communication is 
trapped in a circularity of double, triple and ultimately infinite expectations.  
Nonetheless, expectations can enhance the possibility of successful communication because 
they have a function that allows society to effectively manage the incredible complexity of double 
contingency. As such, socially generalised expectations reduce ranges of possibility to a 
manageable scale as they can inform the actors in a given situation of the scope of the possible 
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selections of the other party. Returning to the theoretical model of the intersection, driver A, relying 
on generalised expectations, can expect a limited number of situations – namely, that driver B will 
pass or will stop. At the same time, the driver can exclude the possibility of certain extraordinary 
scenarios; for example, driver B’s car will suddenly disappear for no foreseeable reason, like an 
earthquake. To put it simply, expectation makes unexpectability and variability expectable.41  
In addition to expectations of expectations, society is required to deal with the risk of the 
disappointment of expectations. The statement that expectation does not eradicate double 
contingency but increases the chances of successful communication means that expectations of 
expectations always accompany the disappointment of expectations. Expectability cannot guarantee 
the realisation of the expected situation. For instance, driver A cannot clearly predict what action 
driver B will take among the expectable action choices (i.e., going or stopping). In this situation, 
driver A still suffers from the risk that his or her expectation will be betrayed by the other party’s 
action. Likewise, society is under more pressure to react to the risk of disappointment which 
invokes a new problem-solving process.42  
C. Globalisation as functional differentiation 
Systems theorists explain that globalisation is a result of functional differentiation, where 
society differentiates itself into many sub-societies to process double contingency in accordance 
with their own intrinsic functions. Strictly speaking, globalisation is nothing more than the radical 
emergence of various sub-social systems.43 Society is required to facilitate the specific structures 
that produce expectations on the one hand, and manage its accompanying risks of disappointment, 
on the other. However, modern society is too complex to propose a general structure that is 
appropriate for all communicative situations. Therefore, society as a whole is differentiated into 
several sub-societies which deal with the expectation of expectation in a particular type of 
communication. All functions within society are allocated exclusively to its sub-societies (e.g., 
economic, legal and political systems) according to the specific roles that those sub-societies take 
up in favour of the continuity of communications.44 As a result, society is differentiated into multi-
polar sub-societies which operate according to their own rationalities or functional purposes.45  
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In systems theory, the specified structure of a social system can be made operational by 
applying a code, namely, a specific form which can be used to connect one communication to 
another.46 As long as the communication is a selection, the original form of this operation is 
basically binary – namely, whether to select or not. In this context, each system understands 
external events by applying the binary value. Although the codes in all sub-societies are binary 
from  a  formative  perspective,  the  contents  of  these  codes  are  verified  from  the  substantive  
perspective of social functions. For example, political systems use concepts of 
governing/opposition as code in an attempt to provide collectively binding decisions for society; by 
the same token, the economic system employs possession/non-possession as its own code in the 
course of material reproduction. Despite such variety in the contents of their codes, every system 
shares the same basic form which is divided into a positive and negative value.47 Luhmann 
explains that, like two people speaking different languages, every system only understands and uses 
its own code and cannot communicate with the code of another system.48 Therefore, sub-societies 
understand the same meaning according to their own disparate rationalities of communication. For 
example, issues regarding off-shore oil drilling might be communicated differently in the economic 
system and the political system; the economic system may place the profitability of oil drilling at its 
analytical centre, whereas the communication of the political system operates according to the 
effects of oil-drilling policies on the next election. 
Systems theory understands globalisation as an ineluctable consequence and the global 
expansion of modern functional differentiation.49 The emergence of modern society means a 
transition from a stratified to a functionally differentiated society.50 The political system, together 
with religious and economic systems, has differentiated itself into an autonomous system as the 
stratified world has degenerated.51 The political system justifies its control over other sub-societies, 
such as the economic system, according to territorial sovereignty under the symbolic unity of the 
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nation-state. However, as functional differentiation has become more radical, other individual sub-
societies have evolved autopoietically beyond the territorial boundaries of the political system. To 
the extent that many non-political sub-societies have gained their autonomy through autopoiesis, 
the territory-based political system has lost its ascendancy, so that the nation-state is now just one of 
many sub-societies.52 At  the  same  time,  sub-societies  that  have  been  liberated  from  the  state  
operate to produce their own communicative networks according to their own sub-systemic 
rationalities beyond national territory. The communications of sub-societies spread globally 
because their code applies universally; the core logic of economic communications operates 
everywhere in the same way regardless of national origin.53 This trend of functional differentiation 
fragments the world into multi-polar networks of social communication based on the use of 
discursive differences. Indeed, globalisation has changed the primary cognitive units with which to 
observe (divide) the world from territoriality to discursivity.54 In the globalised world, the contours 
of one sub-society are drawn mainly by the discursive differences arising from adjacent sub-
societies.55 
D. Formation of the global regime as a global bargain 
The global regime is formed as a non-physical communicative sphere in which functionally 
differentiated sub-societies compete or cooperate in dealing with a common issue. Such 
cooperation or competition (even conflicts) among sub-societies can be recognised as a result of 
interplays between actors which are influenced by each sub-society; for example, a global company 
is an actor in the economic system which operates according to economic rationality, whereas the 
state is an agent of the political system. Conflict or cooperation between economic and political 
systems is observable only in the form of conflict or cooperation between the global company and 
the nation-state.56 Based on this theoretical assumption, systems theorists define a global regime as 
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an issue-driven hetero-anarchical sphere which is fragmented by its own discursive boundaries;57 it 
also emerges as ‘a temporary or, in some cases, lasting cluster or network of functionally 
specialized communication’58 by serving as a circumstance which can produce law beyond nation-
states.59  
i) Features of the global regime 
The features of the global regime can be analysed from two aspects. Firstly, the regime of 
systems theory is an ‘issue-driven’ network in that a specific common issue is an important 
motivation for the regime.60 In a similar context, international regime theorists propose the concept 
of a ‘principle’ to explain the elements that encourage regime members to take part in the regime.61 
This principle is a belief ‘that cooperation in a particular area will lead to some desired outcome’.62 
For example, the international regime for the prevention of nuclear proliferation is based on the 
belief that the regime will control the likelihood of a nuclear war occurring. This concept of a 
principle can be matched with a common global issue which drives global actors to compete and 
cooperate.  
                                                                                                                                     
The Person in the Sight of Autopoiesis’ (1994) 7(2) Ratio Juris. The concept of a person does not refer to a 
human being, but to any other entity, as seen in the discussion of a corporation as a legal person. Gunther 
Teubner, ‘Enterprise Corporatism: New Industrial Policy and the “Essence” of the Legal Person’ (1988) 36(1) 
The American Journal of Comparative Law; Gunther Teubner, ‘Rights of Non-humans? Electronic Agents 
and Animals as New Actors in Politics and Law’ (2006) 33(4) Journal of Law and Society. For example, the 
political system can observe economic communication in the form of corporate behaviour. In turn, the 
economic system can understand the operation of political systems in terms of legislation or administration of 
government. Seen from this point of view, the psychological problems of actors such as ‘phenomena of 
collective addiction’ cannot be entirely ascribed to the crisis of the global economy because actors are 
propelled by communications belonging to the self-expansive economic system. In particular, solutions should 
be found in incongruous structural frictions between the economy and other systemic conflicts rather than in 
reprimands for individual wrongdoing. See Teubner (n 26).  
57 Gunther Teubner, ‘Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism beyond the Nation State’ in Petra 
Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
pp.329-34. 
58  Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of 
Transnational Private Law (Hart, 2010) p.46. 
59 See generally Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Private Regimes: Neo-Spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of 
Autonomous Sectors?’ in Karl-Heinz Ladeur (ed) Public Governance in the Age of Globalization (Ashgate, 
2004) pp.72-75; Teubner and Fischer-Lescano (n 55) pp.1009-12; Dirk Baecker, ‘The Power to Rule the 
World’ in Gralf-Peter Calliess and others (eds), Soziologische Jurisprudenz Festschrift für Gunther Teubner 
zum 65. Geburtstag (De Gruyter Recht, 2009) pp.673-74; Teubner (n 57) pp.331-32. See also Gunther 
Teubner, ‘The Private/public Dichotomy: After the Critique?’ (2007) <http://www.re-public.gr/en/?p=99> 
accessed 15 April 2012; Gunther Teubner, ‘State Policies in Private Law? Comment on Hanoch Dogan’ 
(2008) 56(3) The American Journal of Comparative Law; Calliess and Zumbansen (n 58) p.96ff. (discussing 
challenges to the traditional public/private distinction, ranging from the domestic to the global level). 
60 Calliess and Zumbansen (n 58) p.46. 
61 Krasner (1983) (n 4) p.2. 
62 Jeswald W. Salacuse, ‘The Emerging Global Regime for Investment’ (2010) 51(2) Harvard International 




Secondly, the global regime is characterised by globality because the regime boundary is 
formed not on a statist basis, but on the basis of an ‘invisible’ communicative network of state and 
non-state actors.63 In the functionally differentiated society, nation-states have ceased to be a 
symbolic unity which represents sub-societies and controls functional differentiation within its 
territorial boundaries.64 Instead, nation-states remain ‘merely a self-description of politics’ by 
‘personalizing parts of the political process in the image of a collective actor’.65 Therefore, 
recognition of the global regime can reflect the current hybrid phenomenon of the blurring of 
hierarchical and formal divisions between state and non-state actors, or public and private 
subjects.66  Instead, those global actors or actions are connected by acquiring access to a 
communicative network that the traditional state-centred approach could not clearly recognize.67  
ii) The logic of global regime formation 
The rationale propelling regime members to form a global regime is not just some naive 
moral sense for humanism or altruism, but a strategic rational calculation to circumvent the worst-
case scenario of functional differentiation. This explanation, by and large, fits with the logic of 
domestic social contract theory and international regime theory; whereas international society is 
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presumed to consist of individual sovereign states, the global regime is formed by global actors 
who represent sub-societies. Therefore, global regime theory shows a similar but slightly different 
picture due to the autopoiesis of functionally differentiated sub-societies. 
Global actors are mutually dependent and so cannot be effectually operational without 
acquiring voluntary cooperation from the others. Unlike the pure domestic social contract theory, 
systems theory cannot logically presume the state of nature because individual autopoietic sub-
societies cannot exist as freestanding systems. Looking back at the concept of autopoiesis, one 
system considers other systems to be its environment, and produces meaning by observing and 
applying its own binary code to the operations of the other systems. In other words, the identity of 
one system is delineated by its environment – namely, other systems. An example from human 
cognitive development is a baby gaining self-consciousness only by observing others and 
establishing him- or herself against others. Likewise, an economic system can initiate 
communication only by observing the operations of the political system, such as regulation or 
deregulation. In addition, economic actors can make contracts under the legal system’s contract law. 
Despite their mutual dependency, social systems and their actors compete with one another 
because the systems understand the same issues according to their own rationalities of sub-societies. 
Rationality is functionally differentiated into so many disparate rationalities that no universal 
rationality exists. This situation leads to a number of rationality conflicts which are recognised as 
social conflicts among global actors. The previous world recognised conflicts at the places where 
different nation-states collided, whereas new global conflicts now happen when the rationalities of 
different systems meet.68 To take the example of copies of patent-protected medicines, it might not 
be plausible to solve this conflict in the context of collisions between nation-states. Globalisation 
construes the conflict as existing between economic and public health systems: the transnational 
company’s patent rights, in the economic sense, versus the human rights protection recognised in 
the public health system.69 In addition to mutual indifference, the blind expansion of systemic 
rationality exacerbates the risk of generating a dog-eat-dog world in which one system dominates 
all the other systems under a particular systemic rationality.70 Ironically, the unilateral expansion of 
one system is self-destructive, culminating in the total debacle of the world as a whole. To be more 
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exact, the autocratic expansion of system A reels back against system A itself because it encroaches 
upon system B – namely, the environment of system A. Moreover, such a collapse of one system 
increases the risk of a chain reaction, leading to another system’s collapse.71 
Finally, a global regime cannot emerge until global actors are motivated by a globally 
shared sense of urgency surrounding a global issue. Understanding globalisation as functional 
differentiation makes it clear that systems are existentially dependent on, but operationally 
indifferent to, one another; each system dances until the music stops. In this context, globalisation is 
the culprit which creates more possible conflicts to the exact extent that it can promote a greater 
chance of communication. Of course, today people rarely experience worldwide international 
conflicts, such as World Wars I and II. However, it is worth noting that the current globalised world 
suffers a similar degree of conflict in the sense that numerous small but severe social skirmishes 
occur in the form of rationality conflicts between discursive sectors in everyday life and everywhere 
else beyond national borders. If these conflicts are not kept within manageable levels, globalisation 
as functional differentiation might freeze mutual communications among global actors. Their 
shared fears of a possible worst-case scenario lead each member to compromise in order to secure 
long-term benefits and concede short-term losses through the establishment of a regime. More 
specifically, competing actors of sub-societies delegate their own powers to global administrative 
entities which are supposed to secure each actor’s minimum substantive interests. Of course, this 
compromise is not a one-shot game in which every actor can reach a particular equilibrium 
simultaneously based on accurate calculations out of the blue. In reality, the trajectory of regime 
formation is tortuous as regime members can temporarily agree on a particular cursory structure at 
one time, but renegotiate it at other times. The equilibrium of power relations among global actors 
is achieved and changed through trial and error in the course of the interminable circularity between 
conflicts and their resolution; although one system attempts to dominate the regime temporarily, it 
encounters conflicts and is ultimately forced to give in to other systems.  
E. Formation of the global investment regime 
The idea of global regime theory is applicable to the global investment field; the GIR is 
formed by global state/non-state actors who are required to deal with common global investment 
issues, namely the protection and restriction of global investment. Initially, some investment 
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lawyers have attempted to apply traditional regime theory to GIL in order to explicate why more 
than 2,500 international investment treaties and their arbitrations share very similar legal terms and 
rules, even though all of these treaties were individually established.72 The systems theoretic 
application of regime theory takes a further step by assuming that the GIR comprises not only state 
actors but also non-state actors which operate under other sub-societies.  
i) Principle of the global investment regime: a balance between protection 
and restriction of global investment 
The fundamental engine causing actors to form the GIR is a global consensus concerning 
the need for mechanisms for the protection and restriction of global investment. This global 
consensus is initiated by fear of the destructive thrusts of functional differentiation. This risk 
basically originates from the double contingency situation where one system cannot predict the 
other system’s operation in advance. In a functionally differentiated society, each actor competes in 
order to deal with the global investment issues in favour of its own rationality, on the one hand, and 
is mutually dependent with other actors, on the other. Here, if actors pursue their own interests by 
ignoring other actors and rationalities, such unilateral expansive thrusts run the risk of occasioning 
the total collapse of the global investment field; for example, if the nation-state were to undertake 
politically driven intervention in an extreme fashion, it could block all economic activities. At the 
same time, the abuse of rapacious global investment colonises the autonomy of civil societies.  
In this context, the principle of the GIR does not reflect only the predilection for investment 
protection but a balance between the protection and restriction of investment. As increasingly 
varied actors engaged in the formation of the GIR, global investment issues become engaged in 
more varied contexts, ranging from economic concerns to environmental or human rights issues. In 
a functionally differentiated world, each agent (actor) of each sub-system interprets this principle in 
its own way. In other words, the opinions of global actors in the GIR could principally be 
categorised according to their attitudes towards the protection and restriction of global investment. 
In this context, it sounds more reasonable to say that the principle of the GIR pursues the 
appropriate protection and restriction of global investment.  
To conclude, the principle of balance between investment protection and restriction in the 
global regime serves as a motivation to attract global actors, who want to avoid the risk of regime 
collapse. In this context, the GIR is an issue-driven global network in the sense that the pursuit of 
                                               





the appropriate protection and restriction of global investment could serve as a principle to make 
relevant state and non-state actors comply with the regime. Simultaneously, it is worth noting that 
this principle serves as a source of conflict because all global actors interpret the same principle for 
their own sakes. For example, economic actors want to give more weight to legitimate investment 
protection, whereas nation-states hope to accentuate the legitimate regulatory power of the host 
state.   
ii) Strategic calculation for a certain bargain among regime members 
As a result, the creation of the GIR is the result of strategic rational calculation among all 
actors who trade off their short term interests for longer term benefits in the course of dealing with a 
regime principle; namely, the protection and restriction of global investment. This rational 
calculation is empirically and gradually achieved through the interminable trial and error of global 
actors who expand their own rationality against or make concession to other actors. 
First of all, global investors are better off where a GIR is established. In fact, the economic 
activities of private actors would not work efficiently without formal and practical support from 
nation-states. The cooperation of the host state is necessary in making investments because many 
investments are closely related to the state’s long-term projects or to public interest at the domestic 
level. Further, in an extreme case where the host state withdraws protection of an investment-
related project arbitrarily, private actors have no other formal power to control the state. To be 
specific, foreign investors suffer from an insuperable ‘dynamic inconsistency problem’, in which 
the host state has unilateral discretion to withdraw its commitment to a contract with a foreign 
investor at any time once the investment is placed.73 Therefore,  it  is  crucial  for  the  investor  to  
persuade the host state to voluntarily protect the investment. Of course, the investment restriction 
provisions prescribed directly or indirectly in the investment treaties may carry the risk of crippling 
the economic activities of investors. However, this risk can be counterbalanced by the host state’s 
own commitment to investment protection, insofar as the restriction is reasonably tolerable.  
Nation-states in the GIR have three key tasks: i) they must protect their own citizens’ 
investments abroad; ii) they need to attract foreign investment; and iii) they need to control foreign 
investment at home. Those tasks are required because nation-states operate only around a particular 
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Investment Treaties’ (1998) 38(4) Virginia Journal of International Law pp.658-66; Andrew T. Guzman, 
‘Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ in Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs (eds), The 
Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment (Oxford University Press, 2009) pp.78-83. 
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political rationality; for example, whether the nation-state can secure political legitimacy to govern 
the people.  
Nation-states hope to sign investment treaties in order to protect the property of their own 
citizens located abroad without any direct diplomatic friction with the host state.74 In fact, states 
currently find it increasingly difficult to unilaterally protect their own citizens’ property when it is 
located in another state. For example, gunboat policies and retaliation commonly lead to political or 
diplomatic crises with host states. At the same time, investment-exporting states might face political 
criticism if they turned a blind eye to the sufferings of their own citizens. The global regime could 
save the home state from such dilemmatic burdens by facilitating its citizens to demand remedies 
on their own account.75  
Here, it looks paradoxical for nation-states, particularly developing countries, to sign an 
investment treaty to deal with foreign investment. Guzman, applying the prisoner’s dilemma, 
argues that individual nation-states bid down their regulatory power for investors through the 
separate conclusion of investment treaties in the course of competing to attract more investors; 
although they could have maximised their best interests through collective cooperation in 
establishing a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.76 Eventually, the competitive 
conclusion of BITs may ultimately cause more harm to the developing countries.  
However, whether a race-to-the-bottom situation of the kind that Guzmann anticipates77 
will really happen in the GIR if one considers the nation-state to be a political entity, is questionable. 
Firstly, it is worth noting that nation-states do not operate in exactly the same way as private firms 
in the market. 78  Political rationality fundamentally influences the individual and collective 
behaviour of nation-states; more precisely, nation-states treat global investment differently 
according to the expected political benefits. Nation-states operating according to political rationality 
protect global investment on the condition that the foreign investment is expected to boost the 
national economy, which is associated with the achievement or maintenance of public support. To 
put it conversely, nation-states might simply withdraw any commitment to investment protection if 
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the sovereignty costs of the political system were to overwhelm the benefits of investment 
protection in an extreme case; for example, if the changed regulation for investment protection were 
to cause insuperable public resistance. 
Given such assumptions, participation in the GIR could be considered to be a sub-optimal 
choice because the GIR can help the nation-state to secure minimum control of global investment 
without any serious damage to its reputation among global investors. Of course, it is hard to deny 
Guzmann’s assumption that host states are individually under pressure from competitive forces 
where even a small regulatory change is too sensitive to the inflow of global investment.79 
However, the individual choice of the nation-state as an agent of the political system is influenced 
not only by the sensitivity of investors to policy changes but also by the resistance of various social 
movements which represent other social rationalities. For instance, domestic governments are 
supposed to screen the inflow of foreign investment more strictly if the abuse of investor rights 
causes environmental concerns, thus negatively affecting potential victory in the next election.  
Here, the nation-state could persuade global investors by joining the crowd rather than by 
offering a risky deal. While the nation-state gives a positive signal to potential investors by signing 
BITs, it might be reluctant to promise more investment protection than a generally accepted 
standard. Of course, it is true that nation-states can attract more foreign investment by proposing 
more favourable terms in order to beat other competing states. However, switching to a new type of 
BIT could run the risk of future uncertain political risks or sovereignty costs80 caused by the abuse 
of global investors. As a result, many nation-states negotiate BITs according to a set of standardised 
norms by updating model BITs or the previously successful BITs of economically strong countries, 
such as the U.S. Model BIT or NAFTA.81 If a new BIT follows the standardised model, the foreign 
investors whose home states are influencing the standardisation of the BIT feel more comfortable.  
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Most importantly, the nation-state can control global investment under global regime 
standards without suffering any serious reputational damage. The treaty-making practices of nation-
states standardise not only the investors’ rights but also the regulatory power of the host states. The 
protection level of the regulatory power might not be below the standards defined by the most 
developed countries because those developed countries are also interested in securing a minimum 
scope of regulatory power; as such the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 which prescribes that foreign 
investors cannot have more rights than U.S. investors in the U.S. and that U.S. BITs should be 
drafted according to U.S. legal doctrine and practices.82 Such standards would not cause serious 
reputational harm to the state parties because they look reasonable to potential investors whose 
home states are mainly strong countries influencing the standardisation of the BIT. As a result, the 
regulatory power of the host state is generalised and acceptable to the extent that investment 
protection is acceptable.  
Of course, it seems undeniable that overall levels of investment protection and regulatory 
power incorporated into the BITs are dominated solely by the interests of the most developed 
countries, such the U.S. or the U.K., which are leading the standardisation.  
However, even if this is to some extent true in current investment practices, global and 
national public opinions have emerged as strong candidates to control investor-oriented or 
developed-country oriented inclinations in BIT negotiations. For example, the U.S. BIT programme 
has changed in the wake of global and national criticisms of NAFTA experiences and the neo-
liberal thrust. Also, less developed or developing countries could be checked by their respective 
national social movements which can push a negotiating government to level up investment 
restriction standards in the BIT. Consequently, the overall convergence point could be, to some 
extent, controlled by the ups and downs of the power of global and national social movements.  
In this context, a social movement is another promising GIR player that can affect the 
behaviours of other actors – although Salacuse omits the future potential of these social movements 
in his explication of GIR formation. It is therefore hard to say that the interests of global investment 
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issues are not associated with social values such as human rights, as global investment has become 
more closely related to the everyday lives of ordinary people. 83  The idea of a ‘spotlight 
phenomenon’ 84 might be helpful in understanding how social movements can effectively control 
their global economic and political environments. The social movements and the mass media put 
pressure on global companies by revealing their wrongdoings. Public pressure arising from human 
rights issues directly or indirectly impairs a companies’ reputational value. This mechanism works 
more effectively in industries in which a company’s brand name or world reputation heavily affects 
sales. This dynamic allows global or national civil organisations to effectively monitor 
multinational corporate behaviour through strategies like naming and shaming.85 Against this 
backdrop, global business and nation-states cannot achieve their own goals successfully without 
persuading global social movements in many areas. Nowadays, the impact of social movements, 
which represent non-economic and non-political sub-societies, has gradually become more palpable 
as global investment has become more closely related to the everyday lives of ordinary people.  
Against this background, social movements can use their limited but unignorable influence 
creatively for their mutual benefit by relying on the global regime. Civil society and nation-states 
have discussed a number of norms to regulate the social responsibility of global investors.86 
Despite their increasing influence, social movements do not have enough power to directly control 
state actors or private economic actors in accordance with their own expectations. For example, 
they are not able to reach a general consensus as to how to enforce such normative systems.87 In 
this context, it might be wise and cost-efficient for global civil society to make global investment 
responsible to the public interest through participation in the regime. Thus, instead of exercising a 
doubtful and demanding form of direct social control, social movements could optimise the 
possibility of controlling misbehaviour by global investors and guiding good business practices 
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through the self-compliance of global investors and nation-states. In the first instance, civic groups 
can push investment treaty drafters to take into account the public interest; then, they can expect 
that the self-enforcement mechanisms would control regime actors without too much resistance 
from nation-states and global investors. This strategy might also look acceptable to foreign 
investors as well as state actors, as long as they admit that they cannot function without civil society. 
Therefore, global investors might tolerate reasonable restrictions in order to prevent a worst case 
scenario, such as the paralysis of global business.  
This strategy was discussed in the NAFTA and KORUS-FTA context. Chapter 19 of 
KORUS-FTA mainly originated from the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation 
(NAALC), which was established as a side agreement to the NAFTA. This agreement was 
concluded due to strong demands from U.S. civil society and trade unions, who had criticised 
NAFTA’s pro-business tendencies.88 They attempted to incorporate labour standards into the treaty 
agreement in exchange for cooperation with the investment treaty. According to this agreement, 
individuals or NGOs are able to take part in dispute settlement and policy considerations regarding 
labour issues. It is true that Korean civil society has also taken a passive attitude toward KORUS-
FTA Chapter 19 because the protection under Chapter 19 is insufficient to balance out the harm 
caused by investment protection as per the whole KORUS-FTA. 89  Nevertheless, some 
commentators expect civil society to be able to utilise such global standardization of labour 
protection as a tool to deal with the emerging power of private investors in the investment field 
through active participation in norm-making. In other words, labour protection can be effectively 
secured to the exact extent that investment protection is effective.90  
III. THE FUNCTIONAL NECESSITY OF LAW IN THE GLOBAL INVESTMENT REGIME  
A. Achilles’ heel of the global investment regime 
As described in the previous part, the GIR is established on a finely tuned equilibrium of 
power relations among global actors. If one applies international regime theory to the GIR, one may 
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have to confront its fatal weakness: the regime cannot continue over time, because strategic 
compromise among its relevant social actors is fundamentally vulnerable to external 
circumstances.91 In fact, the model of regime formation is founded upon the purely theoretical 
assumption that payoff calculations concerning commitment to the global regime will not change 
over time. Needless to say, this model could present a strong, cogent account of how the system 
works at the present time when the power equilibrium is stable and predictable.  
However, this model cannot provide a plausible alternative to secure this operation at a 
point in the future. For example, suppose that a global environmental protection regime exists. Here, 
a state that suffers from an unexpected economic downturn might recalculate costs and benefits 
relative to its commitment to the regime; more specifically, the state can underestimate the benefits 
of preventing uncertain, long-term and not-yet-unfolded environmental harm, on the one hand, and 
overestimate the benefits of overcoming an impending economic crisis, on the other. In systems 
theory language, regime members are destined to be trapped in a complicated double contingency 
situation in which one cannot predict whether others will comply with norms in future changes in 
present conditions.  
This problem of the global regime is also true for the GIR. The GIR is not able to operate 
stably over time as long as it is based on the coincidental power relation among relevant actors. The 
nation-state has formal discretion to withdraw its commitment to the GIR (dynamic inconsistency 
problem),92 as seen in some Latin American countries.93 Here, suppose that many countries decide 
to go back to protectionism in response to public criticism over neo-liberalism. If the GIR cannot 
deal with such betrayal actions effectively, other actors like investors can no longer retain their 
normative beliefs. As the GIR becomes less attractive to investors, it cannot serve to control 
investment in favour of nation-states. In fact, investors could stay with host states and accept 
legitimate restrictions in exchange for the host state’s voluntary commitment to protection from 
abusive restrictions. If nation-states were to retreat from the GIR as whole, investors would have no 
incentive to endure legitimate government regulation. Finally, the negative attitudes of nation-states 
could trigger the withdrawal of investors, so that the nation-states lose the minimum control which 
has been secured under the name of legitimate government regulation. On the other hand, civil 
society could take direct and extreme measures to prevent global investment, like the Occupation 
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Movement, instead of using the indirect control of the nation-states to transplant the social interests 
of civil society into the investment treaty. This chain of reactions destructively generates a vicious 
circle of mutual misunderstanding. From the perspective of systems theory, it is logically 
impossible that GIR members could eradicate double contingency, where one contracting party is 
subject to the other party’s actions such as the withdrawal of normative commitments in the case of 
unexpected circumstantial changes. 
The legal system plays a significant role in allowing actors to stick to their normative 
commitments despite the extreme distrust of double contingency found in the GIR. In this context, 
the following Section B discusses the function of law from a systems theory perspective, and then 
explains how the legal system can contribute to the durability of the global regime in general. 
Section C will then articulate the function of law within the GIR by applying this general 
framework to the global investment field.  
B. The functional necessity of law for the durability of the global regime  
Luhmann argues that the law, as a legal system, stabilises normative expectations against 
the changeable situations of the environment.94 As has already been discussed, society is required 
to react to the disappointment of expectations. In relation to this, expectations can be categorised 
into cognitive expectations and normative expectations, according to the nature of the reactions 
(cognitive learning and normative learning) in the case of disappointments.95 In short, cognitive 
expectations happen through cognitive learning, where the system learns from the experience of 
disappointments. In this situation, social systems can change or adjust original expectations when 
they realise that real situations do not meet the expectations of the systems or that meeting the 
expectations requires too much cost. As a result, individual social systems could survive by 
adapting themselves to unexpected challenges. Cognitive expectations are typical of many sub-
societies which adapt the expectations of a system to unsatisfying environmental changes when 
experiencing disappointment 96  For instance, scientists change their hypotheses when the 
experimental data prove to be different from the expected result. Compared to these cognitive 
expectations, normative expectations – generally called norms – do not change regardless of the 
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disappointment.97 As such, the legal system does not learn from experiences, but rather holds on to 
original expectations.  
The stabilisation of normative expectations is required because expectations per se are too 
unstable for actors to stick to them without generalisation, although expectations can play a role in 
abating complexity by making several possible situations expectable. Returning to the example of 
the intersection, suppose that driver A goes through an intersection without any traffic lights. The 
expectation in this specific situation provides driver A only with knowledge as to what kinds of 
situations will be available in the future. Therefore, the driver is allowed to expect several situations 
(e.g., other drivers from other directions will come up or stop but they are not supposed to suddenly 
disappear) and to take corresponding alternative actions (whether to stop if the other car goes on or 
to  keep  going  if  it  stops).  Despite  the  reduction  in  complexity,  the  driver  would  still  be  very  
vulnerable to any single change in the uncontrollable external circumstances – namely, others’ 
reactions – because they cannot be the omniscient controller of future situations. Even if driver A 
crosses the intersection safely, driver A cannot expect to do so every time and has to try his or her 
luck. This is also very much like the rock-paper-scissors game. In this game, even if the available 
expectations (i.e., rock, paper or scissors) are clearly imparted to every participant, nobody knows 
which one of the three possible gestures the other party will make. The fact that an actor A wins 
with scissors against the other party who proposes paper this time does not guarantee that actor A 
will win again with scissors the next time. In fact, there is always a risk of disappointment of 
expectations; indeed, the other party can propose rock the next time. Given this double contingency 
situation, driver A and the rock-paper-scissors player are always required to gamble with their 
‘expectation of expectations’ 98 and risk the ‘disappointments of those expectations’ as long as 
expectations are not generalised. By the same token, the global regime contains an ineluctable risk 
that mutual expectations between two actors in the global regime can go awry with the occurrence 
of unexpected external challenges.  
Compared to this, the generalisation of expectations towards an anonymous third party 
allows the actors in communications to maintain the same expectations despite the risk of 
disappointment over a certain amount of time. For instance, traffic signs can offer a more generally 
applicable signal not only to driver A in a particular situation, but also to any driver, so that he or 
she can expect the same situation at any time and against any driver, as long as the drivers follow 
the rules. In the rock-paper-scissors game, suppose that all the participants in the game agree that 
                                               
97 Luhmann (n 39) pp.149-50. 
98 Luhmann (n 43) p.24ff. 
EMERGENCE OF A GIL IN THE GIR 
 
139 
actor A’s partner should give paper whenever a referee raises his or her right hand (hereafter Rule1). 
In this case, actor A will always propose scissors against any partner whenever actor A sees the 
referee raise his or her right hand according to Rule1. Likewise, the legal system generalises 
expectations by making norms which prescribe the rights and obligations of the actors.  
Of course, such a rule could not extricate actors from double contingency and the risk of 
disappointment. Actually, traffic signs do not eliminate all risk of traffic accidents because a 
negligent driver could disobey or respond improperly to the sign. In the case of the rock-paper-
scissors game, actor A’s partner has the discretion to ignore Rule1 by proposing rock. Experiencing 
disappointment makes it difficult for the actors in the system to stick to the initial rule due to the 
mutual mistrust or misunderstanding that cripples more active attempts at communication. This 
mutual distrust is more common at the global level, which does not have a formal mechanism – 
such as a state authority at the national level – to secure enforcement and make it effective. This 
explains why so many global private regimes emerge and vanish in sudden political shocks.  
In addition, the decisive feature of the legal system is that it can stabilise initial normative 
expectations by processing and absorbing disappointments within the system itself.99 The legal 
system can palliate problems of double contingency below the level that impedes the possibility of 
further future communications between systems by elaborating a structure to process the risk of 
disappointment. Legal systems can maintain original expectations despite their disappointment by 
holding that disappointment to be illegal. Even if driver A is involved in a traffic accident, driver A 
can argue that he or she obeyed the traffic sign and that the other driver’s behaviour was wrong 
(illegal) through the interpretation of the rules. As a result, despite experiencing the accident (the 
disappointment of the expectation), driver A will  still  take  the  same  action  based  on  the  same  
expectation (‘I can pass the intersection because the blue sign means that the drivers going in the 
other direction are supposed to stop for me’) the next time. To borrow the language of systems 
theory, the actor does not learn from the past experience. Likewise, Rule1 of the rock-paper-scissors 
game cannot eliminate the risk of disappointment that the other party does not give paper despite 
the third party’s signal. In this case of disappointment, actor A would raise a claim for the violation 
of Rule1 against the other party, instead of changing the expectation. This opportunity for a claim 
allows the very same actor to take the same action the next time when the third party raises his or 
her right hand. Although the legal system cannot eliminate the risk of disappointment, it can 
alleviate the need to change the normative expectation by transforming disappointment into a 
                                               




matter of legality. In order to do this, the legal system employs a specific binary code (legal/illegal) 
according to its own programme (conditional programme).  
In this context, the law plays a creative role in making society more sustainable. As 
previously demonstrated, while other systems (e.g. science) change their expectations in the case of 
disappointment, the legal system refers to the disappointment of its expectations as an illegal 
situation based on the original expectations by applying a specific type of binary code to legal 
conflicts. Thus, the legal system helps society to deal with disappointments through the production 
and resolution of legal conflicts. This mechanism can condense and confirm certain expectations 
(norms) not only towards a particular current situation, but also towards a general future situation in 
a certain temporal dimension. Through the generalisation of expectations towards the future, the 
law could allow persons to be informed in advance of the impact their actions would have in 
relation to potential future cases.100 Therefore, without any previous experience, one would be 
informed that a certain type of communication or action will be accepted successfully within a 
certain system. Ultimately, the legal system produces the conditions in which other sub-societies 
can promote and generalise their own communicative types by saving those sub-societies from the 
necessity of learning from experience. From a communication perspective, the legal structure can 
prevent disappointment from causing mutual mistrust (destructive misunderstanding) that cripples 
the continuity of communications. It can help maintain the belief that normative expectations will 
be respected by holding temporary disappointments to be illegal.  
In the systems theory context, this belief can be called a creative misunderstanding in two 
respects: the belief is basically a misunderstanding, in the sense that it could be betrayed at any time 
because nobody can guarantee that an actor will comply with the normative expectation in the 
future; nevertheless, this belief is creative because it can help to produce further communications by 
making the actors overcome their sense of uncertainty. This function can be fulfilled by a normative 
belief that the legal system could not completely ignore the interests of the relevant actors, on the 
one hand, whilst securing a minimum scope of expectations for future actions. Here, the legal 
system is created not by top-down coercion for a certain actor, such as the nation-state, but by 
mutual and horizontal credibility among pluralised actors over normative expectations. In this 
setting, social actors can take an action confidently to the extent that they manage to expect a future 
situation in advance without any previous experience.101 This has an affinity with concepts such as 
legal certainty (Rechtssicherheit), which guarantees specific expectations through the maintainance 
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of consistency against any changeable situations. All things considered, it is fair to say that, to the 
extent that expectation is stabilised and generalised, ‘one can live in a more complex society’.102  
In systems theory, the durability that the legal system secures does not mean the capacity to 
eliminate conflicts and induce agreement. Conversely, the legalisation of the global regime is 
expected to cause more conflicts; for example, more actors are allowed to raise a legal claim on the 
grounds of a greater variety of substantive and procedural rights. Given the absence of a control 
tower in the global world, the global regime will encounter more challenges and conflicts than 
national regimes under state authority. Conflicts cannot in any circumstance be eliminated because 
nobody can overcome double contingency unless totalitarianism unifies two systems into one entity. 
However, systems theorists do not consider conflict to be an obstacle to a social system; conversely, 
communication cannot happen without double contingency, which leads to divergence (conflict) 
between actors. Meanwhile, complete and permanent agreement runs the risk of forestalling the 
chances of further communications.103 In this context, the global regime as a communicative 
network can be effectually functional to the extent that a cyclic chain of conflict-communication-
consensus-communication can be stabilised. More specifically, conflicts should be resolved in the 
course of communications to produce a consensus; in turn, an established consensus should be 
challenged in order to provoke another communication leading to conflict.104 Of course, severe and 
prolonged conflict or an overly adamant consensus runs the risk of blocking further 
communications from proceeding. Therefore, conflicts and consensus between communications 
should be temporalised and trivialised so as not to severely impede the connectivity of 
communications. All things considered, the fundamental purpose of the stabilisation of normative 
expectations continues to ensure communications which resolve social conflicts towards 
establishing a new consensus, on the one hand, while challenging extant consensus for another 
productive conflict, on the other hand – without the extreme outcome of the destruction of the 
global regime.  
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The function of law is expected to become gradually imperative with the development of 
the global regime. In practice, the global regime can tackle challenges through non-legal conflict 
resolution and behaviour control. Although Luhmann considers behaviour control and conflict 
resolution as possible performances of a legal system,105 no logical necessity indicates that only the 
legal system is allowed to dominate the role of behavioural control and conflict resolution; in 
aboriginal communities and medieval society, religious authorities did so, whereas many social 
practices or norms in the globalised world are estimated to more effectually control behaviours and 
resolve conflicts than state-based law. Inasmuch as one accentuates the performance of the legal 
system, the fundamental distinction between a non-legal normative system and the law becomes 
obscure.106 However, the law has a specific function that cannot be undertaken by other systems: 
the legal system is the only sub-system that can stabilise normative expectations effectively and 
efficiently by processing the risk of disappointment. This function will be more necessary as the 
current world society has been described as a risk society, as Beck has pointed out.107 Here, a 
global regime without a legal system cannot endure the risk of disappointment because non-legal 
sub-systems, such as political systems or science, will change their own original expectations in the 
case of disappointment. Ultimately, functional necessity for the legal system, with the increasing 
complexity of world society, might serve to motivate the regime to develop its non-legal normative 
system (social norms, customs or practices) into a legal system to stabilise normative 
expectations.108 
C. Function of global investment law 
In this context, GIL is functionally essential for a long-lasting regime because the legal 
system stabilises normative expectations. GIL can transform a state of mutual mistrust into one of 
mutual credibility. Although both are fundamentally considered to be no more than mutual 
misunderstandings or illusions, they may lure, or persuade, global social actors to cooperate. Also, 
GIL cannot eradicate but can mitigate the risk of dynamic inconsistency problems well enough to 
allow communications to continue. Without the legal system, GIR members are destined to take on 
the costly burdens of continually changing their own expectations due to unpredictable changes in 
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the regime. On the other hand, the legal system reduces the burden on actors to change the 
originally agreed-upon consensus of normative expectations because they can challenge the legality 
of betrayal behaviour by other actors through the independent dispute settlement mechanism. This 
process renders the minimum and maximum scope of risk equally expectable to all GIR 
participants. It is when this expectation is calculable beforehand that all regime participants can 
formulate their own action plans in a stable way. For instance, a host state could decide to sign an 
investment treaty and accept foreign investment, because they believe that the system could 
guarantee the acceptable minimum of the legitimate exercise of sovereign power within an 
expectable temporal scope. Likewise, global investors might be able to make an investment plan 
when  the  investment  treaty  of  the  host  state  guarantees  a  generally  acceptable  substantive  rule  
which the investor would feel comfortable with within an expectable temporal scope. Figuratively 
speaking, foreign investors would invest if the law were to give them a green light to do so. On the 
other  hand,  if  the law were to give them a yellow light  as  a  warning,  investors  might  weigh the 
relevant risks and benefits up more carefully than when receiving a green light. Further, this 
function of GIL could be to create a virtuous circle of mutual credibility; once the benefits of 
predictability are proven to work well, it would attract more compliance, reinforcing predictability 
by producing a more fruitful body of cases.  
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT LAW AS A PARTIALLY AUTOPOIETIC 
SYSTEM 
A. Global investment law as a ‘law’? 
As discussed above, the function of law has gradually become necessary for the durability 
of the global regime. The more complex the global regime is, the more imminent such functional 
necessity of the law may be. Eventually, functional necessity encourages the global regime to 
produce a (global) legal system. In turn, it could be said that the law emerges when a set of systems 
work to stabilise normative expectations.  
However, not all normative systems produced in the course of GIR evolution can be 
qualified as legal systems. Like the international regime, the GIR provides many different kinds of 




converge in a given issue-area’.109 In this vein, Salacuse attempts to identify a set of principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures in the global investment field.110 He seems to 
identify these elements as the elements of the international (global) investment legal system without 
further inquiry. As discussed in the above part, it is hard to deny that the current normative system 
of the GIR functions as a ‘law’. However, it is questionable whether the system worked as law in 
the past; indeed, is it possible to say that GIL existed after the establishment of the ICSID 
Convention, even when there were no arbitration claims? From a systems theory perspective, GIL 
did not emerge until its normative elements (investment treaties, arbitration procedures and 
doctrines) could be structured and – most importantly – could operate in an autopoietic way. This is 
because the law cannot stabilise normative expectations until it achieves some degree of autopoiesis. 
In this context, autopoiesis is considered as an important standard in identifying a legal system.  
B. Global investment law as a partially autopoietic system 
i) Autopoiesis of the legal system as a self-referential circularity of legal 
communications 
Strictly speaking, social systems theory considers the law to have features of autopoiesis.111 
Luhmann argues that ‘the legal system is a closed system, producing its own operations, its own 
structures, and its own boundaries by its own operations; not by accepting any external 
determination nor, of course, any external delimitation whatsoever’. 112  Returning to the 
understanding of a social system’s autopoiesis as a continuum of communications, the legal system 
presents a circular networking of legal communications. In this context, Teubner argues that ‘[l]egal 
autopoiesis treats the legal system as a closed system of communication that can only make further 
legal communications out of existing ones’.113 The circularity of the law, already partially found in 
legal positivism, might be able to elucidate some aspects of the autopoietic phenomenon, where 
recognition of the law is authorised by a higher law.114 The validity of a legal norm is confirmed by 
reference not to a political or social authority, but to a legal decision, and vice versa.115  
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This self-referential feature of the legal system is associated with the systems theory 
argument that laws are condensed and confirmed through the process of a remembering and 
forgetting mechanism.116 As Teubner points out, ‘[l]aw as a system of recursive legal operations 
can only refer to past legal operations’.117 While a present communication occurs by building on 
past communications, this present communication is expected to be influential towards a future 
communication. In this process of connection, some communications may be referred to by future 
communications, whereas others are simply forgotten. Through the endless repetition of forgetting 
and remembering, a normative expectation is condensed and confirmed as a set of norms or rules 
which guide communicative actors in dealing with future conflicts. This forgetting and 
remembering operation is prevalent at the level of legal practice, as seen in stare decisis or 
jurisprudence constante.118 The common law doctrine of stare decisis requires a court to follow 
earlier judicial decisions when the same points of a previous decision are recognisable in the current 
case. A previous decision can be overturned not through some other extra-legal justification, but 
only through legal reasoning which convincingly distinguishes the current case from the previous 
one. Although a case, as seen in several civil law countries, does not have any precedential value 
that can formally bind a judge, the need for legal unity or legal consistency guides judges in new 
cases to take previous cases seriously. In the civil law doctrine of jurisprudence constante,119 the 
court pays considerable attention to a rule which is established by the accumulation of cases unless 
its application proves to be explicitly wrong or causes extremely unendurable injustice.120  
ii) Varying degrees of legal autopoiesis 
Teubner’s understanding of autopoiesis differs from Luhmann’s inflexible approach which 
leaves no room for the idea of partial autopoiesis.121 In other words, Teubner has relativised the 
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concept into three kinds of autopoiesis by introducing the hyper-cycle of general systems theory.122 
If one applies this framework to the global regime, one could categorise the normative systems that 
the global regime produces as follows:  
a) Socially diffuse law:  The  ‘socially  diffuse  law’  that  exists  in  the  early  phase  of  legal  
autonomy is ‘found in conflict settlement within groups or organizations’.123 Socially diffuse law is 
distinguishable from various social norms such as moral customs or just professional practices in 
the sense that a dispute settlement mechanism can resolve conflicts according to corresponding 
norms by using the legal binary code.124 As previously discussed, the global regime often produces 
norms of a less formal style, such as codes of conduct or guidelines, and facilitates dispute 
settlement mechanisms to resolve the relevant conflicts in various forms of tribunal, such as 
arbitration or court-style tribunals. In fact, socially diffuse law is enforceable only on the condition 
that it incorporates the substantive extra-legal demands of state and non-state actors. As Guzman 
suggests, from the international law perspective, de facto coercion based on reputation, reciprocity 
and retaliation make it difficult for global regime actors to violate certain norms and decisions.125 
For example, a multinational company tends to comply with informal guidelines because human 
rights activist groups could damage its brand reputation by naming and shaming the company. The 
enforceability of those systems is secured as long as the substantive content of the system reflects 
the results of an equilibrium of factual power relations among the relevant actors. 
b) Partially autopoietic law: The law can start to be partially autopoietic when some degree 
of self-description and self-constitution is evident. First of all, a decisive threshold between non-law 
(social norms) and law can be recognised in the phenomenon of self-description.126 In a strict sense, 
the previously discussed socially diffuse law is not distinguishable from a social norm (or non-law) 
because elements of socially diffuse law are still identical with bare social elements, regardless of 
whether those elements can be defined by using legal language.127 On the other hand, the legal 
system requires an independent rule enabling it to recognise one particular interpretation among 
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several contested interpretations made by social actors whilst being insulated from social influences. 
Legal concepts, rules and procedures are not established through direct acceptance of social 
interests, but through autonomous interpretation. For instance, the legal concept of property is not 
exactly identical to the economic concept of property; practitioners or scholars would legally 
interpret property in one or the other way to expand a specific economic or political interest. The 
legal system elicits an interpretative rule among competing arguments and reasoning pertaining to 
the interpretation of norms. An example of this self-description structure might be Hart’s 
understanding of the correlation between a primary and a secondary rule.128 A secondary rule 
serves as a rule for recognizing the primary rules that relate to social events. Here, the legal system 
can be autonomous when it is legal communication that deals with legal communication.129 
Consequently, the law cannot exist without the dynamic structure of primary and secondary 
rules.130  
The establishment of the partially autopoietic law requires not only self-description but also 
self-constitution, in that mere self-description does not sufficiently illuminate the whole picture of 
the self-referential features of the system;131 Indeed, the ‘self-constitution of the legal system 
components takes place when the self-descriptions in fact become operational in controlling 
communications within the law’.132 As Teubner states, modern law institutionalises the disparity 
between the legal doctrines of academia or legal education and the legal practice of the judicial or 
legislative process. In particular, legal practice – through the use of specific legal procedure – plays 
a role in deciding whether or not to accept particular legal descriptions, such as legal doctrines or 
concepts.133 However, this legal practice in everyday life would be vulnerable to social demands 
without the institutional structures to secure the autonomy of legal decisions. In this respect, the law 
is able to break with socially diffuse law when it can facilitate independent selection procedures 
which insulate legal practice from social influences.134  
This stage of the self-constitution of law is a crucial moment in its journey towards 
autopoietic autonomy because the legal system cannot determine its own course against other extra-
legal impacts until it enters the phase of self-constitution.135 Here, the law shows different degrees 
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of legal autopoiesis according to its degree of self-constitution. In addition, this self-constitution and 
its relevant autonomy are gradualised according to various institutional designs. To be exact, it is 
inversely proportional to the independence of the selection mechanism of legal doctrine from social 
influences. Therefore, the precise degree of autopoiesis varies in each legal system according to 
specific factors, such as the design type of the institutional insulation from social influence or the 
frequency of its practical uses.136  
c) Perfect autopoiesis (hyper-cycle linkage): Teubner states that ‘[l]egal autopoiesis can 
arise only if the self-referential circles referred to above are constituted so as to link together in a 
self-reproductive hyper-cycle’. 137 Even if the legal system could be partly or entirely self-
constituting and self-describing, it cannot be perfectly autopoietic in Maturana’s sense.138 Actually, 
the perfect type of autopoiesis refers to the hyper-cyclic operation, in which one self-reproducing 
cycle of legal components is mutually linked to other cyclic units of self-production, as in ‘a self-
reproductive circle of act-norm-act’.139 More specifically, rules drawn from legal actions (deciding 
a case) influence the establishment of substantive and procedural norms, which further action 
(deciding a case) will consider in any future dispute, in a circular way. This feature of hyper-cycle 
linkage clearly distinguishes perfect autopoiesis from partial autopoiesis in which some parts of 
operations are mutually linked, whereas others are often disconnected in the partially autopoietic 
system.  
iii) Global investment law as a partially autopoietic system 
Given this framework of autopoiesis, global law is fundamentally a partially autopoietic 
legal system. To be exact, while Teubner finds lex mercatoria to be one of the most likely potential 
candidates for global law,140 he assumes that it is just a partially autopoietic system.141  
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Both global  law and socially diffuse law appear  to  facilitate  a  common set  of  norms and 
dispute settlement systems. In addition, both kinds of legal system could secure de facto 
compliance and enforcement on the condition that they are able to reflect on equilibrium in social 
actors’ power games.  
Nevertheless, the defining line between global law and socially diffuse law is whether one 
could recognise the autopoietic structuralisation and operation of independent dispute settlement. 
Although global law establishes norms by accepting other social interests, it should produce 
consistent rules for interpreting norms separately from the direct influence of those very social 
interests (self-description and self-constitution).  
However, global law, like socially diffuse law, does not reach the phase of perfect 
autopoiesis because the production of the substance of global law remains relatively open to extra-
legal influences.142 For example, legal actions such as rule-making in dispute settlement are only 
intermittently – or even not at all – linked to norm-making action. Of course, some interpretive 
rules from tribunals could be incorporated into the norms by influencing the norm-making process; 
yet others could be forgotten or changed in the course of norm-making because social actors can 
change a tribunal’s interpretive rules, which are extremely antagonistic to social actor interests.  
Given this theoretical framework, GIL can be considered to be a partially autopoietic law.  
If one analyses the evolution of GIL in its historical context, although key substantive norms 
and dispute settlement mechanisms were created in normative languages in the 1960s, it is very 
difficult to qualify the system at that time as a legal system from a systems theory perspective. A 
‘socially diffuse law’ of the kind that Teubner describes as the first step in legal evolution is a 
system which can resolve investment disputes effectively using legal language.143 In comparison, 
the  system  created  in  the  1960s  served  merely  as  a  symbolic  promise  that  could  be  arbitrarily  
ignored by the nation-state and was rarely employed by global investors.  
In Teubner’s view of legal evolution, the global investment field after the 1980s gained a 
critical momentum for the GIR to be able to produce socially diffuse law. The GIR in the wake of 
1980s, neo-liberalism has enforced norms and dispute settlement mechanisms based on strategic 
rational choices, where each GIR member expects more benefits by respecting the norms and 
decisions of arbitrations rather than by simply ignoring them.  
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However, it is still unclear whether the GIR started to produce GIL as a partially autopoietic 
legal system. As Teubner indicates, the most important criterion is whether independent dispute 
settlement is autopoietically organised and operated by achieving an autopoietic nature such as self-
description and self-construction; the most important criterion is whether independent dispute 
settlement is autopoietically organised and operated.144  
Investment arbitration became workable as many nation-states started to incorporate the 
relevant clauses into their investment treaties.145 Additionally, in the wake of globalisation and the 
ideology of free trade, global investors more often used investment arbitration.146 In  the  end,  
greater use of the system provided more chances to produce a meaningful jurisprudence so that the 
relevant actors would take this system more seriously. The creation of normative credibility over 
certain norms may be encouraged by the capacity to produce consistent and independent 
interpretative rules among competing arguments. Here, GIL produces its own procedures and 
concepts which could be shared by relevant GIR actors.  
However, GIL does not reach perfect autopoiesis due to a lack of hyper-cyclic organisation 
and operation, and therefore a state in which this interpretative rule can be transformed into a norm 
in a self-referential way without external interruptions. To put it more concretely, GIL could not 
exist without a power equilibrium among social actors, and the autopoietic production of its 
elements are not automatically linked to each other. Therefore, GIL always contains an ineradicable 
risk that its interpretative rules could be changed through a norm-making process, such as treaty-
making. 
Despite this imperfect autopoiesis, global law can be still understood as a law. Needless to 
say, a rigorous reading of Luhmann might not qualify partially autopoietic global law as a legal 
system. In spite of this, if one focuses the function of law in identifying the law, one could paint a 
somewhat different picture; a certain normative system can be called a legal system as long as it can 
successfully fulfil the function of law, i.e. to stabilise normative expectations over time. Such a 
functionalist approach has significant implications in the sense that the global legal system might be 
necessary for the durability of the global regime. Regarding this, although a complete absence of 
autopoiesis makes this function impossible, a system with any degree of imperfect autopoiesis can 
sufficiently fulfil the function of law. 
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Partially autopoietic global law fulfils the function of law by incorporating long-term 
interests as normative expectations in the form of norms and by securing normative expectations 
against challenges caused by short-term interests in the form of independent dispute settlement. 
Global law cannot work efficiently as long as it absolutely refuses to reflect any degree of social 
interests because such a rigorous closure might risk deteriorating commitment to normative 
expectations. The regime should be rearranged when long-term circumstances have changed 
because inflexibility to such changes would make the regime unattractive to its members. Using the 
aforementioned global environmental protection regime as an example, suppose that a new 
technology was developed to permanently capture carbon dioxide. The regime might look 
unattractive and even unreasonable to regime members, unless obligations to cut carbon dioxide 
emissions were to be readjusted. Moreover, the global regime needs to be open to long-term 
benefits and closed to short-term challenges. In a similar vein, international regime theorists argue 
that a regime requires the concepts of ‘effectiveness’ and ‘robustness’ to make it more endurable.147 
The effectiveness of the regime attracts regime participants to stay within the regime. The regime 
needs robustness, or ‘the ability of the regime to withstand external threats and challenges’.148 
Robustness and effectiveness can be maintained when the regime can incorporate the substantial 
interests of regime members in the creation of normative contents, on the one hand; and when 
established normative contents are not easily changed by the short-term disappointments of social 
actors, on the other hand. Seen from this point of view, global law needs to reconcile openness to 
long-term benefits with closure to short-term changes in the context of the function of the law.  
The global legal system can secure the effectiveness and robustness of the global regime by 
taking several steps. Firstly, the global law produces normative expectations (norms) which are 
supposed to be maintained. The norms cannot be effective unless they are responsive enough to 
attract regime participants from the standpoint of effectiveness. In fact, no actors could comply with 
normative expectations that force them to take risks that are too severe. Secondly, global law should 
secure normative expectations by processing the risk of disappointment in a self-referential way, 
separately from external social influences. If normative expectations are too changeable, the regime 
will look unattractive to regime participants, as those participants would not be able to calculate 
possible future risks. In this context, this thesis proposes that the structure of GIL consists of two 
elements: i) the openness of participation in norm-making; and ii) the autopoietic operation of 
independent dispute settlement. In this particular context, it is absurd to disqualify GIL from being a 
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legal system because functionally GIL can also stabilise normative expectations through these two 
elements.  
C. Global investment law’s first element: openness of participation in norm-making 
Global law requires a participation mechanism to produce substantive norms as normative 
expectations. These substantive norms are similar to international regime theory’s understanding of 
norms and rules. Indeed, norms are ‘standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and 
obligations’,149 and international regime theorists characterise rules as ‘specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action’.150 In this context, substantive norms in global law are a series of rights 
and obligations belonging to the relevant regime actors. These substantive norms could be 
established in various forms, ranging simply from statements or codes of conduct to formal bilateral 
or multilateral treaties.  
In this context, GIL also sets up various structures through which individual actors can 
transplant their own sub-systemic interests into legal operations. In relation to the production of 
substantive norms, national procedures for participation in treaty-making could be considered to 
play one of the most important parts in GIL from a formal perspective. The interests of global 
actors are reflected by national representative institutions, such as parliament. Of course, global 
actors can employ various types of informal participation in norm-making at the national and global 
level; for example, the business interests groups can lobby treaty drafters to incorporate global 
investor interests into a treaty. Additionally, the model laws proposed by strong countries or NGOs 
and the documents (e.g. UNCTAD or OECD publications or academic journals) produced by 
scholars or lawyers often influence the drafting of individual treaties and the reasoning behind 
arbitration in a direct or indirect fashion.  
This structure makes the legal system susceptible to external influences by allowing global 
actors to negotiate their interests through legal description, in which the legal system expresses 
extra-legal interests by using legal language. Such susceptibility can secure the chances of 
protecting a minimum scope of actors’ interests through the negotiation process. The negotiation 
process produces normative expectations in the form of substantive norms; these prescribe that the 
rights and obligations of the regime participants will be respected by allowing or preventing 
specific behaviours. For example, the rights of foreign investors are protected to the extent that the 
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host state is prevented from imposing severe or arbitrary restrictions on foreign investment. On the 
other hand, the legitimate regulatory power of the host state is respected to the extent that the 
concept of the public interest serves as a principle to exclude specific investor behaviour from the 
protectable scope of investment. Therefore, investor actions in relation to relevant rights are 
discouraged in practice. 
In particular, the openness of participation can maintain the effectiveness of a regime by 
attracting global actors to the regime because it can give each global actor the expectation of an 
equal chance to transplant its own interests into the normative expectations. Of course, such 
substantive norms do not satisfy all the interests of every global actor involved because some social 
interests are downplayed in the course of the negotiation process. However, the relevant actors 
might be more likely to participate in this negotiation process to the extent that they could expect 
their own minimum interests to be secured, albeit that their maximum interests could not be fully 
realised. As world society suffers from rising uncertainty and risk, these actors might be more 
inclined to trade off somewhat less satisfactory normative expectations for greater predictability 
concerning the protection of their minimum interests. This inclination toward regime participation 
will be more apparent to the extent that norm-making processes are fairer and more transparent.  
Through this mechanism, bare social conflicts are transformed into legal conflicts among 
competing legal arguments representing the rationalities of individual sub-societies. In constructing 
normative expectations in a legal form, each regime member prescribes substantive content by 
using abstract language because such abstractness may make it easier to reach an agreement that 
appeases the relevant actors. Therefore, the more contentious and relevant to various social interests 
the issue is, the more abstract and malleable the terms of treaty are. Although it is true that the 
abstractness of treaty terms might cause a risk of mutual misunderstanding or confusion, this 
abstractness makes it easier for the relevant actors to agree by increasing flexibility. Furthermore, 
this strategy makes the regime more effective because it opens up the possibility of future 
challenges and renegotiation in terms of interpretations insofar as such flexibility does not impair 
the long-term process of negotiation. Specifically, although regime participants will be more or less 
dissatisfied with certain normative expectations, they can be persuaded not to retract their 
commitment to the normative expectations secured because they can expect the possibility of future 
challenges seeking compensation for the disappointment of those expectations through an 
independent decision-making mechanism. To take the example of GIL, as investment treaties use 
many general clauses regarding obligations and rights, they leave generous room in which regime 




challenges prevents regime actors from easily leaving the GIR and encourages more vigorous 
participation.  
D. Global Investment law’s second element: autopoietic operation of independent 
dispute settlement 
The autopoietic operation of the dispute settlement mechanism plays a decisive role in 
stabilising normative expectations by screening out inappropriate external influences. Whilst he 
GIR cannot secure its own effectiveness when its normative expectations are insufficiently 
responsive to the long-term interests of social actors, it could also not maintain any temporal 
robustness if normative expectations were easily changed by short-term myopic challenges.  
Systems theory argues that the legal system can do this job because an independent dispute 
settlement process can make a legal decision over the disappointment of expectations, so regime 
actors do not need to give up their commitment to the regime in case of disappointment. Even if a 
set of normative expectations are established in the form of certain substantive norms at a given 
point in time, the norms per se cannot secure normative expectations over time. Some changed 
circumstances risk causing a regime actor to ignore those normative expectations, resulting in a 
chain reaction that could ultimately cause total distrust in normative credibility due to double 
contingency. In response to double contingency, actors could challenge the legality of a certain 
action instead of giving up their normative expectations. Once legal claims are submitted, the 
dispute settlement mechanism reviews whether such claims are compatible with original long-term 
expectations (normative expectations). Also, the legal system can generalise and maintain 
normative expectations towards a future third party because an actor can have the same expectation 
next time by treating (or processing) disappointments as legal questions regarding the interpretation 
of normative expectations, namely as substantive norms.  
In a similar vein, Guzman, from an international relations perspective, argues that an 
international tribunal is ‘an information mechanism’151 with three functions. Firstly, the tribunal 
can help disputing parties share facts and laws to provide common grounds that might enhances the 
chances of conciliatory conflict resolution.152 Secondly, the tribunal can identify the violation of a 
specific behaviour so as to help other actors to assess and sanction the party that violates the law.153 
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Thirdly, Guzman points out the tribunal’s capacity to produce consistent rules for third parties.154 
This function makes future risks and benefits more predictable in the longer term, serving as an 
incentive to stay with the regime, despite the risk that a player’s interests could be compromised in 
the dispute settlement process.  
Here, the self-referential operation of decision making is critical; a decision should be made 
by reference to internal sources of the system rather than to external claims, as each tribunal relies 
on previous legal communications (decisions) in order to deal with the present case. This inviolable 
chain of internal and mutual references confirms and condenses a series of consistent rules in a 
manner similar to a common law system. Of course, legal decisions in most global legal systems do 
not have any formal legal effect on future decisions, unlike the stare decisis of common law 
countries. However, tribunals established for the adjudication of global law show a self-referential 
feature that is similar to the doctrine of jurisprudence constante.155  
The autopoietic operation of the dispute settlement mechanism is observable in the global 
investment field. GIL produces a consistent interpretative rule through the forgetting and 
remembering process of a network of legal communications (i.e. legal decisions). Individual 
decisions in the arbitration process do not have any formal legal effect to bind later decisions nor 
are they part of any official hierarchy.156 Indeed, many arbitration tribunals have been reluctant to 
recognize the formal binding effect of previous decisions.157 Despite this, in reality the decisions of 
international investment arbitrations are linked in a self-referential way, in that tribunals tend to cite 
previous decisions whenever this helps to interpret the text of a specific treaty.158 In practice, a 
significant number of individual arbitrators treat the previous decisions of other arbitrations as de 
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facto precedents much like the jurisprudence constante principle.159 As the Saipem tribunal points 
out,160 arbitrators pursue legal certainty and consistency through legal harmonisation.161  
The behaviour of individual arbitrators in pursuing legal harmonisation cannot be 
adequately explained solely by reference to professional moral duty. In fact, this GIL mechanism is 
legitimated not by top-down authority but by persuasiveness from the horizontal networking of 
GIR members. Therefore, GIL is highly sensitive to impartiality, which can persuade GIR members 
to concur with its legal certainty. The arbitration system will become fragile or even defunct in the 
future if it shows any apparent bias in favour of a particular group.  
The systemic requirement for legal impartiality and certainty makes individual arbitrators 
subject to an anxiety over reputational damage.162 In practice, individual arbitrators consider 
reputational value to be one of the most important factors in enhancing their chances of 
reappointment and which have a great influence on the arbitration process. If an arbitrator is 
branded as biased, they might be gradually ostracised from the arbitration industry.163 Therefore, in 
this dynamic, individual arbitrators attempt to enjoy benefits of the network effect164; in GIL, the 
abstract languages of the treaty leave broad scope for interpretative choices, whereas the prescribed 
languages are remarkably similar to each other. Given this situation, arbitrators are inclined to 
favour more reputable and less extreme interpretations of other institutions, such as ICSID, which 
are more acceptable to both claimants and host states, in order to circumvent criticisms of national 
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GIL is formed by the conditions caused by functional differentiation in which the political 
system – mainly based on the nation-state – is deteriorating to the extent that other sub-systems are 
mushrooming across the world. In this situation, the GIR has emerged as a grand global bargaining 
tool among global actors (states, investors and civic groups) representing the rationalities of 
relevant sub-societies (e.g., nation-states for the political system, commercial investors for the 
economic system). Although they emulate one another in an attempt to control the global 
investment field, they cannot exist without the cooperation of the others. Ultimately, these actors 
can enjoy the long-term benefits of cooperation and self-compliance by establishing a GIR, despite 
the risks of short-term loss, in order to avoid the worst scenario (See Figure IV-1). 
 
<Figure IV-1> Formation of the Global Investment Regime  
 
As the regime further evolves, the achievement of its longevity stipulates the effectiveness 
and robustness of the system through the function of GIL, which is to stabilise normative 
expectations. Therefore, the normative expectations upon which regime members agree should not 
be too vulnerable to frequent changes, whereas they should be responsive to the long-term interests 
of regime participants. As a result, the global law consists of two structures (see Figure IV-2). 
Firstly, it requires a participation mechanism to translate the various social interests into norms. As 
this mechanism is designed to be open to more varied social interests, the system could gain more 
de facto legitimacy and effectiveness. Secondly, as the mechanism of independent dispute 
settlement is autopoietically structured in light of self-constitution, it can allow regime actors to 
challenge disappointing situations in the form of legal claims rather than simply withdrawing from 
the regime itself. In facing challenges, the autopoietic rule-making of the independent dispute 




very challenging actors (see the dotted lines in Figure IV-2), as long as the legislative body does not 
change the rule officially through participation.  
 
 
<Figure IV-2> Structure of Global Investment Law 
 
Viewed in this light, GIL is not what exists separately from national or international law. 
Indeed, GIL is incarnated only by the implementation or application of specific national or 
international laws dealing with a certain global investment issue, namely the relation between 
investment protection and restriction. Therefore, state-based laws, such as international and national 
laws or private norms, are not always excluded from global law as long as they are related to 
elements of GIL. For example, national legal procedures for creating an international treaty would 
be considered a structural part of the participation mechanism of GIL formation. In addition, GIL 
cannot be dissolved into a bundle of national or international laws. The law can exist as long as it 
can fulfil its function (e.g. generalisation of expectations) to handle disappointments.166 Simple 
‘material formation of the content of legal tenets and the conceptual-doctrinal construction of their 
contexts’ would not significantly avail for recognition of legal system.167 The legal system can be 
observable when legal elements and actions are structuralised and operated an autopoietically. It 
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can be inferred from this analysis that GIL is a hybrid system that has developed beyond any of the 
traditional distinctions such as state/non-state, public/private, or official/non-official laws. GIL has 
come to have emerging properties through the dynamic interplay of global actors who implement 
and apply national or international laws. 
Despite evidence of the existence of a GIL, this chapter leaves unanswered several crucial 
questions pertaining to the alternatives available to the Korean government, especially from the 
perspective of indirect expropriation concerns. As discussed earlier, some worry that the nation-
state will lose all control over foreign investment because it will delegate its own sovereign powers 
to the global legal structure. Further, global law runs the risk of ignoring public interests or other 
social values because the global legal system is too vulnerable to a business-oriented thrust in 
investment arbitration in applying indirect expropriation rules. Given the current situation of global 
investment legal practices, these concerns look more convincing; in fact, a series of global 
recessions have provided opportunities to reflect upon pre-existing legal practices in the global 
investment field. In other words, the current situation pertaining to the global economy and national 
politics appears to challenge the formula of the Washington Consensus, that absolute freedom of 
global investment must bring about national prosperity, despite this neo-liberal belief encouraging 
many nation-states to conclude international investment treaties in the 1980s.168  
In this context, research must address the question of whether the nation-state should 
promote or discourage the development of GIL. If it should, what direction should the nation-state 
take regarding public welfare?  
In this regard, the following chapter will analyse the regulatory trilemma in which the 
nation-state steps down from its dominant position so that it suffers from difficulties in controlling 
sub-systems and the resulting conflicts. Given this situation, this thesis suggests that the current 
nation-state can expect the predictability of its minimum national interests through creative use of 
GIL. Of course, the thesis will recognise the existence of a gap between ideal GIL and its current 
development. In this context, the thesis will discuss constitutionalism as providing a theoretical 
framework to help us to come up with alternatives to reduce such a gap between reality and theory 
and to provide more benefits for relevant global actors, including the nation-state, in the GIR. 
                                               








CONTEXTUAL CONTROL OF THE GLOBAL INVESTMENT REGIME 
THROUGH THE CREATIVE USE OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
STRUCTURAL COUPLING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines a series of alternatives available to the Korean government in dealing 
with so-called indirect expropriation concerns. Chapter III has demonstrated that mere substantive 
doctrinal similarity between the KORUS-FTA and the Korean Constitution cannot circumvent the 
fundamental risk of indirect expropriation claims. It has highlighted that this is because such 
similarity cannot eliminate all possibility of interpretative conflict over the same treaty text between 
the host state and a foreign investor.  
Systems theory understands this phenomenon as a rationality conflict among various sub-
systems.1 More specifically, conflicts among social sub-systems are transformed into interpretative 
conflicts among actors who present their own sub-systems through provisions of the same treaty in 
dispute settlement proceedings. Applying this understanding to the context of indirect expropriation 
concerns, a global investor, as an agent of the economic system, attempts to narrow the scope of the 
host state’s legitimate regulatory power order to expand the conceptual scope of indirect 
expropriation. On the other hand, the host state, as an agent of the political system, argues for 
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broader interpretation of that legitimate regulatory power to control global investment in 
accordance with its political interest.2 
The fundamental problem for the nation-state occurs in the structure of independent dispute 
settlement, which the nation-state cannot entirely control. In the event of conflict, the nation-state 
and the investor agree to resort to an independent dispute settlement mechanism, which operates 
without any national bias. This independent mechanism allows individual investment tribunals to 
resolve relevant legal conflicts by reference to other investment decisions, rather than by reference 
to other national legal sources. Under this independent mechanism, the gradual accumulation of 
cases confirms and condenses a series of autonomous interpretative rules. Therefore, international 
investment tribunals have the discretion to invalidate a constitutionally justifiable government 
action on the ground of a breach of the treaty by relying on an autonomous interpretative rule of 
indirect expropriation. Consequently, a government action taken according to the Korean 
Constitution becomes subject to the tribunal of investor-state arbitration.  
In this regard, the previous chapter has articulated particular rationales that drive an 
individual sovereign state to delegate its own power of conflict resolution to a transnational 
mechanism. In that chapter, systems theory provided the GIR and GIL as theoretical frameworks to 
explain the global prevalence of investment treaties and investor-state arbitration.  
Although this explanation describes the development of GIR and GIL to date, it does not 
address whether this development is desirable for the nation-state, and ultimately for the public.3 In 
response to such challenges, the Australian government has recently stated that it will not adopt 
clauses for investor-state dispute resolution into future trade agreements according to the principle 
that it will not ‘support provisions that would constrain the ability of Australian governments to 
make laws on social, environmental and economic matters in circumstances where those laws do 
not discriminate between domestic and foreign businesses’.4  
Indeed, there are many policy choices available to nation-states to regulate the global 
investment field. For example, a nation-state can protect or restrict foreign investment under 
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national law and resolve relevant conflicts according to national legal proceedings without any 
investment treaties or investment tribunals. Although negotiating states make investment treaties, 
they can allow a national court to adjudicate cases raised under a treaty, rather than delegating this 
task to a transnational mechanism. 
 Despite the many different policy choices available for the regulation of global investment, 
nation-states continue to deal with global investment problems indirectly through reliance on global 
norms and dispute settlement mechanisms; why? To put it differently, why should those actors give 
up direct control over achieving specific substantive goals? In light of the current global economic 
downturn, does more direct political intervention sound like a more convincing alternative? This is 
associated to another question; will an ambitious policy for nation-state control over global 
investment (whether by promotion or restriction) without reliance on the GIL be successful?  
In order to answer these questions, this chapter starts by discerning whether individual 
nation-states can maintain perfect control over the global investment field as a GIR emerges. It 
explains that the neo-liberal model in favour of the absolute freedom of global investors and a 
welfare-state model in favour of complete control over global investment, are both destined to fail 
in the GIR. Relying on that analysis, Part III shows that the nation-state can assume contextual 
control in a manner that lies between rigorous direct control and laissez-faire policies by using the 
autonomy of GIL. It highlights that individual states can secure minimum predictability over global 
investment through the creative use of GIL to attract global investment within controllable levels. 
Part IV demonstrates that the legal autonomy of GIL can be secured through global 
constitutionalism to secure balanced structural couplings between the state, law and other regulated 
societies. The Part V demonstrates that the concept of global constitutionalism provides meaningful 
insights for global and national constitutional alternatives which the Korean government can adopt. 
II. CONTEXTUAL CONTROL OF THE GLOBAL INVESTMENT REGIME THROUGH GLOBAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 
A. Input-output model of the nation-state  
The modern system of global investment in the 20th century experienced two seemingly 
opposing approaches to its management: the welfare-state model approach and the neo-liberal 
model approach.  
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The  welfare-state  model  in  the  global  investment  field  shares  many  features  with  the  
traditional modern welfare state at the national level.5 Firstly, this model presumes that the nation-
state has the primary competence to control other social fields within its territorial boundaries. At 
the national level, the welfare state attempted to increase the capacity of the state to perform public 
tasks. The state, especially after the Great Depression, was required to perform numerous 
interventionist tasks in many societal areas in order to meet needs for economic prosperity, public 
health and public education. In exchange for various public services, people supported the state’s 
authority to organise society under the symbolic unity of the nation-state. Public demand for 
services requires the nation-state to adopt more technical and intrusive measures.6 This welfare-
state model may be applicable to the global investment field. For example, the nation-states 
established ambitious state-driven plans for national economic prosperity in order to gain popular 
support. In accordance with key Keynesian lessons, many developing countries increased their 
domestic demands by protecting their weak national industries, rather than by attracting foreign 
investment. Meanwhile, host states attempted to control global investment within its borders with 
regulatory techniques aimed to prevent global investors from ignoring the host state’s national 
interests.7 Some developing countries imposed national legislation to restrict foreign investment 
within their territory and behaved aggressively towards foreign investment by, for example, 
subjecting it to nationalisation.8 At the international level, this trend led to a greater emphasis on 
the power of the nation-state in legal practice in the international investment field. In particular, 
resource nationalism and the emergence of the ‘third world’ increased the diplomatic strength of 
investment-importing countries against a number of original investor states. Such political 
influence, under the banner of the ‘Calvo Doctrine’9 and the ‘New International Economic 
Order’10, had an important role in giving more weight to sovereign dignity. Latin American 
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countries, influenced by the Calvo Doctrine, preferred national judicial mechanisms to resolve 
conflicts between host states and foreign investors. In addition, many developing countries 
questioned the Hull formula which requires ‘prompt, adequate, and effective’ compensation for 
expropriation, by arguing for more sovereign control over the treatment of investment within a 
state’s territorial jurisdiction.11 On the other hand, the investors of developed countries who had 
lost their colonies suffered from many difficulties in seeking a suitable place to make investments. 
Consequently, investors engaged in risky investments, despite arbitrary changes of regulation in 
newly independent states, as long as the host states could offer attractive advantages such as cheap 
labour forces or natural resources unavailable elsewhere.12  
When the welfare state model was prevalent, the nation-state could secure strong control 
over global investment. Whether the welfare-state model of investment policies was absolutely 
indifferent to attracting foreign investment was somewhat unclear. Historically speaking, many 
nation-states had signed bilateral investment treaties (e.g. the one between Germany and Pakistan in 
1959) and joined the regime of the ICSID Convention for investor-state arbitration (1966) in the 
zenith of the welfare-state model. Nevertheless, major developing countries such as China, Brazil 
and India took passive attitudes towards BITs until the 1980s.13 Additionally, most BITs at that 
time incorporated state-to-state arbitration which cannot be raised by a private investor alone. This 
situation persisted until the Indonesia-Netherland BIT (1968) and Chad-Italy BIT (1969) were 
concluded with investor-state arbitration clauses.14 Even where treaties prescribed investment 
protection or independent dispute settlements, in practice this served as mere ornamentation due to 
lack of enforcement. Of course, non-compliance behaviour by the host state (i.e. an arbitrary retreat 
from contractual commitments, breaches of treaty provisions, or rejecting execution of arbitration 
award) could impair their global reputation or lead them to face diplomatic pressures from other 
states. Nevertheless, host states simply weighed up the possible reputational damage occasioned by 
regulatory changes against the expected benefits of the relevant public policy. In this cost-benefit 
calculation, reputational damages or the possibility of hostile reactions from other states may have 
looked relatively trivial to host states; global investment practices in the era of the welfare-state 
model principally respected the sovereign power of the host state. In addition, the major economic 
                                               
11 Andrew T. Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties’ (1998) 38(4) Virginia Journal of International Law pp.644-51; Andrew T. Guzman, 
‘Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties’ in Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs (eds), The 
Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment (Oxford University Press, 2009) p.74. 
12 Guzman (1998) (n 11) pp.673. 
13 Andrew Paul Newcombe and Lluís Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of 
Treatment (Kluwer Law International, 2009) pp.43-44 
14 ibid pp.44-45 
CONTEXTUAL CONTROL OF GIR THROUGH CREATIVE USE OF GIL AND STRUCTURAL COUPLING 
 
165 
policies of many investment-importing states showed a general tendency to prioritise protectionism 
over the attraction of foreign investment. At least they, like Korea in 1960s, attempted to maintain 
quite tight control over the flow of foreign capital although it was interested in attracting more 
foreign capital.15 
In this situation, investors tended to endure regulatory changes because direct challenges 
against host state action could be costly. For example, the retaliatory withdrawal of investment was 
not a simple endeavour. Additionally, foreign investors lacked credible enforcement through 
investment legal mechanisms; for example, they lacked confidence in the fairness of tribunal 
reviews and states’ willingness to respect any consequent award. More importantly, foreign 
investors were unable to expect predictability due to a dearth in consistent case law. In practice, 
legal action was risky due to tacit regulatory hostility from the host state. In this context, it might be 
fair to say that global investment was generally subject to the ultimate control of nation-states or 
international relations in the sense that investor rights under treaties were de facto no more than 
gentlemen’s agreements or kindnesses that the host state could revoke at any time.  
On the other hand, the neo-liberal model posits that the nation-states can make the 
liberalisation of global investment conducive to national prosperity through deregulation or 
investment protection. Indeed, the welfare-state model trend seems to have come to an end as states’ 
abilities have deteriorated at both domestic and global levels. Since the 1970-1980s, the welfare-
state model has faced serious challenges.16 Nation-states do not seem to be able to coordinate 
social needs and interests or control social conflicts. The welfare-state model is based on a grand 
compromise between the government and big social organisations like trade unions. Thus, people 
support political authority in exchange for the expectation that the political system can provide 
social services for the public. As state capacity has deteriorated, the trade-off between political 
justification and the provision of the social benefits has ceased to work effectively.17 This crisis is 
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exacerbated by globalization because nation-state control does not work well where previously 
territorially restricted national economies have become intertwined in the global economy.18  
Nation-states have responded to this situation through the widespread delegation of their 
own powers to market-oriented institutions or global civil society.19 As nation-states step back 
from omnipotent rule over every social affair, they delegate their traditional regulatory role to other 
independent mechanisms at the national and global levels. This strategy has finally become popular 
in the global investment field, as the attitude toward global investment has fundamentally 
changed.20  
The modern legal regime for international investment took shape against this historical 
background, though its origins appear ambiguous. After the 1980s, many developing countries 
changed their economic policies, trying to use foreign investment to promote the domestic 
economy.21 For example, in the early 1990s many countries changed their national regulatory 
climates toward liberalisation to relax or remove restrictions on foreign investment.22 At the 
international level, they promised investment protection through international investment treaties 
such as NAFTA in order to attract greater foreign investment.23 Over  the  last  two  decades  the  
number of BITs concluded has substantially and rapidly increased from less than 400 to over 
2000.24 Nation-states voluntarily signing BITs have made sovereign decisions to delegate their 
powers over conflict resolution to international mechanisms such as the ICSID system.25 Although 
the ICSID Convention was initiated by major investment-exporting countries in an effort to protect 
their own investments from the national bias of developing countries, neo-liberal economic policies 
substantially encouraged many developing countries to voluntarily guarantee this type of 
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24  UNCTAD, ‘Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements’ (2009) p.2 
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independent dispute settlement in order to send positive signals to foreign investors.26 In addition, 
global investors increasingly started to employ investor-state arbitration over treaty-based disputes 
under the ICSID Convention or other ad hoc arbitration mechanisms over the 20 years after the first 
case was raised in 1987.27 Such more frequent use of investor-state arbitration and host state’s 
respect of international investment law generated a virtuous circle to persuade more global 
investors to rethink the normative potential of investor-state arbitration.  
The neo-liberal model gained prominence due to the bitter lessons of the welfare-state 
model. Nevertheless, both models share fundamentally common characteristics in regulating global 
investment. Firstly, the two models are based on very strong political aspirations. For example, the 
supporters of the welfare-state model believe that the nation-state can control global investment in 
favour of national prosperity through heavy regulation. Similarly, the neo-liberal model is 
motivated by the strong political expectation that deregulation or property protection will bring 
about greater national prosperity.28 In addition, these two political beliefs derive from the deeply 
rooted myth that globalised investment will respond in a causal way to such political expectations. 
Secondly, this mechanical causation expected under both models between regulation and its effects 
ignores the emerging autonomy of the social sphere. Lastly, the two models attempt to 
instrumentalise the legal system in order to achieve specific political goals. For example, the 
welfare-state model arbitrarily ignores international laws related to the protection of foreigners in 
the course of nationalising or regulating foreign investments. The same is true of the neo-liberal 
model; even if the neo-liberal approach pretends to take no action regarding the private sector, in 
reality history shows that the neo-liberal state had played an active role in exercising disciplinary 
power over various social spheres such as labour or the environment in order to create good 
business environments.29 Therefore, the neo-liberal legal model has impaired the legal formalism 
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which generates a balance between economic value and other social values, such as environmental 
protection, under the banner of investment protection.30 
In this context, this study argues that the two models could be categorised as input-output 
models, which presume that regulation as an external input into a system is causally related to a 
corresponding output, that is, the system’s response to that regulation. Also, this model presumes 
that the regulator has the cognitive capacity to see through this mechanical formula between the 
regulation and its regulatory result. For example, the neo-liberal and welfare-state models, as input-
output models, believe that the nation-state can achieve an intended policy goal, such as national 
prosperity, through a series of measures in the global social field. Despite their different substantive 
contents, both the welfare-state and the neo-liberal models are adopted by nation-states on the basis 
of the same presumption: the social field is supposed to react to finely-tuned regulatory actions in a 
causal manner with specific substantive goals.  
B. Global regulatory trilemma of nation-states in the global investment regime  
Given the dynamic of GIR formation, the nation-state is destined to suffer from a vicious 
circle of regulatory failure as long as its regulation skills remain based on the input-output model. 
As discussed above, the GIR is established by global actors belonging to autonomous sub-societies. 
In this situation, the autonomy of the global social field does not allow the nation-state to anticipate 
outcomes in advance. Nevertheless, the use of the input-output model means the nation-state is 
attempting to control such unpredictable global social fields by dominating the legal system. In 
practice, autonomous social systems simply ignore the legal system which is subjugated by political 
interventions. Finally, this situation forces the nation-state to face regulatory failure; for example, 
under the welfare-state model, global investors simply withdrew their investment in order to avoid 
heavy regulation. In the neo-liberal model, global investors exploited deregulation policies simply 
ignoring national interest. The recent global economic crisis has proved that the uncontrollable 
expansion of the global monetary sector under neo-liberal protection has harmed the national real 
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economy.31 Nonetheless, nation-states have responded to this with stronger political rhetoric for 
heavier regulation or more deregulation, although such short-term remedies supposedly do not 
work effectively. In the end, the nation-state cannot escape from this vicious circle, in which 
regulatory failure brings about stronger but hopeless political intervention which is destined to 
cause another regulatory failure (see Figure V-1). What is worse is that this increased political 
pressure risks deconstructing the regime itself. As noted above, the relevant actors cannot make 
unlimited concessions to political interests because the creation of the regime is based on a mutual 
trade-offs between actors including nation-states. Finally, the regime itself might gradually come to 
look unattractive to global investors as economic loss aggravated by politically-dominated 
agreement apparently surpasses the benefits from commitment to the regime itself. 
  
 
<Figure V-1> Regulatory Failure under the Input-Output Model 
 
Systems theory explains this regulatory failure by using the term ‘regulatory trilemma’, 
which is a cacophonous incongruence among political, legal and regulated sub-societies.32 More 
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concretely, a political system instrumentalises the law in order to control a specific social area and 
meet a specific political goal. However, such an intervention leads to over-legalisation of the social 
sphere.33 As a result, political and legal systems ignore the autonomy of the sub-society. In relation 
to the regulatory failure,34 a more fundamental problem is that the regulated sub-society does not 
react in a way that regulating systems such as the political and legal system expect, because each 
system operates autopoietically and indifferently from the others.35 Therefore, clumsy intervention 
(non-regulation or heavy regulation) in the global economic system might cause unexpected 
repercussions, such as the sudden shrinkage of global investment or an economic downturn. In 
response to this unexpected reaction of sub-societies, the political system tends to respond with 
more direct and purposive measures by deconstructing legal formalities such as the rule of law or 
legal certainty (the over-socialisation of law).36 Nevertheless, such measures turn out to be 
hopeless and ineffective because the regulated system reacts according to its own rationality, 
circumventing the political purposes of the legal system. For example, the imposition of a tax on 
corporations leads individual investors to avoid tax or escape to a tax haven. However, less tax does 
not necessarily mean greater national prosperity or the promotion of the national real economy as 
global private actors could invest in sectors not directly related to a nation’s real economy, e.g. 
monetary finance. 
However strong nation-states or other social systems are, this regulatory failure is 
unavoidable as long as regulatory techniques are based on the input-output model. A super nation-
state (e.g. U.S.) or network of nation-states (G20) might be able to generate powerful binding 
regulations to control the global field to a certain temporary extent. However, its long-term 
effectiveness could not be secured without the voluntary cooperation of other GIR members. This is 
because no regulator can escape the dilemma of double contingency, in which the internal 
operations of two autopoietic systems remain blind to each other despite their mutual dependency. 
In fact, regulation itself could be conceptually understood as a flip side of observation in that the 
regulator cannot take action without observing the outputs of the regulated system. Here, the 
regulator is destined to suffer the risk of double contingency; the regulated system will have 
changed while the regulator was responding to observations. Even if the regulator happened to 
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come up with an appropriate measure (M1) to resolve the problem based on an initial observation of 
a certain situation (S1) at a certain time (T1), such a measure could too often become outdated in a 
changed situation (S2)  at  another  time  (T2).  As  a  result,  the  previous  measure  (M1) would often 
cease to work in the current situation (S2). For instance, the government tends not to regulate the 
emerging high technology sector until relevant public concerns drive civil society to force the 
government to take action. However, technology in the regulated area changes so quickly that 
government regulations are soon outdated. In sum, the nation-state has trouble in taking pre-
emptive and appropriate control over the continuously changing regulated system because as a 
regulator it can no longer have an omniscient vantage over the internal autopoietic logic of the 
regulated system. 
C. Contextual control of the nation-state through global investment law 
Today’s nation-states suffer from a dilemma in relation to regulating the global investment 
field which operates beyond the cognitive capacity of the nation-state. Therefore, the clumsy 
national intervention of the outdated welfare-state model runs the risk of triggering an unpredictable 
backlash from the global investment field. At the same time, the recent global crisis caused by neo-
liberalism teaches us a bitter lesson: global investment still needs regulation by the nation-state. The 
one-sided expansive thrust of economic power could ruin not only other sub-societies but also the 
economic system itself, culminating in the total collapse of world society.  
Systems theory approaches propose judicious handling, namely contextual control, over the 
global regime by proceduralising structural couplings among the state, law and other regulated sub-
societies.37 The nation-state does not intervene directly and hastily in the social field even if it itself 
agrees that control is necessary. At the same time, to achieve a specific substantive goal, the nation-
state indirectly manipulates the context within which global investment behaves.  
In effecting contextual control, the nation-state could rely on the legal function of GIL in the 
GIR. In fact, the legal function of stabilising normative expectations through two elements (viz. 
participation mechanism and independent dispute settlement) of GIL can transform the mutual 
indifference of the regulatory trilemma into mutual credibility. Even if the negotiation of normative 
expectations does not perfectly satisfy all the demands of every GIR member, the legal system 
could help regime participants to reap the normative benefits of rough predictability over their 
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minimum interests. Such an expectation of predictability persuades GIR members to stay within the 
GIR itself. In turn, this persuasive authority based on stabilised normative expectations attracts 
regime participants more firmly over time. The effectiveness and enforcement of GIL comes not 
from formal top-down authority to bind the members of the GIR but from the practical 
persuasiveness of the legal function that creates mutual credibility (see Figure V-2). 
 
<Figure V-2> Contextual Control Model 
 
Nation-states can make regulatory power look acceptable to other global actors through 
contextual control. The nation-state can imbue the norm-making and interpretation of GIL with its 
own interests implicitly by using its formal power in two structural elements of GIL. Firstly, the 
participation process of GIL allows the nation-state, like other GIR members, to transplant its own 
interests into generally agreeable normative expectations. To take the example of indirect 
expropriation in the KORUS-FTA, Korea and the U.S. agreed to restrain their own regulatory 
power in order to attract foreign investment. At the same time, the Korean and U.S. governments 
were able to secure the minimum scope of regulatory power by introducing their own national 
doctrine of property rights. Secondly, once their national interests have been incorporated into the 
substantive norms of the investment legal system in the form of the treaty text, independent dispute 
settlement becomes obliged to consider the viewpoints of those states, in proportion to investment 
protection.  
Through contextual control, the nation-state is able to secure the predictability of a 
minimum scope of controllability over the GIR. Of course, the contextual control model cannot 
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guarantee that a nation-state achieves a specific political goal, because the participation process is 
open not only to that state but also to other social actors and global investors. In addition, investor-
state arbitration operates as an independent dispute settlement mechanism of GIL, without any 
connection to national influences. Once substantive norms have been established by the nation-
states and other global actors, the nation-state cannot control the operation of the arbitration process, 
unlike state-to-state consultation. Therefore, the extent to which national interest can be secured 
against investment protection depends on the investment arbitrators reviewing a case, even if they 
are obliged to consider the arguments of both parties. 38  Nevertheless, this risk could be 
compensated for by the predictability of avoiding the worst-case scenario. To put it differently, the 
nation-state can maintain some control over the process by using GIL as a tool for contextual 
control without serious reputational damage. The proportionality principle of indirect expropriation 
provides a good example; in reality, many investment tribunals, which deal with longstanding 
doctrinal questions, propose a very balanced mode of reasoning between two colliding substantive 
interests, as opposed to a black-and-white mode of reasoning. Even where investment protection is 
respected, the nation-state does not lose all control over the global investment field in the sense that 
it prevents the worst-case scenario in which the regulatory power of the host state is ignored 
completely.  
Given the functionally differentiated world society, the benefit of predictability could make 
contextual control convincing for the nation-state, which is required to control uncontrollable global 
social fields. Direct control by nation-states should overcome the too-costly challenges of the 
regulatory trilemma in the autonomous global investment field. Even if direct control looks 
politically attractive to the people, its effectiveness is uncertain because it suffers from unexpected 
backlashes from autonomous social fields. The nation-state is called upon to compare the risk of 
regulatory failure in exercising direct control and the risk of discouraging regulatory power in 
investment arbitration. One should consider whether the political support achieved through the 
application of direct control can be compensated for by the predictability of GIL. If this cost-benefit 
analysis is considered from the side of the nation-state, contextual control might be more workable 
than direct control in promising a rough predictability. Of course, GIL cannot perfectly ensure that 
nation-states will achieve their intended goals. Indeed, the original expectations of the nation-state 
could always be refracted by the rationalities of other actors in the course of their strategic 
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compromises with these actors. Further, there remains a risk that the independent dispute settlement 
regime could curb state policy goals in managing foreign investment. However, contextual control 
can prevent actors from monopolising the global regime through their own one-sided rationalities. 
Conversely, this measure can guarantee that no actor, especially the state, will lose their entire 
capacity to control the regime. As can be inferred from the regime theory, this approach allows the 
nation-state to secure the second worst or the second best outcome by giving up uncertain direct 
interventions to achieve the ideal goal. 
D. Dynamic autonomy of global investment law through structural coupling 
This does not mean that the nation-state is useless in contextual control. Indeed, the nation-
state has a formidable formal power to shape the global mechanism through treaty-making. Given 
this, systems theory suggests that each nation-state could use its formal power more efficiently by 
establishing a form of structural coupling between the law and the global economy within the GIR. 
To be specific, most of the structural elements of GIL, such as treaties, are established only through 
the formal powers of nation-states. Therefore, the nation-state pays more attention to the 
proceduralisation of the legal system than manipulating substantive content.39 In this sense, 
contextual control requires nation-states to use their own powers in a wiser way.40 
The nation-state needs to secure the autonomy of the legal system in order to make 
contextual control effective. Contextual control works effectively when the GIR and GIL are 
operational. If the legal system were dominated by the rationality of one sub-society, it would 
become unattractive to the actors of other sub-societies. Such other actors might withdraw their 
compliance with the regime if they cannot expect the legal system to guarantee their minimum 
interests and prevent the worst-case scenario. In this context, Teubner argues that the law can be 
autonomous when it follows an independent evolutionary path by changing its own internal 
structure in a self-referential way even if it responds to external influences.41 The law can gradually 
achieve a closed and autopoietic operation when (and more importantly because) the legal system is 
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System (Blackwell Publishers, 1993) pp.47-63. 
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cognitively open to the various sub-societies.42 In this context, the autonomy of a system does not 
necessarily mean that the system is hermetic or insular towards substantive content.  
In explaining the openness and closure of one system toward other system, the concept of 
structural coupling plays a significant role in making the legal system functional by setting up its 
autonomy from other external influences. Systems theorists explain that structural coupling, in 
which one system is structurally related to the other or to the environment,43 occurs when ‘a system 
presupposes certain features of its environment on an ongoing basis and relies on them’.44 Even if 
structural coupling allows for the interference of one system to trigger changes in the other system, 
this interference is not direct; it is only reflexive with regard to input and output.45 Structural 
coupling establishes only the structural conditions in which two systems can influence each other. 
One cannot determine how those systems will react to each other due to several systems theory 
premises. Firstly, the two systems operate according to different rationalities and speeds, just like 
two people speaking different languages. More precisely, each system communicates with a 
different code and programme; whereas the legal system understands things according to a legal 
binary code (legal/illegal), the economic system understands them on the basis of possession/non-
possession. Secondly, structural coupling can secure the occurrence of a response as one system can 
recognise the operations of the other system as perturbations (Irritationen, Überraschungen, or 
Störunge in German) 46  The perturbation, as an internally constructed surprise, irritation, 
disappointment or disturbance, occurs cognitively within the system which realises that external 
events are happening contrary to its expectations;47 it is like a shop assistant who feels embarrassed 
when a shopper comes in and speaks in a foreign language. Here, the shop assistant processes this 
embarrassment in his or her own language based on his or her own expectations. Likewise, a 
system processes those perturbations in a self-referential way, so that one system cannot anticipate 
when and how the other system will react. Of course, an autopoietic system has an absolute logical 
discretion to turn its face away from perturbations because it basically operates self-referentially. 
However, it gradually becomes impossible for the system not to react to perturbations because the 
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increasing complexity of society generates more chances of external challenges against the systems. 
Figuratively speaking, although the shop assistant could refuse to trade with foreigners once or 
twice, it is impossible to do so in a shop in a tourist attraction which hundreds of foreigners visit 
every day. To summarise, two autopoietic systems operating indifferently are gradually coupled 
with the other  system in the course of  structuralising the process in  which one system perceives 
impacts from the other and reacts to them in a self-referential way.48 
The openness of the legal system can serve as a precondition for dynamic legal autonomy 
among competing social values by making simultaneous and equal structural couplings with sub-
systems. The legal system as a partially autopoietic system is partially autonomous from one 
system (and its actor) such as a political system (and the nation-state) or the economic system (and 
multinational company) (see Figure V-3). However, functional differentiation does not allow the 
legal system to make a structural coupling with either society as a whole or only one sub-society. 
Instead, the law establishes many individual structural couplings with numerous sub-societies 
which emulate one another. Each of these sub-societies attempts to instrumentalise (or colonise) the 
law under their sub-societal rationalities in order to expand those rationalities into other societies – 
and ultimately into society as a whole. Thus, the power game played among competing sub-social 
systems ends with an ironic situation in which the colliding social influences of sub-societies put 
the law into a situation in which those sub-societies come into balance with each other. Figuratively 
speaking, the law can be impartial due to this armistice among the sub-societies. At this point, the 
autonomy of the law might be able to develop an autonomous rule of conflicts to cope with the 
dynamics of social sub-systems at the periphery of the law. Here, the autonomy of the legal system 
fluctuates among external social influences; even if the legal system would be temporally 
dominated by one system, this inclination is later balanced by another counter-movement (see 
Figure V-4).49 
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This structural mechanism transforms bare social conflicts into conflicts within legal 
arguments representing the rationalities of individual sub-societies.50 Moreover, the vigorous 
tensional debates between colliding rights or doctrines leave the conflicts to a specific and impartial 
institutional mechanism to produce an autonomous rule in terms of its self-constitution.51 In 
addition, global justice emerges not as a specific substantive value, but as a polytextually relational 
value in the course of adjusting colliding rationalities in a polycentric world.52  
 
 
            
 
 <Figure  V-3>                          <Figure  V-4>  
 
III. CONSTITUTIONALISM FOR STRUCTURAL COUPLING IN THE GLOBAL INVESTMENT 
REGIME 
A. Analogical application of constitutionalism to the global investment regime 
The most important point for successful contextual control is how the nation-state 
contributes to legal autonomy. If the legal system is dominated by the rationality of one sub-society, 
the GIR will be trapped in an abyss of double contingency which would cause a vicious circle of 
mutual distrust. Nonetheless, the evolution of GIL has recently entered by a narrow margin into the 
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phase of a partially autopoietic legal system. GIL as a global law is fundamentally exposed to the 
dynamic power games of unequal global actors, on the one hand, and is still in an early stage of 
producing a consistent jurisprudence against challengeable political or economic thrusts, on the 
other. Strictly speaking, the future of GIL is still up in the air and it depends ultimately on how to 
establish legal autonomy through a balanced and simultaneous structural coupling between GIL 
and various social influences.  
Given this, a system theoretic understanding of the constitution could provide valuable 
suggestions for establishing a structural coupling between GIL and other social sectors. Of course, 
it is unclear whether Teubner’s global societal constitution might be observable in the current 
global field in the light of the traditional understanding of the constitution; the traditional concept of 
the constitution presumes that the constitution is usually produced in close connection with a 
political entity such as the nation-state. In particular, it looks quite doubtful whether one could find 
a global investment constitution in the GIR without the existence of a world government. However, 
one could find several faint but promising features of such a constitution as long as the constitution 
is understood not just as a legal text but as a structural coupling between GIL and other social 
sectors. Finally, one could assess how firmly GIL is established for legal autonomy by examining 
the constitutional features in the global investment field. Additionally, nation-states can promote 
those constitutional features in order to set up a more firmly established structural coupling. In this 
context, the following sections will examine the constitutional features of the global investment 
field.  
Teubner proposes a global societal constitution which would reflect the direct structural 
coupling between the law and sub-societies without the nation-state.53 Initially, Luhmann argued 
that the constitution presents a structural coupling between the law and (national) politics, where it 
secures the autopoiesis of law from the interplay with politics and vice versa.54 Luhmann’s 
understanding of the constitution mainly remained at the national level before the heyday of 
globalization. Teubner applies this concept to a global perspective in the name of a global societal 
constitution.55 The global societal constitutions in the differentiated sub-social systems ‘are neither 
                                               
53 Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Private Regimes: Neo-Spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution of Autonomous 
Sectors?’ in Karl-Heinz Ladeur (ed) Public Governance in the Age of Globalization (Ashgate, 2004) p.74. 
54 Luhmann (n 43) pp.381-422. 
55 Teubner (n 53) p.74. 
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legal texts nor are they the de facto structures of social systems’.56 A societal constitution occurs 
through the long-term stabilisation of the dynamic relationship between legal and social 
autonomy.57 The fundamental structure of this relationship is similar to the relationship between 
the law and the political system in the state constitution. In fact, Luhmann argues that while the 
political constitution appears to be associated with the production of legal norms from the legal 
perspective, it is considered to structuralise the political system from the political perspective.58 
This mechanism could also be found in the global societal constitution; the legal system considers 
the societal constitution to be the production of legal norms which are relevant to the structure of 
the social system. At the same time, the societal constitution structuralises the social system which 
is coupled by allowing the law to perceive the rationality of the social system.59  
This structural coupling sets the conditions which enable mutual perturbations to occur 
between the structurally-coupled autopoietic systems. To take the example of the political 
constitution, the author of the constitution intends to prescribe the constitutional text using abstract 
and vague language which could be acceptable to both the political and the legal systems. The 
shared but intentionally ambiguous meanings inscribed in the constitutional text serve as a resource 
that one system could rely on in the case of perturbations.60 For example, suppose the constitution 
prescribes the term ‘democracy’ in the constitutional text without giving any detailed substantive 
contents. In relation to this legal text, the relevant actors can influence each other through a series of 
constitutional procedures prescribed in the constitution. The political system can influence the legal 
system through procedures of norm-making in accordance with the political understanding of 
democracy. By the same token, the legal system can attempt to control the political structure 
through the judicial system in order to take charge of the legal interpretation of the idea of 
democracy. In this context, the constitution is a holistic concept which includes a legal text, together 
with institutions and procedures to deal with influences or perturbations between the two social 
systems.  
In comparison with the national constitution, the global societal constitution provides the 
conditions for structural couplings based on a similar logic but in a different context. As can be seen 
in the regulation of the internet, many global norm-making processes seem to be faced with two 
                                               
56  Gunther Teubner, ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory’ in 
Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand and G Teubner (eds), Transnational Governance and 
Constitutionalism: International Studies in the Theory of Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2004) p.20. 
57 ibid. 
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kinds of problem; it is nearly impossible for an authority acting nationally to regulate global issues 
beyond its national borders, and, at the same time, inter-governmental consensus, including 
international treaties, needs to overcome a number of political obstacles.61 The same applies to GIL. 
As illustrated by the failure to establish a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (hereafter ‘MAI’), 
the global investment field faces many political challenges from nation-states or other social actors 
which still have significant influence, despite their limited powers. 62  Therefore, the global 
investment sector has not established the unitary or centralised constitution possessed by the nation-
state.   
Instead, the GIR has gradually established meta-level self-regulation arising from the rough 
consensus achieved through its hybrid dynamic of norm-making. To be specific, the 
communicative networking in the global regime (community) produces a ‘running code’ based on a 
‘rough consensus’.63 In fact, the global community, unlike the nation-state, cannot generate strong 
and formal legitimacy.64 Therefore, the process of norm-creation starts from a pilot phase – where 
the norm would not have a strong binding effect – as seen in model laws, recommendations or 
reports.65 This proto-code is not fixed but is open to ongoing revision as it is circulated in 
communicative networking.66 For example, the revision process is open to academic discussion, to 
governmental process by trade policy makers or to the global participation of civic groups. 
Continuous communication within an issue-driven regime experiments on and updates the proto-
code into a more hardened norm. In the history of GIL, the primitive principles of international 
investment rules were systemically shaped as a prototype of GIL by a group of academics and 
businessmen in the 1959 Abs-Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment Abroad. Those pioneers 
imported many important principles such as expropriation from traditional international law. Even 
if those principles and substantive norms were not so popular at that time, they were continuously 
updated or re-discussed by policy makers, lawyers or scholars. In particular, the model investment 
treaties of major investment-exporting countries have a significant role in establishing a set of 
                                               
61 Teubner (n 56) pp.20-21. 
62 The OECD members had negotiated this agreement to establish a uniform and systematic rule to deal with 
the global investment issues. Some pointed out that these negotiations were going on without enough 
participation of the non-OECD countries and civil society. Finally, this deal broke down, as it faced massive 
criticism from civil society and from the developing countries. See Peter T. Muchlinski, ‘The Rise and Fall of 
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment: Where Now?’ (2000) 34(3) International Lawyer. 
63  Gralf-Peter Calliess and Peer Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and Running Code: A Theory of 
Transnational Private Law (Hart, 2010) p.134ff. 
64 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance 
(Polity Press, 1995) pp.16-18.  
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investment legal principles that many GIR members share. To be specific, many negotiations of 
international investment treaties tend to update the model BITs of major economic powers such as 
the U.S. or U.K. For example, the U.S. FTAs with Korea, Panama and Columbia employ similar 
language because they were negotiated individually by making changes to the U.S. Model BIT. 
The model BITs will also be updated in the future and discussed in academia, in policy making 
processes and in civil society.  
Even if the GIR does not have any classic form of constitution, it seems to perform a similar 
function to a traditional constitution in light of structural coupling. Although such internal systems 
of the GIR are pluralised and embryonic, compared to national constitutions, they have structurally 
coupled GIL and other sub-societies, as will be seen in the following sections. 
B. Rule-making through judicial review in global investment law 
One of the most important tasks of the constitution in structural coupling is to deal with 
structural corruption that has the potential to destroy legal and social autonomy.67 The history of 
the state political constitution shows that political authoritarianism has easily encroached upon legal 
autonomy and vice versa because mutual perturbations between the law and politics are too fragile 
to maintain a balance. Therefore, the modern political constitution has tackled stable 
institutionalisation of the dynamic equilibrium in which the two opposite influences of the political 
system and the legal system occur at the same rate.68 For example, economic demands attempt to 
liberalise capital flows by deconstructing constitutional social rights, whereas political rhetoric in 
favour of the social welfare state bends various constitutional principles of civil liberty. Here, the 
constitution devotes itself to maintaining a dynamic balance where one influence could be offset by 
another one. This fundamental issue of the political constitution is also applicable to the global 
sphere because global law-making is vulnerable to the pressure of the rationality of coupled sub-
societies.69 In response to this structural corruption, the constitution draws a distinction between 
illegal corruption and legitimate perturbation by institutionalizing this perturbation mechanism.70 
Therefore, the constitution transforms the distinction between a legal and an illegal 
perturbation into the distinction between a constitutional and an unconstitutional perturbation, 
according to a hierarchical distinction between an ordinary and a higher rule. In this context, the 
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constitution recognises the higher rule as a constitutional law against ordinary law. As noted above, 
the legal system stabilises normative expectations by holding, as illegal, external influences that 
threaten originally agreed expectations. Here, the legal system is situated in a dilemma of cognitive 
infinite regression. In other words, how could the law validate a rule to validate the law? How can 
there be a legality of legality?71 This inherent paradox of the legal system requires another 
paradoxical rule: the constitution, which can declare the illegality of legally-enacted law by using 
the term, ‘unconstitutionality’. Simultaneously, the constitution can contain the rules and 
procedures that produce and verify itself.72 Here, Hart’s articulation of the relationship between a 
secondary rule and a primary rule could provide fecund suggestions to alleviate this legal paradox. 
Of course, the recognition of a secondary rule might not eliminate the legal paradox because the 
legality of the secondary rule remains as an unresolved issue in this circular logic. Therefore, the 
legal system is again stuck with an infinite cognitive regression, as it does not answer the question 
of how to recognise the secondary rule to recognise the primary rule (the secondary-secondary 
rule?).73 Historically speaking, constitutional theorists have suffered from this paradox, despite 
numerous efforts to identify ‘separate self-production rules’.74 This  issue  continues  in  a  more  
serious way in the context of globalisation without a formal, positive norm-making process.75 This 
constitutional issue in the global context broaches a number of questions, such as who the norm-
author is or what procedure could be employed for the recognition or production of the secondary 
norm.76  
The constitution has traditionally attempted to deal with this paradox by establishing the 
hierarchical order of the judicial system. To take the example of the political constitution, a systems 
theoretic understanding of the constitution does not encompass only the constitutional texts but also 
the interpretative rules of the texts as well as the structures that produce the rules, norms and other 
relevant institutions. The most important part of the constitution is the institution which produces a 
higher law as a secondary rule; this is usually taken to be the process of judicial review. For 
instance, the supreme or constitutional court, in the political constitution, will hold a legally enacted 
law to be unconstitutional if there is a substantive contradiction with constitutional law.77 For 
                                               
71 Teubner (1993) (n 41) pp.3-4. 
72 Luhmann (n 43) pp.406-08. 
73 Teubner (1993) (n 41) pp.39-40. 
74 Teubner (n 56) p.23. 
75 ibid. 
76 ibid. 
77 ibid p.24. 
CONTEXTUAL CONTROL OF GIR THROUGH CREATIVE USE OF GIL AND STRUCTURAL COUPLING 
 
183 
instance, Marbury v. Madison78 paved the way for constitutional review which made a distinction 
between constitutional and ordinary legal jurisdiction.79 Here, even if the judicial body relies on the 
constitutional text, it produces its own doctrine in the form of a constitutional review which chooses 
among various colliding interpretations of the same constitutional text. To put this into system 
theoretic language, the rule of legal interpretation could be condensed through the system of 
forgetting and remembering, in which the judicial body has a decisive role in this rule-making 
process. In light of Teubner’s concept of self-constitution, one could call a decision of this kind a 
‘constitutional review’, given that the constitution applies its own rule to the case against social 
expectations. In this autopoietic networking of courts, self-constitution translates this recognition of 
social rationality into a legal language in accordance with the general legal principle which presents 
legal rationality.80 Through the selective adaptation of the legal system to other social systems, the 
global societal constitution could establish a structural coupling in a stable way to prevent illegal 
corruption and stabilise legitimate perturbation.81  
The global regime similarly establishes ‘a de facto constitutional review of non-legislative 
law’ at multiple levels such as domestic or international, or private or public.82 However, there is 
no hierarchical structure in the global sphere that is comparable to the traditional political 
constitution. In other words, there is no higher court in the global sphere because the global regime 
does not have a clear jurisdictional differentiation among diversified legal tribunals. To take an 
example from GIL, GIL does not have any formal higher court to review individual arbitrations 
because the tribunals in the individual arbitrations are not formally obliged to follow other 
arbitration decisions. Instead, they are influenced only by the reputational hierarchy of some big 
institutions, such as ICSID. 
In terms of systems theory, the establishment of a higher judicial body serves as a minimum 
condition for the firmly established structural coupling of GIL. In other words, GIL would not last 
long without the institutional process which reviews previous decisions. In fact, GIL suffers from 
inconsistency in its jurisprudence because the pluralised setting of the judicial system allows 
individual tribunals to enjoy quite broad discretion. For example, Lauder v. Czech Republic83and 
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CME v. Czech Republic84 were decided differently, despite their shared facts or arguments.85 As 
long as the original expectations are too changeable, the system might become less attractive to 
GIR members due to its arbitrariness. In this situation, an appellate mechanism can increase the 
coherence and consistency of GIL86  
It is still controversial among international investment lawyers whether the establishment of 
a higher investment court is necessary, or even possible.87 One practitioner points out that the 
pluralised  nature  of  GIL  makes  it  difficult  to  secure  a  water-tight  level  of  consistency  and  
coherence.88 However, it might look reasonable that GIL requires rough consistency to persuade 
GIR members to stay within the regime. In this sense, the current reputation-driven mechanism is 
not sufficient to secure rough consistency and coherence. An influential decision from previous 
arbitration does not completely prevent the reasoning overruled by that institution from being 
revived in other future arbitrations because each arbitration decision does not have any formal 
precedential value for future arbitrations.89 
C. Internal differentiation between the organised and the spontaneous sector 
GIL suffers from a classical legitimacy problem in its norm-creation. In response to this 
legitimacy problem, systems theorists have reconstructed Held’s cosmopolitan democracy within 
                                               
84 CME v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (Netherlands/Czech Republic BIT), Partial Award, 13 September 
2001. 
85 Christian Tams, ‘Is There a Need for an ICSID Appellate Structure’ in Rainer Hofmann and Christian 
Tams (eds), The International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes: Taking Stock After 40 
Years (Nomos, 2007) pp.232-34 (analysing other instances to show the inconsistency in international 
investment law). 
86 Susan D. Franck, ‘The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International 
Law Through Inconsistent Decisions’ (2005) 73(4) Fordham Law Review pp.1617-25; Karl P. Sauvant, ‘The 
Rise of International Investment, Investment Agreements and Investment Disputes’ in Karl P. Sauvant (ed) 
Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (Oxford University Press, 2008) p.15; ICSID, 
‘Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICISD Arbitration ICSID Secretariat Discussion Paper’ (22 
October 2004) pp.14-15 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewAnno
uncePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceNo=14_1.pdf> accessed 15 April 2012. 
87 Tams (n 85) pp.231-40; Asif H Qureshi, ‘An Appellate System in International Investment Arbitration?’' in 
Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Investment Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) pp.1157-59; Federico Ortino, Audley Sheppard and Hugo 
Warner (eds), Investment Treaty Law: Current Issues Volume 1 (British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, 2006), pp.113-148. 
88 ibid pp.234-35; Barton Legum, ‘Options to Establish an Appellate Mechanism for Investment Dispute’ in 
Karl P. Sauvant (ed) Appeals Mechanism in International Investment Disputes (Oxford University Press, 2008) 
pp.237-38. 
89 This issue is discussed in Chapter V. Part IV. B. iv).  
CONTEXTUAL CONTROL OF GIR THROUGH CREATIVE USE OF GIL AND STRUCTURAL COUPLING 
 
185 
the issue-driven (functionally differentiated) regime beyond a territorially delineated state.90 In fact, 
the general notion of democracy in the 19th and 20th centuries assumes that the legitimacy of state-
law is established through a ‘symmetrical’ and ‘congruent’ relationship between the decision-maker 
(government) and the decision-taker (people).91 Here, a formal majority voting system in the 
national constitutional setting secures this mechanism of legitimacy production. However, the 
context of a highly atomised international organisation and non-state actors challenge this 
constitutional link between the rule-making authority and the affected people by setting aside the 
state.92 This  situation  appears  to  be  as  if  a  handful  of  experts  were  to  decide  the  creation  and  
application of norms which affect a number of lay people.93 In response to this challenge, Held and 
the proponents of his theory propose the possibility of democracy in the transnational sphere.94 To 
be more exact, the boundary of this transnational community and the identity of its members are 
defined according to the extent of affectedness95 beyond a territory-based politics, just as the 
regime is formed by specific issues. Therefore, any person or actor is assumed to have a tentative 
entitlement to participate in the communicative network of norm-making as long as those global 
players are affected by the relevant communicative system. The boundary and identity of the global 
regime can be tentatively decided by the degree of affectedness of the involved persons’ everyday 
lives by the global issues.  
Such analyses bear an interesting resemblance to the differentiation of organised and 
spontaneous sectors, which originate from the model of the state-constitution. Initially, this internal 
differentiation into ‘a spontaneous and a formally organized sphere’96 has been successful in the 
political constitution.97 Habermas has described a relationship between the political centre and 
political periphery in the public sphere.98 He explains that the conflicts occurring in the periphery 
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transfer into the political centre. Specifically, the public opinion initiated in the political periphery 
pushes the political centre to recognise and solve the conflicts in a collectively binding and formal 
fashion without apparent violence. Such processes are described and operated with use of legal 
terms (e.g. rights, claims, or legislation).99 In a similar way, Teubner argues that the political 
constitution represents the dualism of ‘the government’ and ‘public opinion’,100 which in turn 
presents a correlation between ‘the organisational law of the state and the citizen’s fundamental 
rights’.101 The political parties and the state administration in the formally organized sector produce 
the legal norm and implement the law, whereas they are coupled with the spontaneous sector where 
electorates or interest groups participate in the norm-making. As a result, the political constitution 
has developed the institutions required to permit citizen involvement in norm-making; for example, 
the citizen could have an active role in legislation and the implementation of law through the 
mechanism of representation. Moreover, legal (constitutional) rights in the court system allow 
people to take a passive role in the law-making of the organised sector through legal claims against 
those laws. This internal differentiation promotes creative perturbation and filters out structural 
corruption by preventing unjustified political pressure from destroying legal autonomy, and the 
converse is also true.102 In globalisation, the dual structure managed by the traditional constitution 
is replaced with ‘the relationship between the spontaneous sector of international relations and of 
international organisations under other auspices’.103 
The separation between the legal centre and periphery serves an important role in 
establishing a structural coupling. In fact, the social norms produced on the legal periphery are 
applied by the legal centre where the judicial bodies are located. Here, the court located in the legal 
centre could be strictly bound by the legal text as a set of normative expectations, whereas that legal 
text itself is produced through participation by the relevant actors on the legal periphery. The legal 
centre does not accept other social influences in a direct way but in an indirect way by considering 
the legal texts that are produced by the social actors of the legal periphery. In other words, the legal 
centre (judicial body or tribunal) could be reflexive to other external influences not through the 
direct acceptance of social interests but through an indirect filtering of the legal periphery which 
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facilitates the structural mechanism that transforms bare social interests into legal languages.104 As 
a result, the reflexivity or multiplicity of the legal centre does not depend on how open the legal 
centre itself is, but on how open the participation procedures of norm-making in the legal periphery 
are to the other social interests. Under the legal centre/periphery distinction, the legal system could 
secure autonomy and reflexivity at the same time through structural coupling with other sub-
societies.  
Finally, the challenging task of global law is to promote this dualism, especially by 
supporting the spontaneous sector and stabilising the justifiable stable perturbation between the two 
sectors. In fact, Teubner admits that this internal differentiation in the global sphere is very weak in 
comparison to that of the political constitution (government/people) or the economic constitution 
(enterprises/market).105 He analyses the fact that non-political and non-economic sub-societies do 
not make sufficient distinction between organised rationality and its corresponding spontaneity;106 
even if he recognises some promising autonomies of the sub-societies in the recent globalisation, 
this autonomy is still very vulnerable to re-colonisation by more strongly established political and 
economic rationality. A more serious problem is that the atomisation of sub-societies leads to the 
establishment of ‘a formally organized sphere of bureaucratic decisions’.107 Nonetheless, Teubner 
attempts to look at the promising but incipient evidence of an emerging spontaneous sector in 
various sub-societies.108 Here, issues of democracy such as participation that Held has raised at the 
level of global politics are revived as urgent issues at the level of fragmented global sub-societies in 
order to establish ‘an autonomous regime of organised decision and spontaneous control 
process’.109 In particular, the global law project makes sure that this social control is managed not 
by political or economic thrust but by multiplexity.110 
As with the dualism of the constitution, the global investment field can be differentiated into 
a centre and a periphery, or into an organised and a spontaneous sector. In terms of a rough 
consensus and a running code, a rough consensus formed in the spontaneous sector (the periphery) 
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of global investment is evolved into a running code of the organised sector (the centre). On the one 
hand, these are matched with the elements of GIL; the participation process allows regime actors in 
the spontaneous sector to produce a rough consensus regarding investment protections and 
restrictions. As the spontaneous sectors are influenced by social interests, actors (the host states, 
global investors and civil activists) attempt to transplant their own social interests into the 
substantive normative contents. On the other hand, the centre of GIL is the network of investment 
arbitrations that can produce an interpretative rule by applying norms to specific cases.  
Through the constitutional mechanism, the centre and periphery, namely the independent 
dispute settlement system and the participation mechanism of the investment legal system, are 
checking each other. This dynamic of mutual checks and balances is similar to a tensional 
relationship between the legislature (or people) and the constitutional court. As the constitutional 
court reviews legislative or governmental acts, the investment tribunal also reviews the acts of host 
states and investors. Meanwhile, other sub-societies could indirectly control the tribunal by 
influencing the treaty text which could bind the tribunal to apply the law in a certain way. Therefore, 
the substantive interests of other legal systems are incorporated into the languages of the investment 
normative text. To take an example from the indirect expropriation issue, the tribunal is required to 
consider regulatory power and other public interests because the government and civil society have 
incorporated ‘legitimate public welfare objectives’ into the treaty text.111  
Nevertheless, the spontaneous sector of the current global investment field is not reflexive 
enough to various social contexts due to a lack of participation. In fact, current GIL is too 
vulnerable to economic influences or investment-importing countries, whereas it is blind to other 
social values such as human rights. Even if some civil society groups have proposed an alternative 
model BIT which attempts to secure various social interests, this has not been broadly accepted by 
national policy makers.112 To  take  the  example  of  NAFTA  negotiations,  the  power  imbalance  
between the U.S. and Mexico has prevented NAFTA from incorporating the Mexican national 
legal system.113 In the case of the KORUS-FTA, some critics argue that the expropriation clauses 
are too oriented to the U.S. property doctrine, despite the adoption of several Korean property 
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doctrines.114 In addition, the participation process at the national level is not sufficiently open to 
other social interests, even though the treaty is closely associated with the everyday life of ordinary 
people.115 
IV. KOREAN CONSTITUTIONAL ALTERNATIVES FOR STRUCTURAL COUPLING OF 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
The previous parts have argued that the nation-state can secure contextual control over the 
global investment field by relying on the autonomy of GIL. In order to achieve contextual control, 
GIL is required to establish a structural coupling between the legal system and other sub-societies in 
the light of global constitutionalism. Despite some evidence of the global constitution, current GIL 
does not perfectly meet the conditions of the global constitution. In this context, the nation-state 
could have one of the most important roles in promoting the constitutional features of GIL as long 
as the nation-state defines itself as one of the GIR participants. Although the nation-state can no 
longer entirely dominate the GIR, the formal powers of nation-states cannot be ignored, especially 
in terms of treaty making. In this context, the following sections pay particular attention to national 
constitutional arrangements for global constitutionalism to pursue structural coupling, from the 
perspective of the Korean government under the KORUS-FTA. Regarding this, the thesis proposes 
two general directions that the nation-state can take: current GIL needs to enhance participation 
which exposes itself to more diversified social contexts by promoting openness, on the one hand. It 
should also protect the autopoietic networking of investment arbitration from inappropriate external 
influences, on the other hand.  
A. Greater participation in the norm-making process  
In terms of participation procedures, nation-states should encourage the democratic 
participation of civil society groups in treaty-making. At the national level, nation-states should 
promote the openness of and participation in treaty-making procedures by introducing more social 
groups into the treaty-making mechanism. In fact, participation and openness are gaining 
significance in the globalised world in which international treaties are involved more directly in the 
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lives of ordinary people.116 However, Korean legal procedures for treaty-making do not guarantee 
sufficient openness from the perspective of participation. While government officials of the 
executive branch are initiating and negotiating FTAs, the legislative branch and other social groups 
have had comparatively few chances to be engaged in treaty-making procedures.  
The Korean legislative branch does not usually become involved in the treaty-making 
process until the executive branch submits the relevant bill for consent. In the Korean constitutional 
system, the President has the constitutional power to conclude and ratify treaties,117 whereas the 
legislature only has a right to consent to some constitutionally important treaties. These include 
‘treaties pertaining to any restriction in sovereignty’, ‘treaties which will burden the State or the 
people with an important financial obligation’, or ‘treaties related to legislative matters’.118 
Although there is no clear doctrinal standard for defining a constitutionally important treaty,119 in 
practice, the executive branch almost always submits a bill for legislative consent for FTAs to the 
National Assembly because FTAs are considered to be a typical type of constitutionally important 
treaty requiring legislative approval. Moreover, according to the general practice of treaty making, 
the executive branch has taken all major steps towards the conclusion of the treaty in accordance 
with its internal procedures on treaty-making even before legislative approval is sought.120 
Since 2004, the Korean government has negotiated and concluded FTAs mainly according 
to the ‘Presidential Directive on the FTA Conclusion Procedure’.121 This administrative rule has 
been revised to increase public and legislative participation at times when FTAs are expected to be 
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controversial. In particular, this directive was amended by the ‘Presidential Directive on 
Deliberations of FTA Conclusion and Implementation’ (hereafter ‘FTA Directive’) following the 
conclusion of the Korea-EU FTA, in order to address certain weak points such as scant public and 
legislative participation. However, despite frequent amendments to the administrative rules 
governing FTA negotiation, the Korean social movement has consistently criticised the 
participatory deficit pertaining to the previous institutional framework. During the political debate 
over the KORUS-FTA in particular, the Korean opposition party criticised the secret negotiation 
and conclusion of the treaty by a handful of high ranking diplomats.122 They argued for the 
enhancement of public participation and greater legislative control over the overall institutional 
framework for FTA negotiation and implementation by stressing the need for more involvement of 
the National Assembly in the decision making.123 They considered the passage of legislative 
statutes governing the FTA-making process as a first step to securing effective control over FTA 
policy against the executive branch and the governing party. In January 2012, the governing party 
and executive branch agreed to pass the Korean Trade Procedure Act in order to appease opposition 
parties. This new statute will be effective from 18 July 2012.  
Under the FTA directive and Korean Trade Procedure Act, the Ministerial Meeting on 
Foreign Economic Affairs (hereafter ‘MMFEA’) has the authority to initiate FTA negotiations 
between Korea and other states. The MMFEA, chaired by the Minister of Strategy and Finance, is 
composed of cabinet ministers who take charge of overall issues pertaining to national economic 
matters. The Free Trade Agreement Opportunity Committee (hereafter ‘FTAOC’), established 
under the FTA Directive, can also recommend that the MMFEA launch FTA negotiations.124 The 
Minister for Trade chairs this committee, which is composed of assistant ministers from the 
relevant ministries, according to Article 5 of the FTA Directive.125 Assistant ministers attending the 
FTAOC coordinate the various policies of each ministry during FTA negotiations.126 The Korean 
Trade Procedure Act requires the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade to assess the feasibility of 
concluding the relevant FTA.127 Although the Korean Trade Procedure Act does not specify who 
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exactly should perform this feasibility assessment, the Minster is likely to assign this task to the 
FTAOC. This body deliberates on the general orientation of future FTA policy, as well as the 
feasibility of concluding relevant FTAs and their national effects.128 The FTA Directive allows the 
FTAOC to form a Private Advisory Committee in which civil trade experts can provide specialist 
advice.129 The Private Advisory Committee of the FTAOC could serve as a channel through which 
civil society interests may be represented at the inter-ministerial level. The FTAOC’s chairperson 
can appoint advisory committee members from those with extensive knowledge and experience of 
the international economic sector, or those who can represent the opinions of relevant interest 
groups.130 Before negotiations begin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade should establish 
plans concerning the conclusion of a trade treaty, known as a ‘Trade Treaty Conclusion Plan’.131 
The current system requires a public hearing before both the establishment of a Trade Treaty 
Conclusion Plan132 and before the launch of a proposed FTA negotiation.133 In addition, the Korea 
Trade Procedure Act requires the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade to establish a Trade 
Advisory Committee within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.134 
Established under the control of the Minster of Strategy and Finance, the Free Trade 
Agreements Domestic Measures Committee (FTADMC) is also designed to obtain public support 
for the conclusion and ratification of FTAs through cooperation between government and civil 
society.135 The FTADMC provides the public with relevant information on the conclusion of FTAs 
and considers opinions from various strata of society, whilst supporting legislative activities 
associated with FTA conclusion, ratification and approval.136 The FTADMC is intended to 
generate a government-civil society partnership and it is therefore composed of both officials and 
civilians (unlike the FTAOC). Additionally, the Committee is co-chaired by the Minister of 
Strategy and Finance together with a civilian member appointed by that Minister.137 Like the 
FTAOC, the FTAMDC can form an advisory committee when deemed necessary.138 It should 
report public opinion on FTAs to the President on a regular basis,139 and can request cooperation 
                                               
128 Kim (n 125) p.165. 
129 ibid. 
130 FTA Directive Article 10. 
131 Korean Trade Procedure Act Article 6(1). 
132 ibid Article 7. 
133 FTA Directive Article 12. 
134 Korean Trade Procedure Act Article 21. 
135 FTADMC Official Website <http://fta.korea.kr/kr/intro/greet/01/> accessed 15 April 2012. 
136 Free Trade Agreements Domestic Measures Committee Decree (FTADMC Decree) Article 2. 
137 ibid Article 3. 
138 ibid Article 6. 
139 ibid Article 7. 
CONTEXTUAL CONTROL OF GIR THROUGH CREATIVE USE OF GIL AND STRUCTURAL COUPLING 
 
193 
from relevant institutions and groups if it is in need of a specialist opinion or relevant information 
from government officials or civil experts.140 
Despite the relatively frequent upgrades in the institutional framework for FTA negotiation, 
the executive branch could still be said to dominate FTA-making. The decision-making structure 
for negotiating and concluding these agreements is vulnerable to inappropriate influences from 
politics and the economy. Although each ministry in the FTAOC is supposed to represent various 
social interests in the treaty-making process, they are homogeneous in the sense that the committee 
is composed solely of internal government officials. Moreover, government officials must generally 
follow the political goals of the governing party or may be ideologically aligned with major 
business actors. Consequently, urgent social needs tend to be distorted by a small number of 
government officials or experts who are inclined to favour certain economic or political interests.  
In response to this deficiency, the newly established Korean Trade Procedure Act prescribes 
that anyone can present opinions concerning a trade treaty or agreement.141 However, it is unclear 
whether the authorities have any binding obligation to consider those opinions because the Act 
allows the government to consider such opinions ‘if the government finds the opinions 
reasonable’.142 As such, the executive branch actually has fundamental discretion over whether or 
not to accept public opinion.  
Of course, this general clause is implemented mainly through several committees whose 
task is to consider the interests of civil society. However, several of these procedures for 
participation are used merely as instruments of support for the government decisions of techno-
bureaucratic elites. Whilst there are a number of committees through which civil experts can 
engage in FTA policy making, there are no clear standards by which such committees can secure 
their independence or autonomy, as their members are appointed by government officials. 
Consequently, the system remains relatively closed to direct input from civil society. Worse, those 
committees which are intended to promote government-civil society partnership do not appear to 
make a substantial contribution to democratic participation. In fact, it is unclear whether such 
committees have any meaningful influence on the FTA decision-making process. For example, the 
opinions of private advisory committees can only have a supportive role in government 
deliberations on FTA negotiations because they have no legally binding force. In addition, it is not 
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clear how the public opinion collected by the FTAMDC can be brought to bear on the decisions of 
government committees like the FTAOC or MMFEA, who take practical charge of FTA matters, in 
any legally binding sense.  
It follows that other relevant actors, such as trade unions or NGOs, take part in decision-
making processes only as subordinate or even tokenistic partners, thus giving the mere appearance 
of democratic participation. Therefore, it is perhaps unsurprising that civil society views the 
numerous government measures designed to increase participation and transparency in decision 
making with extreme cynicism. At the same time, one cannot expect an independent committee to 
have the constitutional authority to bind democratically elected institutions to a given point of view.  
In this context, the participation of the National Assembly as another constitutional organ 
could serve to alleviate the executive branch’s domination of FTA practices. However, despite the 
constitutional function of the legislative branch in formally representing public opinion, the 
National Assembly plays a very limited role in the process of treaty-making. In fact, legislative 
controls are quite often impeded by lack of information and expertise. The legislature has a mere 
symbolic function because it cannot reconsider the substantive details of the treaty after its 
conclusion by plenipotentiaries from both sides of the negotiations. This leads to constitutional 
claims: some critics argue that the executive branch has infringed upon the powers of the legislature 
in  concluding  the  KORUS-FTA  because  it  forged  ahead  unilaterally  with  the  U.S.  FTA  
negotiations, showing reluctance to furnish the Korean public with the relevant information. It is 
said that ‘the administration has monopolized FTA-related information and carried out negotiations 
in a hasty, unfaithful and unilateral manner’.143 Thus, 23 Korean lawmakers raised a constitutional 
claim against the KORUS-FTA based on a lack of transparent disclosure of negotiation information. 
Notably, they criticised the executive branch for monopolising FTA-related information and 
systematically hindering legislative intervention. However, the Korean Constitutional Court 
avoided a substantive review on this point by deciding the case on the basis of a procedural 
requirement for constitutional claims. The Court held that the constitutional power of the National 
Assembly is granted not to individual members of the National Assembly but to the National 
Assembly as an institution. Therefore, the Court argued that individual law-makers as members of 
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the National Assembly have no legitimate standing to raise a constitutional claim of infringement 
upon the constitutional power of the National Assembly.144  
The new Korean Trade Procedure Act seeks to respond to some of the criticisms concerning 
the role of the National Assembly in treaty negotiations. Under the new framework, the government 
should present information about FTA negotiations and their implementation to the National 
Assembly and the public.145 The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade should report plans 
concerning the conclusion of a trade treaty146 and other important issues.147 In addition, the 
National Assembly can ask the executive branch to negotiate and conclude treaties in accordance 
with the Korean Trade Procedure Act in the case that the executive branch refuses to follow the Act 
on the ground that the relevant treaty is not a trade treaty defined under the Act.148 The National 
Assembly also can request the executive branch to submit a bill of approval for a treaty or 
agreement if the National Assembly recognises it as a trade treaty.149 The executive branch cannot 
therefore argue that a relevant agreement does not require legislative approval under Article 60(1) 
of the Korean Constitution as long as the National Assembly defines that agreement as falling 
within the concept of ‘trade treaty’ under Article 2 of the Korean Trade Procedure Act. Furthermore, 
the National Assembly can present its opinions regarding reported FTA issues,150 and can establish 
a special committee to monitor the FTA negotiation process of the executive branch.151 Although 
transparency towards the legislature has increased, the current system invites many questions as to 
whether or how legislative inputs can be influential on the decision making process for FTAs. 
Indeed, no special legislative committee has any formal legal authority to control negotiations 
themselves.152  
As a result, the Korean government should adopt more sophisticated procedural instruments 
to promote participation by social actors. Of course, there is a risk that efficient and strategic 
negotiations between two state parties could be crippled if social activists intentionally abuse the 
value of participation in order to delay the treaty-making process. Moreover, in terms of 
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transparency, it is very difficult for trade policy makers to reveal the details of the negotiation 
process to the public because negotiation strategy needs to some extent to remain confidential from 
the other party; negotiators cannot arrive at a successful agreement without hidden cards. 
Nevertheless, public support is critical to successful negotiations, conclusions and, eventually, the 
stable operation of an FTA, to the extent that its detailed technical contents are anticipated to have a 
significant influence on the national interests and everyday lives of ordinary people. This trend is 
found in a series of recent events associated with Korean trade policy. In 2008, the newly elected 
President’s trade policy was to deregulate imports of U.S. beef, which other countries had barred 
because of mad cow disease. This policy, enacted without the public’s support, provoked a huge 
nationwide protest for several months; the President was forced to apologize for his mistake.153 In 
the end, Korean public pressure made the U.S. administration consider an alternative policy 
regarding beef exports.  
In practice, this mechanism causes a chronic, repeated and similar pattern of problems in 
Korean constitutional practice. Here, the executive branch launches and pushes negotiation 
unilaterally without sufficient participation and disclosure of information. Later, the investment 
treaty catches the public’s attention suddenly – at the eleventh hour of treaty-making – when it is 
discussed in the National Assembly for legislative approval. Lack of participation in the initial 
stages of treaty-making could subject investment treaties with politically controversial countries 
such as the U.S. to greater obstacles regardless of their contents, as illustrated in a comparison 
between the KORUS-FTA and other FTAs.154 Taking the example of the KORUS-FTA, as the 
substantive details of that FTA were revealed to the public, the Korean people realised that they had 
been furnished with insufficient knowledge of the treaty and inadequate opportunities to present 
their own views in the early stages of its formation. Further, KORUS-FTA opposition groups 
attempted to exaggerate the possible risks, whereas the Korean government underplayed these risks. 
Meanwhile, the public became sympathetic to conspiracy theories about the government hiding 
something. This spread very quickly through social networking users, motivated by ideological 
drivers including anti-capitalist and anti-American sentiment.155  
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Although the KORUS-FTA has already been effective, lack of participation can still work 
to unsettle its future operation. As discussed in relation to systems theory, normative expectations 
should be re-adjusted appropriately according to circumstantial changes in order to attract the 
relevant actors for the effectiveness of the GIR; in other words, actors will withdraw commitment 
to the regime if it imposes too severe burden on them without securing their minimum interests.156 
The GIR can maintain its effectiveness when it can facilitate participation mechanisms to change 
normative expectations, namely norms, under a general consensus among the relevant regime 
actors and according to the legitimate procedure. In the context of the KORUS-FTA, if its 
implementation would cause unbearable social problems for the Korean public, its long-term stable 
operation could face public resistance as illustrated by the mad-cow row.157  
Korea needs to establish a more sophisticated constitutional setting encompassing 
democratic control by the legislature and the efficient executive negotiation in treaty-making. Of 
course, it would be impetuous to claim that all critical views concerning FTAs are unfounded. If 
one considers the KORUS-FTA ratification experience, it could nevertheless be said that 
unnecessary and extreme public resistance could be spared in advance by delivering democratic 
participation and transparency to the public. In this context, Korea can enjoy the economic benefits 
of FTAs fully only when they are founded on general public support and cooperation from civil 
society. The Korean government must be able to guarantee the stable operation of FTAs in practice 
to attract more foreign investment and maximise the benefits of these agreements. However 
attractive the terms of an FTA may be, foreign actors would not expand their investment or trade 
into the Korean market if implementation of those terms is unstable. In this context, this thesis 
proposes several policy suggestions in relation to the institutional framework of Korean FTA 
making process:  
Firstly, the National Assembly must incorporate the key negotiation goals for investment 
treaties into the Korean Trade Procedure Act in a similar way to the U.S. Trade Act of 2002. Even 
if this takes a long time, the governing and opposition parties should patiently review and discuss 
every issue that the various social interest groups have raised regarding foreign trade policies, 
because such negotiation goals will ultimately be presumed non-negotiable core national interests.  
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Secondly, the legislature should instruct the executive branch to negotiate in accordance 
with those policy goals. At the same time, it is worth noting that the internal processes of the 
executive branch should not completely neglect the value of participation and openness. At 
minimum, the government needs to introduce measures to secure the autonomy of deliberative 
bodies, such as the private advisory committee or the KTADMC. For example, the civil members 
of the FTAMDC or the private advisory body should be appointed on the basis of a 
recommendation by the relevant civil group. In addition, the FTAMDC should be involved in the 
early stages of launching FTA negotiations by participating in the FTAOC or MMFEA. In order to 
secure substantial influence over decision-making, it is worth considering that the FTA Directive 
requires the approval of the FTADMC and of a private advisory body’s social and economic effect 
study of a prospective FTA before any official announcement of FTA negotiations. Such measures 
could make the normative content of the FTA effectively reflexive to other social contexts before 
the treaty itself is concluded by the dominant political or economic actors.  
In addition, the Korean government needs to establish its own model of investment law, 
which purports to reflect the key negotiation goals. It is highly questionable that the other 
negotiating state party will take a Korean model treaty seriously. However, it also looks unrealistic 
to expect a Korean model BIT to be completely ignored in bilateral negotiations. For instance, the 
Korean government has incorporated several Korean national doctrines into the indirect 
expropriation provisions of the KORSU-FTA, in spite its unequal bargaining power vis-a-vis the 
U.S. Given this experience, the establishment of a Korean Model BIT could mitigate the dominant 
position of the model investment treaty of stronger countries, so as to create a global momentum 
towards a fairer model investment treaty. At minimum, it could enhance the chance to update the 
Model BIT of stronger countries in a different way from what such countries intended.158  
Thirdly, the legislature must mainly review whether the executive branch has reflected the 
negotiation goals sufficiently and reasonably in the investment treaty before approving the treaty. 
Although party politics cannot eradicate all risk of political turmoil between the governing party 
and the opposition party concerning legislative approval of a treaty, unnecessary and destructive 
political quarrel would be saved to the extent that a general consensus is reached in advance.  
Lastly, Korea should take steps to establish a structural mechanism to oversee the 
implementation of the investment treaty, in order to reduce the risk of instability in implementation. 
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Such a mechanism would aid both parties to circumvent and remedy any potential problems before 
they become too serious. Korea’s establishment of a new institutional framework to oversee the 
implementation of the Korea-EU FTA is a positive step. Indeed, the Korean Trade Procedure Act 
requires the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade to assess the implementation of any FTA that 
came into effect within the last 10 years.159 The Minister should assess the following: the economic 
effects of the trade agreement; the feasibility and reform of domestic measures to support 
vulnerable industries; issues discussed in the joint committee for the FTA; and any other issues that 
the Minister deems necessary.160 In addition, Article 17 of the Korean Trade Procedure Act 
requires the government to take appropriate measures, including re-negotiation, where the 
implementation of  a  treaty causes unrecoverable domestic  harm in relation to a  specific  item for  
trading. 
Nevertheless, it remains unclear how Korean civil society or the legislature could be 
involved in this process because the government has not yet provided any clear procedures for 
conducting the implementation assessment. Indeed, the executive branch has discretion over how to 
shape the future institutional design of the oversight of FTA implementation by virtue of Article 
15(3) of the Korean Trade Procedure Act, which allows it to prescribe specific procedural rules 
through a presidential decree, rather than legislative enactment. Moreover, the Korean Trade 
Procedure Act fails to address whether and how civil society or the legislature can push the 
executive branch to propose a re-negotiation of an FTA.  
It is suggested that an institutional mechanism for FTA practice should allow civil society 
and the legislature to participate in any implementation assessment. Further, Korean civil society 
should be allowed to effectively recommend that the executive branch initiate discussion about 
serious problems in the KORUS-FTA Joint Committee if the assessment discovers serious 
problems concerning its implementation. In this regard, the Korea-EU FTA suggests an impressive 
example for participation; Article 15.1.4 of the Korea-EU FTA states that the Trade Committee – 
which is similar to the KORUS-FTA Joint Committee – can ‘communicate with all interested 
parties including private sector and civil society organisations’. A specific model of participation in 
the Trade Committee can be developed at the bilateral level between the two contracting parties.161 
At the same time, the Korean government can and should take seriously the creation of an 
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institutional link between an international organisation, such as the KORUS-FTA Joint Committee, 
and national procedure that promotes participation in the KORUS-FTA Joint Committee at the 
national level. 
B. Protection of the autopoietic operation of investment arbitration 
The nation-state should protect the autopoietic operations of independent dispute settlement 
from the inappropriate influences of global actors, including the nation-state itself. The 
independence of the arbitrator and arbitration system is very controversial, although several recent 
empirical studies have not produced any meaningful data to show a bias in investment 
arbitration.162 Some commentators have pointed out that these empirical researches need to be 
refined further.163 Moreover, they point out numerous circumstantial evidence to show arbitrator 
bias. For example, at a conference David Schneiderman disclosed that the arbitrator was under 
political  pressure  from the  United  States  in  the  Loewen case,  where  the  U.S.  government  was  a  
respondent state.164 It might not be unreasonable to cast doubt on the independence of the Loewen 
tribunal in the sense that the final decision was made in favour of the U.S. government, although 
there is no obvious evidence indicating that the political pressure alluded to really worked. At the 
same time, it is still true that the overall culture of the professional group is influenced more directly 
by the market power of global investors as real customers and the political hegemony of strong 
developed countries as global standard setters, than by the civil society – although more profound 
sociological and empirical research is required.165  
Regarding the impartiality of investment arbitration, legal scholarship has not yet proposed 
plausible solutions to safeguard the judicial independence of investment arbitrators. Whilst this 
thesis demonstrates that sensitivity to reputation can control the behaviour of individual 
arbitrators,166 given that investment remains dominated by western-oriented, investor-friendly legal 
cultures, it seems doubtful that the independence of global investment arbitration will be secured by 
the innate dynamic of reputation damages alone.167 Harten therefore argues that the investment 
arbitration system needs to borrow elements from the public court system in relation to appointment 
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processes, such as security of tenure.168 However, such public law analogies may serve as an 
institutional shield to protect biased arbitrators from public criticism, as sensitivity to reputational 
damage in this field is less acute. Consequently, this thesis admits that the independence issue has 
yet to be discussed further in light of more compelling social and empirical evidence in this regard.  
This thesis therefore simply proposes several minimum conditions for protecting the 
autopoietic operation of the investment arbitration system. Those proposals aim to create a context 
in which arbitration can secure its independence by exposing itself equally to other social influences 
whilst protecting itself from inappropriate influences. Here, the nation-state should pay attention to 
designing procedural contexts, rather than controlling substantive decisions directly. Of course, 
meeting those conditions might not solve all the problems of GIL. However, any ambitious 
investor-state arbitration reform may not maximise the benefits of contextual control through 
structural coupling without meeting those conditions. In this regard, the thesis argues that the 
KORUS-FTA requires further improvement in favour of structural coupling.  
i) Participation of a non-disputing third party 
Amicus Curiae or the participation of non-disputing parties in arbitration proceedings could 
promote the internal dynamic for autonomy of arbitration through the creative use of anxiety 
relevant to reputational damages. The sensitivity of arbitrators and arbitration as whole to 
reputational damage and legitimacy crisis is proportionate to the degree of structural coupling. In 
other words, the capacity to secure independence through an autopoietic network of legal decisions 
depends on the extent to which the system is simultaneously and commensurately open to extra-
legal influences. Nevertheless, the political influences of nation-states and the economic power of 
global investors are relatively huge because on one hand, nation-states retain the formal capacity to 
change the system itself,169 and on the other hand, global investors are customers with the right to 
use arbitration services.170 When compared to this, it is hard to deny that the influence of social 
movements remains relatively less formal and less significant, although some practitioners 
recognise the emerging power of public scrutiny exercised by a critical civil society and 
academia.171 In this context, the participation of a non-disputing third party, such as civil groups, 
serves as a more significant and formal tool for a social movement to imbue the arbitration with 
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various social values. This mechanism is gaining significance in securing the independence of GIL 
practices.172 In practice, some tribunals, even without any clear provision for amicus curiae, accept 
amicus submissions from non-government organisations or municipal authorities,173 as illustrated 
by the Methanex174 and UPS cases.175 In the Methanex case,176 the tribunal justified its discretion 
to consider amicus briefs on the ground that Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
(revised as Article 17(1) in 2010) allows the tribunal to ‘conduct the arbitration in such manner as it 
considers appropriate’.177 Finally, in 2003, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued a statement 
recommending ‘non-disputing party participation’ in the Chapter 11 arbitration proceedings.178 In 
light of the ICSID system, the ICSID tribunal upheld the consideration of amicus curiae with 
similar reasoning to the Methanex and UPS cases on the basis of the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules.179 This strand of practices had some influence on the amendment of ICSID Arbitration Rule 
37(2) and the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, Article 28(3) in allowing amicus curiae. Through such 
admissibility, the decision-making process in producing legal rules can be sensitive to other social 
values than political or economic values under the public interest. In this vein, the Methanex 
tribunal recognised the public character of the dispute on the ground, not of its relation to the state, 
but of the fact that its subject-matter was closely related to the general public.180 This will enhance 
the independence, and eventually legitimacy, of the arbitration system from the corruption or bias 
that makes the entire system less attractive to GIR members. 
                                               
172 See generally James Harrison, ‘Recent Developments to Promote Transparency and Public Participation in 
Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2010) L’Observateur des Nations Unies pp.131-37. 
173 Steve Charnovitz, ‘Nongovernmental Organizations and International Law’ (2006) 100(2) The American 
Journal of International Law pp.353-54. 
174 Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Decision of the Tribunal on 
Petitions from Third Persons to Intervene as “Amici Curiae”, 15 January 2001. See also Suez, Sociedad 
General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A v. Argentine Republic, ICSID No. ARB/03/19, 
Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 19 May 2005.  
175 United Parcel Service of America Inc.(UPS) v. Government of Canada, UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Decision 
of the Tribunal on Petitions for intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae, 17 October 2001. 
176 See generally Patrick Dumberry, ‘The Admissibility of Amicus Curiae Briefs by NGOs in Investors-States 
Arbitration: The Precedent Set by the Methanex Case in the Context of NAFTA Chapter 11 proceedings’ 
(2001) 1(3) Non-State Actors and International Law; Howard Mann, ‘Opening the Doors, At least a Little: 
Comment on the Amicus Decision in Methanex v. United States’ (2001) 10(2) Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law. 
177 Methanex v. United States of America (n 174) paras.24-31. 
178 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, ‘Statement of the Free Trade Commission on Non-disputing Party 
Participation’ (2003) <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Nondisputing-en.pdf> accessed 15 April 2012. 
179 Suez v. Argentine Republic (n 174). 
180 Methanex v. United States of America (n 174) para.49. 
CONTEXTUAL CONTROL OF GIR THROUGH CREATIVE USE OF GIL AND STRUCTURAL COUPLING 
 
203 
Korea and the U.S. have agreed to allow the participation of non-disputing parties in 
proceedings by adjusting the 2004 U.S. Model BIT.181 Thus, Article 11.20.4 of the KORUS-FTA 
allows non-disputing parties to make ‘oral and written submissions to the tribunal regarding the 
interpretation’ of the KORUS-FTA. The Agreement enumerates several conditions which the 
tribunal should consider in deciding whether or not to accept a written submission from non-
disputing parties. The KORUS-FTA prescribes the forms of the submission so as to allow only 
‘oral and written submission’182 by contrast to the 2004 U.S. Model BIT, which does not specify 
the form of submission in particular. Moreover, the submission should ‘assist the tribunal in the 
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceedings by bringing a perspective, 
particular knowledge, or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties’.183 In addition, 
the submission by the non-disputing parties should deal with ‘a matter within the scope of the 
dispute’184 and be concerned with ‘a significant interest in the proceedings’.185 Notably, the 
KORUS-FTA clearly prescribes that participation by non-disputing parties shall not cause 
disruptions in the proceedings, nor any undue burden or unfair prejudice towards any disputing 
party. Moreover, the Agreement allows the disputing parties to present their own opinions 
regarding participation of non-disputing parties.186 
Despite this important development, there is no clear rule for permitting the participation of 
non-disputing parties in proceedings. This does not mean that the tribunal’s discretion to allow or 
reject the participation of non-disputing parties is unlimited. There are several commonalities that 
the investment tribunal shares in determining whether a non-disputing party is allowed to 
participate in proceedings.187 Thus it is difficult for a tribunal to reject the participation of a non-
disputing party as long as the petitioner can prove that his or her submission meets the following 
conditions. Firstly, the submission of amicus curiae should be related to the public interest; the 
Methanex tribunal recognised the public character of the dispute on the grounds not of its state-
relation but of the fact that its subject-matter was closely related to the general public.188 Thereafter, 
the UPS arbitration under NAFTA’s Chapter 11 followed the reasoning of the Methanex decision 
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on third party participation.189  Through such admissibility, the decision-making process for 
producing legal norms can be sensitive to other social values under the public interest. Secondly, 
the submission of amicus curiae is allowed when the tribunal admits that the submission can bring 
‘expertise, experience, and independence’190 in the context of ‘a perspective, particular knowledge, 
or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties’.191 Lastly, the submission should be 
clearly ‘within the scope of the dispute’192, because the non-disputing party in the investment 
arbitration should serve as a faithful supporter of the tribunal’s decision-making.193  
Nevertheless, the current system needs to go a step further in order to encourage the genuine 
function of participation of non-disputing parties. Future tribunals under the KORUS-FTA could 
impose some limits on the role of non-disputing parties.194 In fact, investment arbitration does not 
require the attendance of non-disputing parties at the hearing. Moreover, the arbitrator can reject a 
request for the non-disputing party to attend the hearing, though the tribunal is not prevented from 
consulting the petitioner in relation to their written submission.195 From this perspective, the 
KORUS-FTA should secure a right for non-disputing parties to participate in oral proceedings 
because greater engagement in these proceedings can encourage non-disputing parties to take a 
more active role, subjecting the tribunal to a greater diversity of views than just ‘a one-off 
submission’.196 
ii) Publication system 
The Korean government should establish a publication system in which arbitration 
decisions are fairly and fully published as long as the case is associated with the public interest and 
publication is not severely contrary to the interests of the disputing parties. This should promote the 
autopoietic operation of the arbitration system. The issue is usually discussed in terms of the 
transparency principle.197 In international commercial arbitration, the confidentiality of arbitration 
procedures is one of the practical reasons for private business actors to decide to choose informal 
private arbitration. Generally speaking, disputants prefer to have their cases heard in private for 
practical reasons; for example, their business reputations might be damaged if information about 
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the case were exposed to the public.198 This confidentiality principle in international commercial 
arbitration has been adopted by investor-state arbitration in a bid to attract foreign investors. 
However, many critical commentators have argued that confidentiality in investor-arbitration leaves 
important public policy issues to a handful of investment practitioners.199 They argue that public 
proceedings or access to the case information can indirectly place tribunals under public scrutiny. 
Transparency could render investment tribunals more impartial by increasing sensitivity of 
reputational damage to a greater variety of social contexts. In addition, some commentators point 
out that transparency could increase the legitimacy of individual arbitration decisions and of GIL as 
a whole.200  Against this backdrop, many arbitration rules and investment treaties have set 
minimum conditions for publicity and access to information.201  
From a systems theory perspective, transparency could be interpreted as an important factor 
in securing the autopoietic operation of arbitration. Furthermore, it does not collide with the long-
term interests of global investors. One might argue that GIL could actually be derailed because 
foreign investors would not prefer a system where all information from proceedings is revealed to 
the public. However, such transparency is not necessarily against the interests of foreign investors 
because the publication of decisions makes arbitration outcomes more consistent and predictable. 
As discussed above, GIL functions according to the mechanisms of remembering and forgetting.202 
Communicative linkages based on the logic of remembering and forgetting can occur when 
previous communication is accessible to future communication.203 In other words, precedents must 
be available to communicative legal actors who raise normative claims. Therefore, every decision 
could become involved in the production of norms through the forgetting and remembering 
mechanism as soon as it is published.204  
Taking the example of GIL, a tribunal can decide a present case by considering the legal 
points and reasoning of previous decisions. Through this process, global investment arbitration can 
produce more predictable and consistent rules by relying on the accumulation of cases. In this 
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process, some decisions are followed if arbitrators find them convincing. Others are rejected if 
arbitrators consider them unpersuasive. The minimum condition to making such operations 
workable is that the system makes the body of cases available to future arbitrators. Indeed, some 
arbitration decisions are unofficially published through academic journals such as International 
Legal Materials or internet databases such as Investment Treaty Arbitration.205 However, such an 
unofficial publication system does not provide all decisions, because editors tend to choose 
decisions that they consider significant, or because the editors are not legally qualified to collect all 
the relevant information from disputing parties. On the other hand, an internet database, compared 
to a public court system, is not centralised and organised enough to be accessible to all decisions. 
Such biased or incomplete information about decisions can deter a future tribunal from comparing 
legal  arguments  from  similar  cases  fairly  in  the  course  of  the  forgetting  and  remembering  
mechanism.  
In this context, arbitration decisions, or the key legal reasoning behind them, should be 
accessible through a formal publication system, even if some of the information about proceedings 
is withheld from the public because of significant public interest factors, such as national security, 
or due to intolerable harm to business. In actuality, the KORUS-FTA requires respondents to make 
relevant information promptly available to the public.206 In addition, the tribunal is required to 
make ‘hearings open to the public’ in accordance with ‘the appropriate logistical arrangements’.207 
On the other hand, KORUS-FTA prescribes the measures and procedures required to protect 
information from the public or from other third parties. For example, a respondent state does not 
need to provide information related to the ‘Essential Security’ under Article 23.2208 and the 
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‘Disclosure of Information’ under Article 23.4.209 In addition, Article 11.21.4 of the KORUS-FTA 
protects from public disclosure ‘protected information’ defined as ‘confidential business 
information or information that is privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure under a Party’s 
law’.210 Here, the tribunal has the authority to decide whether information should be considered as 
‘protected’. Moreover, a disputing party can request the Joint Committee to consider issuing a 
decision which determines the protected information.211  
From the systems theory perspective, the KORUS-FTA’s transparency provisions seem to 
balance transparency with confidentiality. At the very least, the relevant provisions of Article 11.21 
meet the minimum condition of the publication system because the ‘orders, awards, and decisions 
of the tribunal’ are principally available to the public, with some exceptions. Additionally, the 
Korean government should publish legal reasoning and excerpts in a similar way to that prescribed 
by ICSID Arbitration Rule 48(4).212 The Korean government therefore needs to promptly publish 
decisions and make them available to the public and especially to other arbitrators through a 
website or government official gazette, as done in the national public court system, by NAFTA 
state parties and on the ICSID website.213  
iii) Engagement in the interpretation of arbitration 
Although the nation-state cannot influence investment arbitration directly, it can develop 
many instruments to guide the tribunal in interpretation of the treaty text indirectly.214 The clearest 
engagement can be made through participation in the norm-making process. As seen in the new 
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drafting of indirect expropriation provisions in the KORUS-FTA, a negotiating state can agree to 
reduce the interpretative discretion of a tribunal by employing more precise language and detailed 
guidelines for treaty interpretation or by adding formal side agreements (e.g. the side agreements to 
the NAFTA) or informal side-instruments such as the exchange letters at the time of conclusion.215 
In addition, a nation-state could unilaterally provide purely national sources (e.g. statements or 
documents relative to the nation-state’s interpretation of the treaty) to supplement tribunal 
deliberations, in the light of VCLT.216 
Additionally, Korea and the U.S. under the KORUS-FTA can use, for involvement in treaty 
interpretation, the KORUS-FTA Joint Committee which can issue opinions to bind an arbitrator’s 
interpretation of the treaty text.217 Article 22.2.3(d) allows the Joint Committee to issue opinions 
which bind the tribunal’s interpretations according to Article 11.22.3 and Article 11.23.2. From a 
systems theory perspective, the Joint Committee could act as an emergency brake in a case where 
the tribunal did not appropriately consider national or public interests in the course of applying the 
law to the case.  
However, the consistency produced by an investment arbitration mechanism could be 
undermined if the Committee were to produce de facto amendments under the guise of 
interpretation. Indeed, some tribunals have raised questions about whether the opinion of an FTA 
special committee is just an interpretation or a disguised amendment.218 Those tribunals eventually 
recognised the binding effect of the committee’s opinion,219 though they remained silent on the 
nature of the ‘interpretation’ by the special committee.220 Even if the opinion expressed by the 
Committee cannot influence current or past arbitration decisions, it could deter future arbitration 
from referring to previous decisions in terms of the autopoietic networking of investment 
arbitrations. The nation-state needs to take a very careful approach to engaging in interpreting treaty 
in order to protect the autopoietic networking of GIL. Of course, it would be absurd to claim that 
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any engagement with tribunal interpretation is undesirable,221 because such tools can persuade 
nation-states and other global actors to stay with the GIR by providing opportunities to readjust 
unreasonable tribunal interpretations. 222  Nevertheless, this does not mean that any such 
engagement should be permitted; 223  if such activities change originally agreed normative 
expectations in an unacceptable way, the system as a whole looks less reliable to GIR members, 
especially global investors. 
Given this, the involvement of states in interpretation should be made on reasonable and 
persuasive grounds founded on a general consensus among the relevant actors; for example, even if 
the issuing of the Committee’s opinions cannot be considered to be a treaty amendment, the 
relevant procedures need to be carefully structured in a way that makes them more similar to 
amendment procedures. This is because it is possible for the committee to issue an opinion which 
has an effect similar to amendment, namely to change normative expectations. In this context, the 
issuance of opinions needs the participation of the relevant GIR member because the Committee’s 
opinion is associated with changes in normative expectations which reflect wider social interests. 
Additionally, the negotiation process should not be unilaterally dominated by the executive branch. 
Therefore, the Korean government needs to establish a special committee which consists of 
members of the three branches and has the discretion to initiate discussion. While the legislature 
can consider civil society and business group opinions, the judicial branch should review legal 
issues of treaty interpretation in accordance with Korean national law. The National Assembly, 
based on a report of the special committee, then needs to establish the broad agenda and relevant 
principles. The Minister can then negotiate with the U.S government according to this agenda and 
these principles and conclude a deal with the other state party on condition of legislative approval. 
In addition to affairs concerning the KORUS-FTA Joint Committee, this special committee needs 
to provide advisory opinions when the executive branch prepares to use unilateral instruments (e.g. 
provision of a national statement or report concerning treaty interpretation).  
iv) Establishment of an appellate body 
The nation-state needs to be attentive in establishing an appeals mechanism which would 
supervise the operations of individual arbitration decisions in favour of doctrinal coherence against 
unjustifiable extra-legal influences. Many investment policy makers in nation-states seem to share 
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the sentiment of the necessity to establish such an appeals mechanism.224 Notably, the U.S. Trade 
Act of 2002 defines, as one of the negotiating objectives of U.S. free trade agreements, that of 
‘providing for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to the interpretations 
of investment provisions in trade agreements’.225 This policy goal influenced the KORUS-FTA 
negotiations to the extent that Annex 11-D of the current KORUS-FTA prescribes that  
[w]ithin three years after the date this Agreement enters into force, the Parties shall 
consider whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to review 
awards rendered under Article 11.26 in arbitration commenced after they establish the 
appellate body or similar mechanism.226  
At the multinational level, the ICSID has echoed this trend by initiating discussion of an 
appeals facility, which operates under ICSID’s auspices.227  
On the other hand, some investment legal practitioners are sceptical about this project 
because of its practical problems.228 They  argue  that  it  may  be  unrealistic  to  believe  that  the  
establishment of an appeals mechanism will be a panacea for all of the problems in current GIL. An 
appellate body for investment disputes could cause more problems than it solves if it acts as a sort 
of investment constitutional court, vulnerable to a one-sided extra-legal thrust but not reflexive to 
other social values;229 Given the legal environment of the current global investment field, it is very 
difficult for an appellate body to discern consistent and coherent general rules of legal interpretation 
because each arbitration tribunal interprets a treaty text according to slightly different contexts or 
facts, even if those texts are similar to each other.230 Additionally, the system of investor-state 
arbitrations has not accumulated enough cases to produce consistent doctrinal rules, and the current 
state of GIL development has no urgent need for such air-tight consistency and coherence of 
jurisprudence, given that such concerns have been raised only in a few high profile cases.231  
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The plausibility of the establishment of an appeals mechanism depends on the future 
development of GIL. Despite its pluralist setting, the terms and doctrines of GIL are, remarkably, 
standardised232 enough  to  broach  a  unified  multilateral  investment  treaty  such  as  a  MAI.  As  the  
GIR itself becomes more complicated and unpredictable, the current reputation-driven mechanism 
cannot satisfy the necessity for more predictable and consistent interpretative rules concerning the 
standardised terms of individual investment treaties. Although some degree of inconsistency found 
in  judicial  decisions  is  normal  in  any  legal  system,  it  is  fair  to  say  that  the  current  degree  of  
inconsistency found in investment arbitration decisions too often goes beyond an acceptable line. 
Thus, unpredictability caused by inconsistent decision making in investment arbitration is said to 
trigger nation-states to engage in more active involvement in treaty interpretation, or even treaty 
termination;233  some commentators point out that investment tribunals have suffered from 
interpretive inconsistency even in relation to the same clause of the same treaty.234 
Moreover, it is an exaggeration to claim that an appellate body would obtain an unchecked 
judicial power if one considers constitutional dualism, i.e. legal periphery and centre. Such a 
judicial body (legal centre) will have a tensional relationship with GIR members, just like the 
dynamic between the national constitutional court and the people. Indeed, that appellate judicial 
body – just like other ordinary investment arbitration bodies and national courts – could be subject 
to public scrutiny. Further, regime members can change the rules of the game by amending norms 
if the decisions produced by the judicial body were unreasonably favourable to a particular social 
need.  
Nevertheless, this issue seems to be open to future discussion in the context of establishing a 
global investment appeals mechanism, including reforms to the ICISD Convention. Practically 
speaking, a difficult question might be raised in relation to the ICSID Convention (to which Korea 
and  the  U.S.  are  both  parties)  in  the  context  of  the  KORUS-FTA.  Article  53  of  the  ICSID  
Convention principally denies the possibility for engaging other appellate procedures once an 
award is rendered by the ICSID tribunal. A commentator argues that even if Korea and the U.S. 
agree to establish an appellate court to review individual arbitration decisions, it may be doubtful 
that such an appellate court could consider decisions awarded by ICSID tribunals.235  
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However, if Korea and the U.S. agree to amend the treaty or establish an additional protocol 
or a separate agreement to the ICSID Convention in the effect to establish an appellate 
mechanism,236 it may be possible to circumvent Article 53 on the basis of an inter-se modification 
of the multilateral treaty specific to Korea and the U.S., under Article 41 of the VCLT.237  
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the establishment of an appellate body within the 
KORUS-FTA system alone will bring about desirable results for both countries and for the 
operation of GIL as a whole. Tams argues that the appellate body should be designed to be one 
single standing body with the comprehensive competence to hear appeals proposed in all 
investment disputes in order to cope with the inconsistency problem.238 For example, if the party 
can appeal to different appellate bodies according to different treaties, some degree of consistency 
might be secured within the jurisdiction of a specific treaty. However, it is still doubtful whether the 
inconsistency problem could be cured at the level of whole international investment law as a 
different appellate bodies could produce different rules; for instance, a decision of NAFTA 
appellate body would collide with a decision of KORUS-FTA appellate body if Korean and 
Mexican investors would raise claims on the same U.S. regulation according to different treaties.239 
Secondly, the appellate body should be designed to have more competence to hear as many cases as 
possible in order to maximise the opportunities for the appellate body to create doctrinal 
consistency by influencing future investment awards.240 Lastly, the appeals system for investment 
arbitration requires the establishment of a standing body comprising a small number of arbitrators 
in order to increase institutional consistency in deciding investment disputes.241  
As a result, an appeals mechanism could not achieve its intended goals without a grand 
project such as an ‘international investment court’242 or a ‘supreme investment court’243 in 
addition to the amendment of the ICSID Convention. No steps could be taken without political 
consensus motivated by the nation-state and the public opinion of global investors and civil 
society. 244  In particular, proponents for the appeals mechanism need to propose practical 
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alternatives to appease the worries of small investors or countries who anticipate that the appeals 
mechanism carries the risk of increasing the burdens of time and financial cost in resolution of 
investment disputes.245 To summarise, it is practically impossible for unilateral or bilateral actions 
of Korea or the U.S. within the KORUS-FTA alone to bring about the desirable effects in the light 
of the autopoietic operation of the whole GIL.  
V. CONCLUSION 
As has been discussed above, indirect expropriation concerns could be considered to 
involve a conflict between the political rationality of the nation-state and the economic rationality of 
the global investor. The GIL transforms these bare social conflicts into legal conflicts among 
colliding interpretations of the same legal text. Host states attempt to interpret legal texts in favour 
of more regulatory power for the government, whereas foreign investors try to nullify such 
arguments by relying on the investment protection provisions.  
Here, systems theory proposes contextual control by relying on legal autonomy to adjust 
various sub-social systems, including the nation-state. In contrast to the traditional welfare-state 
model, contextual control asks nation-states to intentionally stay away from the autonomous 
operations of the legal system. Therefore, nation-states refrain from dominating the production of 
the detailed substantive normative contents of indirect expropriation. Instead, they can participate as 
one of the global actors in the norm-making process in order to secure national regulatory power. 
On the other hand, nation-states consent to have recourse to independent dispute settlement, namely 
to investor-state arbitration, when a legal conflict between the host state and a foreign investor is 
raised regarding the interpretation of the substantive norms, such as indirect expropriation 
provisions. This tribunal is established independently but it is obliged to produce a balanced 
doctrine which proportionally adjusts various social interests, including national power. Although 
contextual control looks similar in appearance to the neo-liberal approach, the nation-state does not 
entirely lose its control over the global investment field because they can secure predictability in 
preventing the worst-case scenario.  
Of course, the effective operation of this system requires GIL to maintain its dynamic 
autonomy through partial autopoiesis. In fact, GIL cannot be perfectly independent from the nation-
                                               




states because nation-states have the most significant formal role in establishing treaties. At the 
same time, the legal system is also partially autonomous from many other sub-systems, which 
compete in using the legal system in favour of their own interests. Through this mechanism, the 
legal system can maintain a dynamic autonomy among competing social values by making 
simultaneous and equal contacts with sub-systems. In the language of systems theory, legal systems 
should form structural couplings with other social systems. Consequently, the concept of global law 
could be considered as ‘reflexive transnational law’,246 namely the global application of ‘reflexive 
law’ in the sense that contextual control guides the legal system to ‘conform to the conditions of the 
structural coupling’.247  
In this context, the lessons of the system theoretic understanding of the constitution could 
help us to assess whether or to what extent GIL can make a sound structural coupling with other 
sub-societies. Of course, it might look doubtful that a global constitution is emerging in the global 
investment field. Nevertheless, the concept of such a constitution could at least be applicable to an 
analysis of the structural coupling between the legal system and other globalised sub-societies as 
long as the national constitution is considered to be one of the most representative examples of the 
structural coupling between the law and other sub-societies. According to this analogical analysis of 
national constitutionalism, this thesis has discovered several features of constitutionalism in global 
investment. It has also shown that, even if this analysis has demonstrated some degree of structural 
coupling between GIL and other sub-societies, that structural coupling is not fully developed. 
Eventually, the half-baked establishment of this structural coupling will threaten the dynamic 
autonomy of GIL itself by exposing GIL as a whole to inappropriate influences from other strong 
sub-societies such as the economic system. In order to correct such flaws, the Korean government 
needs to employ two general strategies in the context of the KORUS-FTA: it must protect the 
autopoietic operations of arbitrations in the organised sector and enhance the democratic 
participation of various social actors in the spontaneous sector. 
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I. THESIS SUMMARY  
This thesis, so far, has discussed how the Korean government can control the global 
investment field. Within this topic, the thesis particularly analysed the global challenges and 
opportunities which are associated with the indirect expropriation doctrine under the investor-state 
arbitration of the KORUS-FTA.  
Although there is no concrete definition of indirect expropriation, it is generally considered 
as a governmental action that has a similar effect to physical and direct expropriation without 
transfer of property. Initially, the doctrine of indirect expropriation was developed in the course of 
protecting foreign investment from arbitrary governmental measures. However, many critics argue 
that foreign investors have often abused this doctrine in order to attack various government actions 
which protect the national public interest. In response to such criticism, the drafters of KORUS-
FTA have agreed to narrow the scope of the indirect expropriation doctrine by echoing Korean and 
U.S. property law and by accepting the recent development of the indirect expropriation doctrine. 
Therefore, a future tribunal under the KORUS-FTA is expected to employ a proportionality test 
which will compare the private and the public interest in reviewing the indirect expropriation claim. 
In this context, Chapter III argues that it is an overstatement to claim that the indirect expropriation 
doctrine of the KORUS-FTA is completely different from the Korean constitutional doctrine of 
property rights in its substantive aspects.  
However, this thesis also contests the Korean government’s assertion that the indirect 
expropriation provision does not challenge the Korean government’s actions under any 
circumstances. The reason is that the Korean government delegates the traditional sovereign power 
of conflict resolution to the global system of investor-state arbitration. The investor-state arbitration 




investor argues that the host state has breached its treaty obligations. Here, the tribunal operates 
autonomously, outside the national control, even if the arbitration is established by the consent of 
the nation-state. To be more specific, the tribunal under the investor-state arbitration interprets the 
substantive norms according to its own rules without any direct reference to national laws. This 
independent rule of interpretation is developed through the accumulation of other previous 
arbitration decisions. As a result, the possible tribunal established under the KORUS-FTA reviews 
the constitutionally justifiable government actions according to the transnational rules of the GIL. 
The nation-state would face a heavy amount of liability if the tribunal upheld the illegality of the 
government action because the relevant cases are usually associated with long-term and huge 
projects or with significant public interests. In short, the Korean government is expected to face a 
risk that investment arbitration could curb their public projects according to the transnational rule 
by delegating the conflict resolution power to another transnational institution.  
This analysis leads to another profound question: why does the nation-state voluntarily 
assumes such a risk by relying on the GIL, rather than using its own national system? This question 
cannot be answered without a theoretical framework to account for both the substantive and the 
procedural aspects of global investment mechanism.  
Chapter IV employs systems theory to examine the nature of the GIL that is emerging in the 
globalised investment field. According to systems theory, the global actors, in the functionally 
differentiated world, compete in order to represent their own sub-systems. At the same time, those 
global actors cooperate in establishing a regime in order to prevent overly severe competition or 
mutual ignorance from destroying the entire world. In this world, the nation-state has lost its 
supreme authority to control the global regime; its role is limited in the presentation of the political 
system as just one of numerous sub-systems. Meanwhile, the legal system evolves gradually into a 
global legal system, and the classic tie between the nation-state and the legal system becomes 
weaker. The global law, as one of the autopoietic social systems, takes up a special task in dealing 
with social conflicts within the global regime; the regime participants are persuaded by the specific 
legal function to stabilise their normative expectations. This function of law makes the global 
regime more durable in the long-run against short-term challenges.  
The regime actors can avoid the risk of direct social conflict by relying on the global legal 
system. This function works under two structural elements of global law: the participation 
mechanism and the independent dispute settlement. The participation mechanism of the legal 
system allows the regime members to produce a normative expectation as a compromise among the 




intervening directly in each other’s matter. Next, the legal system allows one actor to challenge the 
other actors not with hostile reactions but with the independent dispute settlement, when the others 
betray normative expectations. The structural mechanism of the global law attracts the regime 
participants to stay within the regime by promising the longer-term benefits of legal consistency or 
predictability concerning the originally agreed-upon normative expectations.  
Ultimately, Chapter IV demonstrates that the GIR is emerging by applying the systems 
theoretic framework to the global investment field. The GIR is formed by the relevant global actors 
(e.g. nation-states, global investors and social activists) who cooperate and compete over a common 
issue (i.e., the balance between the restrictions and the protections of global investments). Although 
all relevant actors operate according to their different rationalities, their operations stipulate the 
operations of others; for example, investment cannot operate efficiently without the tactic or 
affirmative regulatory supports of the host state, and many nation-states do not seem to find any 
engine to boost the national economy without the attraction of global investment. Meanwhile, two 
actors are often involved in conflict in regards to regulatory power and property protection; 
investors want to prevent the host state from interfering with their business activities; the host state 
wants to prevent the abusive power of investors from causing public concerns over financial crises, 
environmental pollution or other issues. Such conflicts carry the risk of total paralysis of the entire 
global investment field, in which anyone cannot put down other actors permanently under its own 
rationality. In order to avoid such disastrous results, global actors gradually form a common ground, 
the GIR, in which they compete or cooperate based on some degree of expectation for their own 
interests (e.g. property protection, political controllability or social justice).  
As the GIR become more fragile with increased regime complexity, the GIR requires the 
function of GIL to stabilise normative expectations, by setting up two elements of global law: 
openness of participation mechanism and autopoietic structuralisation and operations of dispute 
settlement. If one applies this framework to the issues relative to the indirect expropriation, the 
doctrine of indirect expropriation is established as a norm through the participation mechanism (e.g. 
treaty-making or policy proposals from various interests groups) of GIR members. This 
participation mechanism makes the normative expectations of the indirect expropriation doctrine 
reflective to various values of the nation-state, investors and other social actors. In spite of some 
degree of dissatisfaction, the stakeholders of the GIR might settle for the predictability expectations 
because the interpretation of the indirect expropriation clauses allows the GIR members to expect 
what actions will be clearly allowed or prevented in the future. Although the GIR members can 




withdrawal of the normative expectation; the members can stick to the initially agreed norms by 
challenging the legality of interpretation in the independent dispute settlement. 
This issue involves the following questions: Should we promote the evolution of the GIL? If 
so, what direction can the nation-state and the other regime members take to expand the relevant 
opportunities and to reduce the possible risks?  
In order to address those issues, the Chapter V starts by analysing the current status of 
nation-state in the global investment regime. The current nation-state, as one of the GIR members, 
is required to control the uncontrollable GIR. Actually, the nation-state should attempt to get 
political advantage from global investment so as to gain public support. In this connection, the 
nation-state is required to deal with two demands: i) the nation-state should attract global 
investment within its own territories by promising the protection of foreign investment; and ii) the 
nation-state is required to control the global investment field in order to prevent global investment 
from inflicting unacceptable harm on the political system. However, the problem arises because the 
globalised investment field does not always follow the political intentions of the nation-states; too 
many functionally differentiated sub-societies are competing to control the GIR as the actors of the 
sub-societies operate autopoietically by ignoring or circumventing political control.  
In dealing with those tasks, three choices are available to the nation-states: i) the nation-
states can employ stronger control over the global investment field in accordance with the public or 
national  interests  (the  welfare-state  model);  ii)  they  can  give  up  control  by  relying  on  the  
expectation that absolute freedom of economic activity would automatically be conducive to the 
national prosperity (the neo-liberalist model); and iii) they can admit and creatively take advantage 
of the emergence of the GIL (the contextual control model). Among these options, this thesis 
argues for the third choice: that the nation-state can secure the minimum scope of control over the 
global investment field by using the GIL. The history of the GIL shows that both the welfare state 
and the neo-liberalist models seem to fail because both of them neglect the legal and social 
autonomies. Against this backdrop, this thesis proposes a form of contextual control by relying on 
the autonomy of the GIL: the nation-state does not directly dominate the production of the legal 
contents, whereas the nation-state creatively uses and constructs the structural elements of the 
emerging GIL. The contextual control is totally different from the neo-liberalist (no control) 
approach because the nation-state does not give up control but pursues a very active role in 
establishing the structural mechanism necessary to secure legal autonomy. In addition, this 
contextual control is different from the welfare-state model (direct control) in the sense that the 




procedures) within which the GIR actors behave. In terms of contextual control, the nation-states 
themselves voluntarily construct the structural mechanism within which they work as one of the 
participants. Nevertheless, the nation-states do not relinquish their formal position as institutional 
designers.  
Under the contextual control model, the nation-state, as one of many global actors, is 
involved in the participation mechanism which produces the normative expectations (i.e. norms). 
Such a participation mechanism allows all the relevant global actors to officially or unofficially 
graft their own interests into the legal system through investment treaty making. To take an 
example of indirect expropriation under the KORUS-FTA, the invisible pressure of the global 
economic system drives the nation-states to prescribe the indirect expropriation provisions for the 
purpose of attracting global investors. In addition, civil society can influence the negotiations and 
conclusions of the KORUS-FTA through various channels, such as the media or protests. 
Otherwise, economic actors or social activists could officially participate through the national 
procedures of the treaty making. Here, the nation-state does not give up control of the process of 
norm-creation because it can also participate in this process. To be more specific, the Korean and 
the U.S. governments, as discussed in Chapter III, drafted the provisions in accordance with their 
national interests by considering their own national legal doctrines. Through this participation 
mechanism, indirect expropriation can serve as a compromise which is reflexive both in relation to 
economic and social interests, and to the nation-states.  
Next, the independent dispute settlement mechanism has the critical role in stabilising 
normative expectations. Even if the treaty text itself transforms social interests into legal language, 
it does not eliminate the possibility of legal conflict between the host state and a foreign investor. 
For example, indirect expropriation reflects both political and economic rationality, according to the 
principle that the foreign investor’s rights shall be protected on the condition that these rights should 
not ignore the national interests in an unacceptable way. However, legal conflicts inevitably arise 
when two parties interpret the same text differently. For instance, the nation-state attempts to restrict 
foreign investment on the grounds of ‘legitimate public welfare objectives’1 which  makes  the  
relevant governmental action immune from the investment claims. However, the foreign investor 
would contend that the relevant government action is not within the conceptual scope of ‘legitimate 
public welfare objectives’. In this situation, the global investor, facing such a disappointing situation, 
could take an extreme action such as the withdrawal of the investment if the nation-state dominates 
                                               





the conflict resolution. In order to prevent this disastrous result, the nation-state consents to an 
independent dispute settlement which the global investor voluntarily respects. In the systems 
theoretic perspective, this mechanism holds the relevant actors to the original normative expectation 
despite the disappointing behaviours of other actors. To put it differently, those actors claim their 
legality before the tribunal without the withdrawal of their investment or costly government 
interference. This conflict resolution process is independent but not arbitrary because it has an 
obligation to consider all the arguments proposed by the relevant actors in the course of interpreting 
the treaty text through persuasive reasoning. Therefore, the dispute settlement mechanism can 
produce predictable rules to adjust the relevant interests of all global actors, including nation-states.  
In the case of indirect expropriation, the recent tribunal decisions have shown a tendency to 
converge on the proportionality principle to balance public and private interests. In addition, the 
crucial attractiveness of the independent dispute settlement process is that this mechanism can 
produce a consistency and predictability by sticking to the original normative expectations through 
autopoietic operations. To be more specific, the investment tribunals under this system make 
decisions by citing the previous arbitration decisions rather than other external legal sources. 
Through this mechanism, the GIL can strike down the short-term interests of the actors by securing 
the long-term benefits of all the global actors, thereby securing predictability and consistency. 
Despite  the  unpredictability  of  the  GIR,  the  GIL  can  help  each  GIR member  to  make  decisions  
based on the predictability which is supposed to secure the minimum scope of the normative 
expectations in a balanced way.  
The nation-state, like other GIR members, could also enjoy some of the benefits of global 
predictability in the unpredictable global world by relying on GIL. The nation-state does not lose all 
control over the global investment field because the legal system prevents the worst-case scenario 
in  which  the  regulatory  power  of  the  state  is  ignored  completely.  First  of  all,  the  treaty  text  can  
reflect the national interests of the regulatory power because the nation-state can participate in the 
treaty making process. In addition, the proportionality principle produced by the investment tribunal 
can protect the legitimate regulatory powers of the nation-states against the private interests in a 
balanced way. Of course, GIL does not guarantee that a nation-state can perfectly achieve a specific 
political goal; for instance, the national interest has to be negotiated with investment protection and 
other social needs. Nevertheless, the nation-state can predict the broad scope of a transnational rule, 
which is not the best but also not the worst. Actually, the nation-state cannot ignore such a benefit 
as predictability and consistency, given the unpredictability and uncontrollability of the current 




Lastly, the thesis examines several high-profile measures which can contribute to reform of 
the current GIL. In order to make contextual control effective, the global investment field needs to 
secure the autonomy of the GIL. Here, legal autonomy does not mean closure toward the external 
influences of the sub-societies. Rather, the autonomy of the legal system can be established by 
making itself equally and simultaneously open to all the competing sub-systems. In the systems 
theoretic perspective, legal autonomy could be established through structural coupling between the 
legal system and other sub-social systems. To put it differently, as long as the structural coupling is 
not firmly established in the global investment field, the GIL cannot be expected to make the 
jurisprudence of indirect expropriation reflexive to various social values. In order to assess the 
degree of the structural coupling in the global investment field, the thesis analogically employs the 
system theoretic concept of the constitution, in other words, the structural coupling between the law 
and other social systems. This analysis demonstrates that structural coupling in the current global 
investment field is not fully fledged, so the lack of structural coupling corrupts the autonomy of the 
GIL. In response to such flaws, this thesis proposes several possible projects for the Korean 
government to contribute to the establishment of structural coupling in the context of the KORUS-
FTA. Simply put, the Korean government should enhance public participation, which would make 
the normative expectations reflexive in the course of the treaty-making process. At the same time, 
the Korean government should protect the autopoietic operation of the investor-state arbitration 
which sticks to normative expectations in favour of consistency and predictability.  
II. LONG-TERM STRATEGIES OF THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT  
As  long  as  the  KORUS-FTA  is  formally  in  effect,  the  Korean  government  will  find  it  
difficult to terminate this. Such a quixotic action that the Korean opposition parties argue for could 
cause more risks than benefits.2 Although it might be difficult to empirically prove that that signing 
the FTA attracts more foreign investment, it is relatively apparent that the termination of the 
KORUS-FTA might send negative signals to potential global investors. Given that the current 
indirect expropriation is not extremely against the Korean constitutional system, it is very 
questionable  whether  the  unilateral  termination  of  the  KORUS-FTA  will  be  beneficial  to  the  
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Korean people, as long as Korea does not find an alternative model to maintain its economy 
without reliance on the global economy. 
More fundamentally, this thesis argues that Korea – not only as an investment-importing 
state but also as an investment-exporting state – can be better off when it is staying within the GIR 
by relying on GIL. Firstly, Korea as an investment-exporting state can attempt to protect its 
investment from arbitral measures of foreign countries without apparent diplomatic conflicts – 
particularly with politically strong countries such as China. While Korean investors is allowed to 
seek a legal remedy individually through investor-state arbitration according to the GIL, the Korean 
government can achieve the goal of investment protection by simply saying to the host state 
‘Follow the global rule’. In the current world, the unilateral measure of any single country including 
Korea might not work effectively for property protection of its citizens abroad. In this context, the 
Korean government can make a convincing excuse for the public need of property protection 
abroad without diplomatic conflicts with strong countries. Maybe, this GIL in a case could be more 
functional for Korean investors than when they resort to the Korean government. At the same time, 
Korea as an investment-importing country can prevent the side effect of foreign investment without 
sending extremely negative signals to the future investors of economically strong countries such as 
the U.S. or the U.K. To be specific, the Korean government can make BITs or FTAs to provide a 
promise of investment protection in order to attract more investors, whereas it can specify the terms 
of the BITs and FTAs in such a way to secure the minimum scope of regulatory power to restrict 
the investment.  
Nevertheless, the current KORUS-FTA includes potential risks, which may occur in 
unusual situations, just like a delayed action bomb explodes only under certain conditions. In this 
context, the thesis proposes the following several long-term strategies for the Korean government 
and people to modulate the possible concerns, even if Korea does not possess the capacity for short-
term strategies. 
The National Assembly, based on a social consensus, needs to amend the current Korean 
Trade Procedure Act, to proclaim the general negotiation goals of the investment treaty and to 
strengthen democratic participation in the treaty negotiation and in committees established under 
the treaty. In accordance with these negotiation goals, the Korean government should propose a 
Korean Model BIT, which includes substantive norms such as indirect expropriation and 
investment arbitration procedures. In relation to norm-making, the Korean government and people 
need to keep in mind that no government has the right to force national and global investors to 




governmental power should be respected for the essential constitutional task of the sovereign state. 
Therefore, it is not a wise option to eliminate the indirect expropriation clauses from the Model BIT. 
Instead, the government needs to initiate social discussion to specify its detailed contents through 
democratic participation by relevant social actors. For example, Korean civil society and academia 
need to discuss and clarify the concept of ‘legitimate public welfare objectives’ clearer in order to 
avoid alleged conflicts with the Korean Constitution. 
Although the Korean Trade Procedure Act and the Korean Model BIT cannot directly 
influence the KORUS-FTA, which has already been concluded, they will serve as the standards in 
discussing the indirect expropriation concerns or arbitration procedures in the KORUS-FTA Joint 
Committee with the United States. Korea is supposed to evaluate the benefits and harms cased by 
the KORUS-FTA implementation according to the Korean Trade Procedure Act. In relation to 
oversight of treaty implementation, if Korea would have its Model BIT, it could serve as a 
guideline to assess whether and how KORUS-FTA investment tribunals work appropriately in the 
light of Korean government’s intention. If the Korean government recognise intolerable harms 
relative to the treaty implementation, it can use several channels. The Korean government, in a 
Committee on Service and Investment supervised by the Joint Committee, can discuss any 
procedural or substantive issues in regards to the implementation of the KORUS-FTA. Through 
this committee, the Korean government can propose amendments of the investment arbitration 
procedures or the indirect expropriation clauses in ways to promote structural coupling. Even if the 
Korean government cannot amend the treaty text, the Korean government in the KORUS-FTA 
Joint Committee can discuss the issuance of the interpretive statement. For example, the Joint 
Committees can guide the tribunal by specifying the detailed contents of ‘legitimate public welfare 
objectives’. Of course, it may not be easy to persuade the U.S. government to accept the Korean 
proposals unless the current KORUS-FTA seriously challenges the U.S. national system. 
Nevertheless, a certain political momentum can occur to amend the KORUS-FTA, as witnessed in 
the Korean candle protests against U.S. beef exports. At least, it is necessary that he Korean 
government is prepared for unexpected opportunities to amend the KORUS-FTA with the U.S. in 
the future by establishing an elaborate set of principles and strategies for negotiation through public 
discussion.3 
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Even without any substantive amendments, the Korean government can employ various 
national measures to guide indirectly the KORUS-FTA investment tribunal in order to interpret the 
treaty in a particular manner.4 For example, the Model BIT or the governmental statement for 
clarification of the treaty terms serves as a source that the tribunal can choose to refer to in the 
context of the VCLT. Although the future KORUS-FTA tribunal would ignore such government 
states or Korean Model BITs in interpreting the KORUS-FTA text, this could serve domestically as 
a guideline for Korean officials in reducing the risk of unnecessary investment disputes when they 
establish public policies. Of course, it is imperative for the establishment of contextual coupling that 
any involvement in the treaty interpretation is made under the negotiation goals which are 
established through the appropriate participations of the relevant actors.  
III. PROSPECT OF CONTEXTUAL CONTROL 
Although the Korean solutions proposed in Chapter V ultimately aim to contribute to the 
global establishment of structural coupling, global structural coupling cannot be completely and 
firmly established by just one or two nation-states because the global investment field consists of 
individually established treaties and pluralistic institutions. More significantly, too strong a 
globalised political system, dominated by a handful of powerful states, runs the risk of distorting the 
efforts of relatively small nation-states or social activists who attempt to establish a structural 
coupling in the current global investment field.  
First of all, the current global investment field is still heavily influenced by the power games 
of the nation-states operating in the globalised political system. In this context, it is clear that the 
FTA’s political implications cannot be ignored.5 In other words, the FTA could be motivated by 
such political purposes as foreign policy or national security. For example, the U.S. government has 
pursued FTAs with small Middle Eastern countries as important foreign policy instruments for the 
Middle Eastern area.6 The reason is that such economic ties could bind counterpart states with the 
same economic interests as the U.S. Ultimately, such a strategy makes it easy to persuade the 
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relevant countries to favour the U.S. when they make political or international decisions. In this 
context,  the  U.S.  has  nothing  to  lose  from  the  KORUS-FTA  in  terms  of  its  North  East  Asian  
foreign policy. The alliance with Korea is one of the United States’ major important traditional 
alliances in North East Asia, where the U.S. faces China and North Korea. In addition, Korea, as 
one of the ten largest trading countries in the world, has an economic effect on other Asian 
countries. Therefore, strong economic ties with Korea could create room to steer the Asian political 
and economic context, even allowing the U.S. to participate in the Asian regional economic 
community.7 The same goes for small countries, especially in the context of national security; 
some Asian countries such as Taiwan have tried to establish FTAs with the U.S. and other powers 
in response to the ‘China challenges’.8 On Korea’s side, an FTA regime could create a more stable 
international relationship in East Asia, in terms of national security, by binding those major states 
together under one common economic interest and reinforcing their traditional military and political 
alliances. In this political context, the Korean government has pursued FTAs with major countries 
such as Japan and the United States for reasons of economic prosperity and stable national 
security.9  
These political impacts have negative effects on the GIL because they are likely to distort 
any structural coupling in favour of the strong powerful states. For example, the geo-political 
reason of the KORUS-FTA deters the Korean government from rejecting the 2004 U.S. Model BIT; 
as a result, even if the KORUS-FTA incorporates more Korean national legal doctrines than do the 
previous U.S. FTAs, the main contents of the treaty still could be seen as a mere update of the 2004 
U.S. Model BIT, which is based on the U.S. regulatory taking doctrine. In addition, an imbalance of 
                                               
7 Many Asian countries are interested in FTAs or other multilateral regional agreements such as the Korea-
China-Japan FTA. This could lead to another huge regional economic (or political) community such as the EU. 
Given this trend, the KORUS-FTA model is expected to influence other Asian FTA models. Further, the 
KORUS-FTA could serve as a connection to a joint Asian-Pacific regional economic (or possibly political) 
scheme. In fact, the KORUS-FTA is open to a future state party in Asia, especially China and Japan, whether 
deliberately or not. For example, KORUS-FTA Article 24.4 (1) provided the following: ‘Any country or 
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between the country or group of countries and the Parties and following approval in accordance with the 
applicable legal requirements and procedures of each Party and acceding country’. See Yong-Shik Lee, ‘The 
Beginning of Economic Integration between East Asia and North America? – Forming the Third Largest Free 
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Perspective pp.175-77; Nakryoon Choi and Hongshik Lee, A Sectorial Assessment of a Korea-US FTA and 
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negotiation powers between Korea and the U.S. might force the Korean negotiators, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, to ignore the inputs of civil society. For instance, Korean 
government officials and the governing party, facing criticism from civil society, have emphasised 
the geo-political importance of the KORUS-FTA, which is expected to strengthen the military and 
political ties with the U.S. 
Further, such unbalanced power relations in global politics run the risk of corrupting global 
projects to establish structural coupling in the global investment field. The alternative model BIT 
which some civil groups propose could serve as one of several ambitious solutions that reflect a 
variety of social interests and the interests of the investment-importing countries. Otherwise, the 
MAI could be an important founding step in establishing structural coupling in terms of the 
production of generally acceptable and reflexively normative expectations in the global investment 
field. However, it looks very unlikely that the major investment-exporting countries would 
voluntarily accept any such global projects as the alternative model BIT or MAI; the reason is that 
those major states would be reluctant to give up their model BIT in the negotiation process because 
of their own national interests. Even if a global consensus such as a MAI were to be established, its 
detailed contents would be very likely to be distorted by those major economically powerful states, 
as can be seen in the failure of previous MAI project. The same applies to the establishment of the 
unitary appeals mechanism in the global investment field, because it looks quite uncertain whether 
those major states would voluntarily bind themselves under the appellate judicial body.10 The 
strong nation-states would worsen the situation in league with the strong global economic systems. 
In fact, the global companies whose headquarters are located in the strong countries can have more 
influence on the treaty-making process that is initiated by those countries. Moreover, it is 
undeniable that the government policy makers, investment lawyers and global businessmen 
establish chemistry through invisible networking. Finally, the GIL is actually privatised unofficially 
or officially by the private economic actors with the political support from strong nation-states. The 
establishment of structural coupling is therefore destined to be extremely vulnerable to 
inappropriate external influences, as long as the political system dominates the global investment 
field and as long as the structural elements of political system are shaped by a combination of 
private economic actors and a small number of powerful states.  
In the language of systems theory, the global investment field is situated in a poorly 
differentiated world society, which is unequally differentiated into sub-societies. Ideally speaking, 
                                               




the perfect type of legal autonomy can be established only in a perfectly functionally differentiated 
world, in which every relevant sub-society has the same degree of influence on the legal system 
through structural coupling. Compared to this, some sub-societies in the current GIR tend to have 
more influence on the legal system than others because the current world society does not reach the 
ideal status of functional differentiation. As a result, such a power imbalance among the sub-
societies encroaches upon the autonomy of the legal system, as the structural coupling is easily 
distorted by those powerful sub-societies, such as the political system or the economic system. 
Along with an imbalance among the sub-societies, the inequality of power between the nation-
states within the political system deforms the global investment field in a more serious way. Such 
double distortions curb the efforts of the nation-states and the global social movement towards 
structural coupling. Precisely speaking, the combination between some part (strong nation-states) of 
the political system and the emerging global economic system suppresses the other part of the 
political system (small nation-states) and global social movements. In this context, it is fair to say 
that the current problems of the global investment field are caused not by functional differentiation 
itself but by imperfect or unbalanced functional differentiation.  
Currently, the poorly differentiated world society seems to be trapped in a dilemma between 
the perfect functional differentiation stage and the traditional territorial differentiation stage. At the 
very least, it seems impossible to turn back the clock to the traditional territorially differentiated 
world because the systems theory argues that globalisation as functional differentiation is an 
irresistible and inevitable process in the modern world.11 Even if the world society has already 
departed from the traditional world, it has not yet achieved perfect functional differentiation. 
Additionally, the current world society has still not found enough critical momentum to break 
through the current in-between situation and to make significant progress towards the more ideal 
form of functional differentiation. Here, a vicious circle is generated as the failure to gain the critical 
momentum cripples, or even deforms, the development of the functional differentiation in turn.  
Nevertheless, such a dilemma does not necessarily lead to a pessimistic view regarding 
contextual control, even if this does not guarantee a rosy picture either. If globalisation as functional 
differentiation is unstoppable, then the momentum toward more functional differentiation is 
supposed to be created dramatically and it may happen eventually even at an unexpected time and 
in an unexpected way. As the world becomes increasingly globalised and functionally differentiated, 
contextual control could become more effective. Political power and the economic system will be 
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balanced with the emergence of other sub-societies. In this context, Luhmann paid attention to the 
potentiality of social movements.12 Moreover, the major powers of the state are supposed to 
deteriorate within the political system. As Hardt and Negri have analysed, globalisation will cripple 
the traditional powerful states, such as the United States, and will hinder them from maintaining 
their political hegemony in traditional ways.13 For example, the political powers of the strong states 
often and unexpectedly seem to be threatened by even a small social group in the functionally 
differentiated globalised world, as in the Wikileaks scandal. To summarise, unstoppable functional 
differentiation will equalise the powers of nation-states within the globalised political system and 
the influences of the sub-societies in the world society. In proportion to the increase in functional 
differentiation, contextual control will be more workable in the future.  
In this situation, any steps towards a global legal system could make a meaningful 
contribution to functional differentiation by binding the strong states to global legalism. Moreover, 
those steps could generate better conditions for contextual control through structural coupling. Of 
course, the initial stage of the global legal system would be easily influenced by strong political 
states such as the United States. Nevertheless, the global legal system could evolve independently 
once the system has been launched because no strong country could maintain control over the 
globalised world permanently. Along with unstoppable functional differentiation, the global legal 
system could eventually bind the founding states back into universal normative values such as the 
rule of law. This situation is evidenced by the so-called ‘blowback’ phenomenon in U.S. foreign 
policy, in which U.S. power is boxed up in the universal or ideological values such as democracy 
and human rights that the United States initiated.14 For example, although human rights were 
initiated by the United States to manipulate many undeveloped countries, ironically this value has 
deterred the United States from taking aggressive actions in its war on terror. In a similar vein, 
Posner warns that global legalism will not necessarily guarantee that the U.S. can advance its 
national interests because the U.S may twist its own arm with the universal principles of the legal 
system.15  
A similar situation exists in the global investment field. Historically speaking, the major 
frameworks of the GIL were initiated by major investment-exporting countries such as the United 
States. Those major countries intended to protect the private investments of their own people 
                                               
12 Niklas Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (Suhrkamp, 1997) pp.847-65. 
13 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Harvard University Press, 2000). 
14 Michael Hirsh, ‘At War With Ourselves: In Kosovo, America Confronts Its Own Ideals’ (1999) 299 
Harpers. 




abroad from the governmental measures of other undeveloped countries. However, this legal 
system restricts not only the investment-importing countries but also the major investment-
exporting countries equally. For example, the investor-state arbitration, as one of the important 
elements of the early GIL, did not always protect the national interests of the strong states, as seen 
in the Metahnex case, in which a Canadian investor challenged the U.S. environmental protection 
policy. In the case of the KORUS-FTA, the U.S. government could be challenged by a Korean 
investor to the same extent that U.S. investors could challenge the Korean government. Even if the 
initial legal system was oriented towards neo-liberalist ideology, the history of the global 
investment field shows that the current systems are gradually and continuously being updating itself 
in response to the criticism of the other social activists and the investment-importing countries. 
Figuratively speaking, even if the ship is built by a ship maker, the route of the ship is decided by its 
captain once the ship has been launched. Similarly, although the GIL was initiated by the major 
states, it does not necessarily favour the founding states. Likewise, the present that the legal orders 
are heavily dominated by the private actors does not necessarily dominate the future that those will 
be tied to neo-liberalist views.16 Of course, it looks harder for the Korean investor to win in the 
arbitration against the U.S. and for the civil society to drastically change the investor-orientated 
policies at the current corrupted (in systems theory language) state of GIL. If the persuasiveness and 
legitimacy of the GIL is enhanced through democratic participation by more various global actors, 
however, the political influence on the GIL will wither away. In the end, the global public opinion 
by use of GIL could beleaguer the political hegemony of strong countries or the blind expansion of 
global investment as seen in Gramsci’s understanding of ‘the war of position’.17 In this context, the 
GIR will be controlled not only by those major states or private economic actors, but also by 
various other actors in the GIR, once it has been launched. The legal system, floating on the sea of 
the colliding sub-societies, has a tendency to follow its own evolutionary path. On this point, a 
contextual controller like a sailor can catch the opportunity to manipulate the ship of the legal 
system. Consequently, the efforts of small countries such as Korea or of global activists could 
become more effective in establishing structural coupling, as the economic system and the strong 
countries’ powers in the globalised world are balanced by other emerging sub-societies.  
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IV. TO EAT OR NOT TO EAT?  
Nevertheless, this thesis does not perversely insist on the contextual control of the nation-
state.  Actually,  a  sailor  may  not  be  able  to  perfectly  control  the  ship  because  the  ship  might  be  
stranded due to unexpected environmental changes, such as storms. Likewise, the contextual 
controller cannot guarantee the success of contextual control over the global investment field 
because contextual control is very vulnerable to unpredictable future situations. To put it differently, 
nobody can anticipate how and when the GIR will catch the momentum which will enable it to 
break through the current dilemmatic global situation, to the same extent that nobody can deny the 
possibility of such a critical momentum. Whether or not the nation-states will take contextual 
control depends entirely on the choice of the national peoples who live in the present globalised 
world. Figuratively speaking, the KORUS-FTA looks like the poisonous apple in Snow White and 
the Seven Dwarfs; if the princess did not take a bite of the apple, she would not meet the prince. 
However, the marriage with the prince does not necessarily guarantee her a happy life, and in 
taking it she loses the chance of ‘living happily ever after’ with the seven dwarfs. In any case, 
nobody should be her stepmother, a wicked Queen who tricked Snow White into eating the apple 
so as to take some risk. To the same extent, nobody has a right to forbid the princess from eating an 
apple as a chance to meet the prince. If the princess is to be considered as an awakened subject, she 
should have a fair chance to compare the risks and opportunities.  
Nevertheless, this thesis still carefully propounds the contextual control based on legal 
autopoiesis for handling the global investment issues. Of course, the establishment of structural 
coupling could be a very painstaking job because structural coupling is a very sophisticated process 
and it is easily corrupted. Additionally, contextual control needs to overcome numerous obstacles in 
the current GIR, which has several flaws in the light of structural coupling. Nonetheless, it is too 
early merely to give up an autopoietic approach because of several flaws in the approach without 
careful analysis. Consequently, this approach may require more sophisticated research on whether 
the relevant problems can be solved with a more profound and genuine understanding of the 
autopoiesis. Especially, this thesis argues that contextual control can be proposed as a convincing 
solution, given the history of the global investment field. As has been discussed above, the huge 
experiments of the welfare-state model and the neo-liberalist model in the 20th century seem to have 
failed with the emergence of the unpredictable globalised world. On the other hand, the autopoietic 
approach to the nation-state is still in the experimental phase, in the sense that the current GIL has 




Given this situation, the nation-state can consider the contextual control of systems theory as one of 
the potential experimental approaches that may be adopted in the 21st century, in which the nation-
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